Smith v. Smith, Docket No. 81910

• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan
• Citation: 447 N.W.2d 715,433 Mich. 606
• Docket Number: No. 1,Docket No. 81910,1
• Parties: Mary Carlen SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Clarke SMITH, Defendant-Appellant. ARIS KENNETH 433 Mich. 606, 447 N.W.2d 715, 58 U.S.L.W. 2344 (Calendar).
• Decision Date: 08 November 1989

Page 715

447 N.W.2d 715

Mary Carlen SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Clarke SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.

ARIS KENNETH

Docket No. 81910.

433 Mich. 606, 447 N.W.2d 715, 58 U.S.L.W. 2344

(Calendar No. 1).

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Jan. 4, 1989.

Decided Nov. 8, 1989.

Richard Radke, Jr., Grand Rapids, Joseph F. Lavey, II, Staff Atty./Advocacy Specialist, Michigan Protection & Advocacy Service, Marquette, Kluczynski, Girtz & Vogelzang by Richard Radke, Jr., Grand Rapids, for plaintiff-appellee, Mary Carlen Smith.

Shaner & Olsen, P.C. by V. Carl Shaner, Ann Arbor, for defendant-appellant.

Victor, Robbins & Bassett by Scott Bassett, Birmingham, for Amicus Curiae.

RILEY, Chief Justice.

The issue we must decide in this case is whether the Age of Majority Act ¹ effectively rendered as null and void the "exceptional circumstances" clause of M.C.L. Sec. 552.17a; M.S.A. Sec. 25.97(1). Upon dissolution of a marriage, Sec. 17a grants the court jurisdiction to require either parent to make payments for the support of each child until the age of eighteen years, and in the case of "exceptional circumstances," support payments may be required after a child "attains that age."

We find that the amendments of the child support and custody statutes enacted subsequent to the passage of the Age of Majority Act, which employ the restrictive term "minor child," evidence a legislative intent to authorize support payments for the benefit of minor children only. Further, the history of appellate court interpretation of Sec. 17a supports the conclusion that the duration of child support payments is limited by the age of majority statute. Therefore, we conclude that the exceptional-circumstances clause of Sec. 17a is a legal nullity and that support payments may not be awarded beyond the age of majority, eighteen years.

Accordingly, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in authorizing postmajority child support payments upon a finding of "exceptional circumstances." Thus, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The Washtenaw Circuit Court granted Mary Carlen Smith and Michael Clarke Smith a judgment of divorce on August 30, 1973. The parties had one child, Aimee, who suffers physical and mental deficiencies as a result of birth defects. These deficiencies have been diagnosed to be permanent.

In August of 1984, plaintiff filed a motion to increase child support and to extend support beyond Aimee's eighteenth birthday. The trial court denied the motion, holding that it lacked authority to award postmajority support. However, the Court of Appeals authorized the trial court to award postmajority support and remanded the case to determine whether Aimee's condition constituted an "exceptional circumstance." ² Defendant sought leave to appeal, which we granted on June 22, 1988. ³

II. ANALYSES

A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The child support statute upon which the issue centers is M.C.L. Sec. 552.17a; M.S.A. Sec. 25.97(1). The pertinent part of Sec. 17a provides:

"The court shall have jurisdiction in making such order or judgment relative to the minor children of such parties as authorized in this chapter to award custody of each child to 1 of the parties or a third person until each child has attained the age of 18 years and may require either parent to pay such allowance as may be deemed proper for the support of each child until each child shall have attained that age and may in case of exceptional circumstances, require payment of such allowance for any child after he attains that age."

In the event of exceptional circumstances, Michigan courts have consistently authorized support payments beyond the prescribed statutory age, but limited such support to the age of majority, which was then twenty-one years. Titus v. Titus, 311 Mich. 434, 437, 18 N.W.2d 883 (1945); Johnson v. Johnson, 346 Mich. 418, 426, 78 N.W.2d 216 (1956). ⁴ However, the subsequent We begin our analyses by looking at the first sentence of Sec. 17a which provides: "The court shall have jurisdiction in making such order or judgment relative to the minor children of such parties as authorized in this chapter...." M.C.L. Sec. 552.17a; M.S.A. Sec. 25.97(1) (emphasis added). Following this sentence, Sec. 17a uses the word "child" ⁵ five additional times. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1985) defines the term "child:"

amendment of the Age of Majority [433 MICH 612] Act, which reduced the age of majority to eighteen years, put in question the legal validity of the exceptional-circumstances provision of Sec. 17a.

"2a: a young person esp. between infancy and youth; b: a childlike or childish person; c: a person not yet of age."

