Chafin v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.
| Citation | 93 S.E. 822,80 W.Va. 703 |
| Decision Date | 25 September 1917 |
| Docket Number | 2879. |
| Parties | CHAFIN v. NORFOLK & W. RY. CO. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Submitted September 18, 1917.
Syllabus by the Court.
Upon demurrer to evidence by defendant, if the plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to sustain his case, oral evidence of the demurrant conflicting with that of the demurree is ignored, and the demurrer overruled, unless the oral evidence of the demurrant be so clearly preponderant over that of the demurree that the verdict for the demurree would be set aside.
At common law the right of action for an injury to the person is extinguished by the death of the injured party. The purpose of the act of Congress approved April 22, 1908, c. 149, § 9 35 Stat. 66, as amended by the act of Congress approved April 5, 1910, c. 143, § 2, 36 Stat. 291 (U. S. Comp. St. 1916, § 8665), commonly known as the "Employers' Liability Law," is to give a right of action for the benefit of certain relatives, dependent upon the employé wrongfully killed, for the pecuniary loss to them resulting from his death, and also to give an employé wrongfully injured a right of action therefor, which shall survive, in case of his death, to the same beneficiaries.
The pecuniary loss recoverable, under the act of Congress known as the Employers' Liability Law, by one dependent upon the employé wrongfully killed, must be a loss which can be measured by a pecuniary standard, and does not include an inestimable loss, such as loss of society and companionship or the care and advice of a husband.
Damages under the Employers' Liability Law of Congress should be equivalent to compensation for the deprivation of the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits that would have resulted from the continued life of the deceased employé.
A given sum of money in hand is worth more than the like sum payable in the future; and, where a verdict is based upon the deprivation of future benefits, the ascertained amount of these should ordinarily be discounted so as to make the verdict equivalent to their present value.
The verdict of a jury will be set aside as excessive, in an action for damages under the Employers' Liability Law of Congress, if it appear that in ascertaining the amount the jury proceeded upon a wrong theory, or violated some rule of law governing the case, and thereby found more than the pecuniary injuries, or that the verdict is so excessive as to indicate partiality, passion, or prejudice in the minds of the jurors.
A recovery under the Employers' Liability Law of Congress must be limited to compensating those relatives for whom the administrator sues, who are shown to have sustained some pecuniary loss; and while a judgment for a claim under said law may be for a gross amount, the interest of each beneficiary must be measured by his or her individual pecuniary loss; this apportionment is for the jury to return when requested so to do.
In an action for personal injuries, where there is a demurrer to the evidence by the defendant, and there is no error in the trial in so far as it determines the liability of the defendant, but there is error in ascertaining the amount of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled in the action, the two issues are distinct and separable, and a new trial may be granted, limited to ascertaining the proper amount of damages, and, when so ascertained, judgment thereon for the plaintiff may be entered.
Error to Circuit Court, Mingo County.
Trespass on the case by Tennessee Chafin, administratrix of the estate of C. C. Chafin, against the Norfolk & Western Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed and remanded, with trial limited to a single issue.
Theodore W. Reath, of Philadelphia, Pa., and Holt, Duncan & Holt, of Huntington, for plaintiff in error.
Wiles & Bias, of Williamson, for defendant in error.
This is an action of trespass on the case, based upon the Employers' Liability Act of Congress, instituted in the circuit court of Mingo county, W. Va., by Tennessee Chafin, administratrix of the estate of C. C Chafin, deceased, against the Norfolk & Western Railway Company, to recover $50,000 damages for the death of the said C. C. Chafin, alleged to have resulted from the wrongful act of the defendant railway company.
