Chaffee v. Chaffee

• Decision Date: 14 January 1867
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Maria Chaffee v. Amos Chaffee

15 Mich. 184

Maria Chaffee v. Amos Chaffee

Supreme Court of Michigan

January 14, 1867

November 1, 1866; November 2, 1866; November 3, 1866, Heard

Appeal in chancery from Wayne circuit.

The bill in this cause was filed by complainant for a divorce a mensa et thoro, and for alimony.

The cause was heard in the court below on the pleadings and proofs, and the bill was dismissed.

The complainant appealed.

Judgement of the court below affirmed.

Levi Bishop and G. V. N. Lothrop, for complainant.

D. C Holbrook and S. T. Douglass, for defendant.

Christiancy J. Cooley, J., Campbell, J., Martin, Ch. J. concurred.

OPINION

Christiancy J.:

The bill was filed for a divorce a mensa et thoro, and for alimony, or a reasonable support and maintenance for complainant and her daughter Lizzie, a young lady about twenty-two years of age, alleged to be an invalid, unable to support herself, and compelled by the defendant to leave her home.

The case was heard in the court below upon pleadings and proofs, and the bill being dismissed, the case comes to this court upon appeal. A preliminary objection is taken by the defendant, that the bill does not make a case warranting the relief prayed. As we are all of opinion that the case made by the bill and sustained by the proof does not warrant a decree for the divorce prayed for, the objection to the sufficiency of the bill is only important so far as relates to the question of support and maintenance. The statute--Comp. L., § 3263--provides, "In case of an application for a divorce from bed and board, although a decree for such divorce be not made, the court may make such order or decree for the support and maintenance of the wife and children, or any of them, by the husband, or out of his property, as the nature of the case may render suitable and proper." The denial of the divorce, therefore, does not of itself dispose of the case, and the court are bound to examine the evidence and consider the circumstances of the case with reference to the question whether a support and maintenance should not be ordered, notwithstanding the divorce is denied. This allowance for support and maintenance without a decree of divorce, is not a new feature found for the first time in this statute; it comes precisely within the original definition of alimony in the English law, which did not extend to cases of divorce, but was confined to cases where the wife lived separate without a divorce. See Bishop on M. and Divorce, book 5, chap. 19, §§ 350 and 351, and cases there cited.

But this allowance can only be made under this statute in case of an "application for a divorce from bed and board." This must be such an "application" as is contemplated by the statute, and that is a proper bill for a divorce. The bill should, therefore, be one which, if sustained by proof, would warrant a decree for divorce from bed and board. In this view, and this only, the sufficiency of the bill becomes important in the present case.

There are but two grounds upon which it is or can be claimed that the bill makes a case for divorce. First, cruelty to the wife; and, second, that the husband being of sufficient ability, has grossly or wantonly and cruelly refused or neglected to provide her a suitable maintenance.

The bill does not expressly charge cruelty to the wife, though it does charge "that for several years past the defendant has been exceedingly morose, irritable, captious, quarrelsome, abusive and tyrannical in his family; treating his children with great harshness, and sometimes with unnecessary violence, thus rendering his home and that of complainant exceedingly uncomfortable and unpleasant, as well for her and the family as for himself;" that during a severe and dangerous fit of sickness of their daughter Lizzie, he treated her with unkindness and harshness, and showed a determination either to turn her out of his house or to break up housekeeping, so as to deprive her of a home and its comforts. It also alleges that his temper has become so soured that he seems to hate all his children, and complainant with them; that he has frequently ordered them out of the house, and put them out by violence. (This last allegation is not claimed to apply to the wife, though from the context it might be construed.)

Now, I do not wish to be understood to say that cruelty to children might not be carried to such an extent as to constitute cruelty to the wife, especially under our statute, which does not, like the English decisions, restrict the definition to acts of personal violence to the wife, or bodily harm actually inflicted or reasonably apprehended--a definition which, like some other relics of barbarism in the English law, ignores the human soul, with all its susceptibilities of suffering tortures more intense than physical pain, and more certainly destructive of health and life. See Evans v. Evans (1 Hag. Con., 35), 4 Eng. Ec., 310, 312; Lockwood v. Lockwood (2 Curt. Ec., 281), 7 Eng. Ec., 114, 115; 1 Bishop M. and Div., §§ 715 to 733; Rice v. Rice, 6 Ind. 100. And while I fully admit that the objection to the bill in this stage of the case is not to be treated with the same favor as if made by demurrer, yet I am inclined to think the allegation of cruelty as respects the wife is not sufficient to sustain the bill on this ground. But I think this point immaterial, because the bill is clearly sufficient on the second ground, of cruelty and wantonly neglecting and refusing to provide a suitable maintenance. His ability to do this is distinctly alleged, and that he was worth from $ 75,000 to $ 100,000; that he had a comfortable residence in the city of Detroit, reasonably well furnished, where he had lived for years; it also substantially charges that defendant had, without any fault on her part, and without just cause or excuse, turned her off and refused to allow her to live with him; that he peremptorily ordered her to quit the house, and go and board elsewhere; that she did leave, in obedience to this order, taking with her such of the furniture as he permitted her to take, but, for sufficient reasons which she states, instead of going to board, that she hired a house, removed into it, etc., he remaining alone in his residence; that they have not since lived together, and that he has been requested to furnish her support, but he has wantonly and cruelly neglected and refused so to do.

It is claimed by the defense that the allegations of the bill on this point amount only to a charge that he determined to break up housekeeping, and ordered her to leave and go and board with him in some other place. I do not find anything in the bill to warrant this construction.

Having thus driven her from him, and from her house, it was his clear duty to provide for her a sufficient support and maintenance, and his neglect or refusal to do so was, under the circumstances stated in the bill, both wanton and cruel.

The bill, therefore, sets forth sufficient ground for the divorce, if sustained by the evidence.

But the evidence does not sustain the bill, especially in reference to the charge that she was driven from him or her home by his peremptory order and against her will; and that she left solely in consequence of such order. This is the main ground upon which the divorce...