Chairs v. Burgess
| Decision Date | 08 March 1982 |
| Citation | 143 F.3d 1432 |
| Parties | 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1491 James Humphrey CHAIRS, Danny Wayne Oliver, Bobby Wayne Fisher, Ralph Jones, Marvin Walker Hopkins, All Persons Who Are Or Have Been Incarcerated in the Morgan County Jail Under the Custody and Control of the Sheriff of Morgan County, Alabama Since |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Andrew W. Redd, Ellen Leonard, Albert S. Butler, Ala. Dept. of Corr., Montgomery, AL, for Defendants-Appellants.
Robert M. Shipman, Huntsville, AL, William E. Shinn, Jr., Harris, Caddell & Shanks, P.C., Decatur, AL, for Plaintiffs.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
Before EDMONDSON, CARNES and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
In this jail-overcrowding case, we conclude that the district court erred in holding the State in contempt for violating an injunction. We vacate the district court's order and remand for further proceedings.
In March 1986, a consent decree (Decree) was entered by the district court for the Northern District of Alabama. 1 Under the Decree, the Alabama Department of Corrections and the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections (the State) were ordered to remove state prisoners from the Morgan County Jail within thirty days of the receipt by the State of the conviction and sentencing transcript for the transferring inmate.
On 20 February 1997, the Morgan County Sheriff and Morgan County (the County) filed a motion to enforce the Decree. At that time, the County alleged that there were thirty-two prisoners who, under the terms of the Decree, should have been already removed to state prison facilities. The motion requested that the court hold the State in contempt and impose sanctions on the State for failing to comply with the Decree. In addition, counsel for the Plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney's fees due to the repeated and costly efforts to ensure that the State comply with the Decree.
On 3 March 1997, the district court filed an order directing the State to show cause for their noncompliance at a hearing on 20 March 1997. On 18 March 1997, the State filed a response to the County's motion asserting that the State was unable to comply with the Decree due to substantial overcrowding of the state prison system. On the same day (that is, two days before the contempt hearing), the State also filed a motion to modify the Decree.
At the show cause hearing, the district court found that, contrary to the State's argument, it was possible for the State to comply with the Decree. As a result, the district court issued the following order:
[T]he Court finds and concludes that the Department has wilfully violated the Consent Decree.
In order to compel compliance with the Consent Decree, it is hereby ORDERED that the United States Marshall shall take the Commissioner or his designee[ 2] into custody and detain him/her until such time as the Department has fully complied with the terms of the Consent Decree.
Henceforth, for each day a state inmate is held in the Morgan County Jail in violation of the terms of the Consent Decree, the Department shall reimburse the Morgan County Jail at the rate of Twenty-three Dollars ($23.00). Said reimbursement shall be made by the twentieth (20th) day of the succeeding month following the violation.
Counsel for the county defendants and the plaintiffs shall have and recover from the Department a reasonable attorney's fee for all services rendered in efforts to achieve compliance with the Consent Decree since 1990. Within fifteen (15) days of the date of this Order, said counsel shall file with the court a statement of the fee requested, services rendered, hours expended, and expenses incurred in these efforts. In the absence of agreement between the parties, the matter shall be set down for hearing on motion by either counsel.
The court shall impose a fine as an additional sanction for the past and current violations of the Consent Decree. The amount of the fine shall be reserved for further hearing and determination.
The State now appeals the district court's failure to modify the Decree, the contempt finding and the imposition of the first three sanctions.
The State contends that it should not have been held in contempt for two reasons: (1) that the district court improperly declined to hear the motion to modify the Decree at the show cause hearing; and (2) that the circumstances made the finding of contempt error. We discuss each in turn.
We have said that "typically" motions to modify should be heard at the same time as the contempt proceeding. See Mercer v Mitchell, 908 F.2d 763, 768 (11th Cir.1990). This practice makes sense because commonly the defense to contempt is based on changed circumstances that would also warrant modifying the pertinent decree.
But, the circumstances that might warrant a finding of no contempt in a particular instance may not warrant a modification of a decree. For example, the pertinent new circumstances may be too temporary or aberrational. And circumstances that might warrant a court to exercise its discretion and loosen a decree by way of modification may not necessarily amount to a complete defense to contempt under the earlier unmodified decree. 4 It depends. And, we have never ruled out altogether the power of a district court, in the management of its docket, to postpone a formal hearing on a motion to modify to a time after the show cause hearing on contempt.
In this case, the motion to modify was filed two days before the show cause hearing was to be held. It was unclear at the show cause hearing that all the parties had then been served with the motion to modify. In such circumstances, the district court did not commit reversible error by declining to hear the motion to modify although the court went on to find the State to be in contempt. As a result, the questions here are whether the show cause hearing on contempt (when viewed merely as a show cause hearing on contempt) was adequate and whether the finding of contempt was justified.
"[C]ivil contempt proceeding[§ are] brought to enforce a court order that requires [a party] to act in some defined manner." Mercer, 908 F.2d at 768. A petitioner "must [first] establish by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged contemnor violated [a] court's earlier order." United States v. Roberts, 858 F.2d 698, 700 (11th Cir.1988) (citation omitted). Once this prima facie showing of a violation is made, the burden then shifts to the alleged contemnor "to produce evidence explaining his noncompliance" at a "show cause" hearing. Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Watkins, 943 F.2d 1297, 1301 (11th Cir.1991); see Mercer, 908 F.2d at 768; Roberts, 858 F.2d at 701.
At the show cause hearing, the contemnor is "allowed to show either that he did not violate the court order or that he was excused from complying." Mercer, 908 F.2d at 768. A contemnor may be excused because of an "inability" to comply with the terms of the order. See Watkins, 943 F.2d at 1301; Roberts, 858 F.2d at 701. To satisfy this burden, a contemnor must "offer proof beyond the mere assertion of an inability." Watkins, 943 F.2d at 1301. Instead, a contemnor "demonstrate[s] an inability to comply only by showing that [he has] made 'in good faith all reasonable efforts to comply.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 534, 91 S.Ct. 1580, 1583, 29 L.Ed.2d 85 (1971)); see also Roberts, 858 F.2d at 701; Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513, 1525 (11th Cir.1984) ().
On appeal, the State contends that the district court committed basically two errors. First, the State argues that the district court's limited inquiry and determination about the State's "ability to comply" was too narrow. Second, it contends that the district court improperly excluded evidence that was relevant to a determination of "ability."
In this case, the State was violating the Decree. The State said that its violation should be excused. The State claimed that its violations were the result of an inability to comply with the terms of the Decree. And to support the claim of inability, the State offered evidence of these circumstances: (1) that the state prison system's resources were entirely inadequate, that is, not enough facilities, beds and guards were available for all of the prisoners being sentenced; and (2) that the State was subject to a large number of court orders 5 requiring the removal of prisoners from county jails.
The district court, however, rejected the State's argument. In so doing, the district court appears to have limited its focus to the fact that the State transferred most of the excess prisoners out of the Morgan County Jail before the show cause hearing. 6 And, because the State actually transferred prisoners from the county jail to state prisons, the district court found the State must have had the ability to comply with the Decree. 7 Because the district court found that the State had no inability to comply with the Decree, the district court concluded the State was in contempt. We conclude that the district court's interpretation of "inability" was incorrect.
That it was not strictly impossible for the State to transfer prisoners from the Morgan County Jail when necessary is immaterial. 8 It does not prove or mean that the State was not unable to comply with the Decree. "Inability," as a defense to contempt, does not mean...
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