On the 26th day of May, 1913, C. C. Chafin was a yard conductor upon the yards of the defendant company, located at Williamson, Mingo county, W. Va., and, as such conductor, was engaged on the night of that day in switching a caboose from the west end of the middle yard to the east end of the north yard. The yard engine under his control had been coupled to the caboose, and was backing over a yard track known as the "old main line," with the caboose in front, eastward, and in the direction of the east end of the north yard, where another caboose was to be picked up. Chafin and the brakeman of his crew were riding with lanterns in their hands on the front platform of the caboose, which was being shoved along the track in question, and came into collision with a loaded freight train from which the engine had been detached, and which had been left standing or stored upon this track, and Chafin was crushed between the caboose and the end of the freight train and instantly killed. It was nighttime, and the yard engine was backing at the rate of from six to eight miles per hour. Chafin was in command of his switching crew, and directed its operations. He had received orders to do switching, and no instructions had been given him by the yardmaster as to which track he should take in going from one part of the yard to the other. The old main track over which he was backing was traveled both ways, east and west, by yard engines on occasions. It was likewise used for the purpose of switching cars thereon.
Chafin left a widow surviving him, and one child en ventre sa mere, which was subsequently born, and was about 17 months old at the date of the trial. The widow, Tennessee Chafin, was appointed administratrix of his estate, and brought this suit to recover damages for the benefit of herself and child, they being the sole dependents. At the time of his death Chafin was about 26 years of age, and his wife was about the same age.
The declaration charges the four following distinct grounds of negligence against the defendant railway company: First, that the company failed to exercise reasonable care in the employment of competent officers, agents, and employés; second, that it failed to establish proper rules for the government of the yard; third, that it failed to furnish safe tracks, engines, cars, equipment, etc., in the yard where Chafin was at work; and, fourth, that it negligently permitted one of its tracks to become blocked with loaded freight cars in the nighttime, without any light or danger signal thereon, which track Chafin was under the necessity of using, and, while so using it carefully and without fault of his own, ran into the cars so blocking it, and was killed.
The defendant pleaded not guilty, upon which issue was joined, and thereupon the case was tried to a jury; and, after the evidence both for the plaintiff and the defendant had been introduced, the defendant demurred to the plaintiff's evidence, in which demurrer the plaintiff joined, and thereupon the jury returned a conditional verdict for the sum of $19,000 in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant then moved the court to set aside the verdict of the jury because it was contrary to law and the evidence, as well as contrary to the act of Congress in such cases made and provided, and because the damages were excessive.
It is certain that the death of Chafin was caused by the negligence of some one. Conceding that he had the right to use that track for the purpose he did use it the night of the accident, yet if he knew the track was liable to be blocked, and if it was his duty to provide for the safety of his train without notice from any one whether or not the track was obstructed, and he voluntarily took the risk of the track being free from obstructions and provided no sufficient means for the protection of his train, then the negligence was his. But, on the contrary, if Chafin had the right to use that track at the time for the purpose for which he used it, and it was obstructed by cars standing on it, and it was the duty of the yardmaster to notify him that the track was obstructed in time for him to provide for the safety of his train, and the yardmaster knew the track was obstructed and knew that Chafin would rely upon him for such information, and that in the absence of such notice would assume that the track was open, and that he failed to notify Chafin, then the yardmaster was at fault.
Counsel for defendant were of opinion that the evidence on this point was such that there should be judgment for the defendant, and demurred to the evidence. By the demurrer to the evidence the case was withdrawn from the jury, and the trial court was required to observe the rules established by this court, by a long line of decisions, namely, in the cases of Barrett v. Coal Co., 55 W.Va. 395, 47 S.E. 154; Mannon v. Railroad Co., 56 W.Va. 554, 49 S.E. 450; Shaver v. Edgell, 48 W.Va. 502, 37 S.E. 664; Gunn v. Railroad Co., 42 W.Va. 676, 26 S.E. 546, 36 L.R.A. 575; Kelley v. Railroad Co., 58 W.Va. 216, 52 S.E. 520, 2 L.R.A. (N. S.) 898; Robinson v. Sheets, 63 W.Va. 394, 61 S.E. 347. In Kelley v. Railroad Co., supra, the rule is fully and correctly stated as follows:
"Upon demurrer to evidence by defendant, if the plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to sustain his case, oral evidence of the demurrant conflicting with that of the demurree is ignored, and the demurrer overruled, unless the oral evidence of...
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