Given this commonly accepted definition of "child" and the use of the words "minor children" in the first sentence of Sec. 17a, we are persuaded that the Legislature intended the word "child" in Sec. 17a to apply exclusively to minor children. ⁶

Moreover, it is important to note that at the time the Legislature enacted Sec. 17a, the age of majority in Michigan was twenty-one. Thus, absent exceptional circumstances, Sec. 17a statutorily limited support payments up to the time of a child's eighteenth birthday, three years before the age of majority. It was this Court in Johnson, supra, that interpreted the exceptional-circumstances clause to allow support payments beyond a child's eighteenth birthday, but not beyond the age of majority.

After M.C.L. Sec. 722.52; M.S.A. Sec. 25.244(52) reduced the age of majority to eighteen years, in our judgment, amendments of the child support and custody laws evidence the intention of the Legislature to leave intact the Johnson rationale.

M.C.L. Sec. 552.15; M.S.A. Sec. 25.95 governs the care, custody, and support of minor children during the pendency of an action to dissolve a marriage. Specifically, Sec. 1 of the current version of this statute, 1985 P.A. 214, ⁷ uses the term "minor children" three times; whereas, the preamendment version of Sec. 1 referred only once to "minor children," and once to "children." ⁸

Similarly, M.C.L. Sec. 552.16; M.S.A. Sec. 25.96 governs the care, custody, and support of minor children after a divorce judgment. Again, the pertinent segment of the statute, Sec. 16(1), refers only to "minor There can be no dispute that Secs. 15 through 17a of Michigan's divorce laws, M.C.L. Sec. 552.1 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 25.81 et seq., address the issue of child custody and support pursuant to a divorce action. Statutes in pari materia should be construed together. Webster v. Rotary Electric Steel Co., 321 Mich. 526, 531, 33 N.W.2d 69 (1948). Thus, Sec. 17a, by its initial reference to "minor children," coupled with Secs. 15 and 16 which refer exclusively to "minor children," evidence the intent of the Legislature to align the child support laws with the rationale that payments are to be limited by the age of majority, currently eighteen years.

children." ⁹

Consistent with the legislative intent of Secs. 15 through 17a is the 1980 amendment of the Child Custody Act. ¹⁰ 1980 P.A. 161, Sec. 1 amended Sec. 7(1) of the Child Custody Act by deleting the "exceptional circumstances" clause. Now, pursuant to Sec. 7(1), a circuit court has authority to award support payments only until a child becomes eighteen years of age. Reference to "exceptional circumstances" has been completely omitted. ¹¹

Finally, 1972 P.A. 16 amended 1968 P.A. 293 ¹² for the specific purpose of reconciling the statute with the Age of Majority Act. 1972 P.A. 16, Sec. 1 amended the definition of the term "minor" to "a person under the age of 18 years," from "a person under the age of 21 years." M.C.L. Sec. 722.1(a); M.S.A. Sec. 25.244(1)(a). The saving clause of this amendment, 1972 P.A. 16, Sec. 2, preserves all rights and duties of a person incurred prior to January 1, 1972, "[a]s if had not been passed." ¹³ 1972 P.A. 16 also amended Sec. 4(1)(b) of the emancipation statute which now provides: "(1) An emancipation occurs by operation of law: (b) When a person The amendments of the Child Custody Act and the emancipation statute exemplify how the Legislature has acted to conform the laws governing the protection and support of children with the Age of Majority Act. ¹⁶ Quoting from Kaimowitz, Legal emancipation of minors in Michigan, 19 Wayne L R 23, 24 (1972):

                reaches the age of 18 years." 14  In fact, throughout the entire emancipation statute, reference is only made to "a minor."   See M.C.L. Sec. 722.4;  M.S.A. Sec. 25.244(4). 15
                

"If a legislative body wishes, for whatever purpose, it can wave a magic wand and emancipate him [a minor] to suit its convenience. Though 21 usually is the dividing line between minority and majority, the age of majority in Michigan is now 18. The state seemingly can be as arbitrary as it pleases in raising or lowering the barrier for all or just some purposes. ¹¹

While the Legislature has the ability to "waive a magic wand," this Court is bound to interpret Sec. 17a in accordance with the intent of the Legislature . Const.1963, art. 3, Sec. 2, ¹⁷ and art. 4, Sec. 1. ¹⁸ The power to statutorily limit the duration of child support payments is within the exclusive discretion of the Legislature. Though nearly a century old, the holding of Detroit v. Wayne Co. Circuit Judge, 79 Mich. 384, 387, 44 N.W. 622 (1890), is applicable. "It is one of the necessary and fundamental rules of law that the judicial power cannot The Legislature has taken affirmative action to amend the child support laws, the Child Custody Act, and the Emancipation of Minors Act. All of the amendments evidence a legislative intent to retain the longstanding rule that support payments are to be limited by the age of majority. ¹⁹ It is the intent of the Legislature, supported by its affirmative actions, which we find persuasive. ²⁰ The contention by the dissent that we are "relying on legislative silence," p. 735, is wholly unfounded and in disregard of the...