Chakmak v. Koss

• Decision Date: 12 January 2023
• Docket Number: 359169
• Parties: SCOTT J. CHAKMAK, as Trustee of the CHAKMAK FAMILY TRUST, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SUZANNE KOSS, individually, and SCOTT S. SAMBERG as Trustee of the JOAN S. CHAKMAK TRUST, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

SCOTT J. CHAKMAK, as Trustee of the CHAKMAK FAMILY TRUST, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SUZANNE KOSS, individually, and SCOTT S. SAMBERG as Trustee of the JOAN S. CHAKMAK TRUST, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 359169

Court of Appeals of Michigan

January 12, 2023

UNPUBLISHED

Oakland Circuit Court LC No. 2021-187327-CH

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and SERVITTO and GADOLA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants, Suzanne Koss, individually, and Scott S. Samberg, as trustee of the Joan S. Chakmak Trust, appeal as of right the trial court's order denying their motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and granting summary disposition to plaintiff, Scott J. Chakmak, as trustee of the Chakmak Family Trust, under MCR 2.116(I). We affirm.

I. FACTS

This appeal involves a dispute over the ownership of certain real property. Plaintiff and defendants are stepsiblings; plaintiff's father, Albert Chakmak, married defendants' mother, Joan Chakmak. Plaintiff, Scott Chakmak, is the trustee and beneficiary of the Chakmak Family Trust, while defendant, Scott S. Samberg, is the trustee of the Joan S. Chakmak Trust.

In 2000, Albert and Joan Chakmak purchased a home in Clarkston, Michigan (the property). In 2002, Albert and Joan established the Albert and Joan Chakmak Trust, of which Albert and Joan were the sole trustees, and executed a quitclaim deed conveying the property to the trust. The parties do not dispute that the couple gave the quitclaim deed to their attorney and advised their attorney that the deed should be recorded only if Albert and Joan died simultaneously. If the couple did not die simultaneously, the attorney was not to record the deed and the surviving spouse purportedly would receive record title to the property.

1

Albert died in 2011, leaving Joan as the surviving spouse. Thereafter, the trust was divided into two trusts, the Family Trust and the Survivor's Trust, each of which was to receive a one-half share of the assets of the Albert and Joan Chakmak Trust. After Albert's death, Joan conveyed the property by a recorded quitclaim deed to the Joan S. Chakmak Trust, of which she was the trustee. In 2018, Joan recorded an enhanced life estate deed transferring a remainder interest in the property to her daughter, defendant Koss. Joan died in 2019. The amended complaint alleges that at the time of its filing, defendant Koss resided on the property and claimed full ownership interest in the property.

Plaintiff initiated this action alleging that the Family Trust owns a one-half interest in the property and seeking to quiet title to the Family Trust's interest in the property. Plaintiff alleged that the 2002 quitclaim deed transferred the property to the Albert and Joan Chakmak Trust, which was subject to division between the Family Trust and the Survivor's Trust upon Albert's death. When Joan thereafter died, the property was subject to distribution under the trusts. Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), contending that the 2002 deed did not convey the property to the Albert and Joan Chakmak Trust because the deed was never "delivered." Plaintiff moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and MCR 2.116(I). The trial court denied defendants' motion and granted plaintiff's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I). Defendants now appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that the trial court erred by granting plaintiff summary disposition and denying defendants summary disposition. Defendants argue that, taking the allegations in the complaint as true, the record establishes that Albert and Joan did not transfer the property to the Albert and Joan Chakmak Trust because when they executed the quitclaim deed in 2002 and gave it to their attorney, they did not intend to convey the property to the trust at that time and therefore did not "deliver" the deed. We disagree.

We review de novo the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition. El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich. 152, 159; 934 N.W.2d 665 (2019). We also review de novo a trial court's decision in an action to quiet title. Beach v Lima Twp, 489 Mich. 99, 106; 802 N.W.2d 1 (2011). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the claim; summary disposition is warranted under MCR 2.116(C)(8) when the claim is so unenforceable that no factual development could justify recovery. El-Khalil, 504 Mich. at 159. When reviewing the trial court's grant or denial of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), we consider the motion based upon the pleadings alone and accept all factual allegations as true. Id. at 160. The trial court may grant summary disposition to the opposing party under MCR 2.116(I)(2) "[i]f it appears to the court that the opposing party, rather than the moving party, is entitled to judgment." See Connell v Lima Twp, 336 Mich.App. 263, 281; 970 N.W.2d 354 (2021). Under MCR 2.116(I)(1), the trial court shall enter judgment without delay "[i]f the pleadings show that a party is entitled to...