Chalasani v. Neuman

• Decision Date: 21 November 1983
• Citation: 97 A.D.2d 806,468 N.Y.S.2d 672
• Parties: Prasad CHALASANI, Appellant, v. Carl NEUMAN, d/b/a Lydia E. Hall Hospital, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 672

468 N.Y.S.2d 672

97 A.D.2d 806

Prasad CHALASANI, Appellant, v. Carl NEUMAN, d/b/a Lydia E. Hall Hospital, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

Nov. 21, 1983.

Cohn & Beck, Mineola (Ronald J. Berk, New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Morris Ehrlich, P.C., New York City (H. Johannes Galley, New York City, of counsel), for respondents.

LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae, New York City (Taylor R. Briggs and Abigail T. Reardon, New York City, of counsel), for the Medical Soc. of the State of N.Y., amicus curiae.

Before DAMIANI, J.P., and TITONE, LAZER and MANGANO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In an action, inter alia, to enjoin defendant from depriving plaintiff from staff membership and privileges at Lydia E. Hall Hospital, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (McCAFFREY, J.), dated December 23, 1982, which granted that branch of defendant's motion which sought to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Order reversed, on the law, with costs, that branch of defendant's motion which sought dismissal of the complaint denied, and complaint reinstated.

The complaint alleges that Lydia E. Hall Hospital failed to follow certain procedures included in its by-laws when it denied plaintiff reappointment to the medical staff of the hospital. Defendant, by his answer, denied, inter alia, that the hospital violated its by-laws. Defendant then moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (subd. [a], par. 7), to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Special Term granted that branch of defendant's motion which sought dismissal of the complaint on the ground that an alleged "violation of Medical Staff By-Laws of the hospital do[es] not give rise to an action against the hospital".

We disagree and hold that the complaint does sufficiently plead a cause of action to withstand the motion to dismiss.

New York State regulations provide that a hospital must have "a medical staff organized under by-laws approved by the governing body" (10 NYCRR 405.1023; see 10 NYCRR 405.1[a] ). Those regulations further require that the by-laws of a hospital shall include "[a] procedure for granting and withdrawing privileges to physicians" and "[a] mechanism for appeal of decisions regarding medical staff membership and privileges" (10 NYCRR 405.1023[i][2][iii][iv] ). To suggest that a hospital is not bound by its by-laws, which are mandated by the regulations, would reduce the by-laws to "a meaningless mouthing of words" (see Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 49 N.Y.2d 652, 662, 427 N.Y.S.2d 760, 404 N.E.2d 1302). Accordingly, the complaint does state a cause of action based on the hospital's alleged failure to follow the procedures set forth in its medical staff by-laws (cf. Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., supra; see, also, Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Assn., 395 Pa. 257, 149 A.2d 456; Gotsis v. Lorain Community Hosp., 46 Ohio App.2d 8, 345 N.E.2d 641; Nagib v. St. Therese Hosp., 41 Ill.App.3d 970, 355 N.E.2d 211; Margolin v. Morton F. Plant Hosp. Assn., 348 So.2d 57 [Fla.App.] ).

We further note that plaintiff's failure to submit a copy of the by-laws to Special Term does not preclude a finding that the complaint states a cause of action. The allegations in the complaint, liberally construed, adequately put defendant on notice as to the specific aspects of the by-laws which were alleged to be violated (cf. Underpinning & Foundation Constructors v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 46 N.Y.2d 459, 462, 414 N.Y.S.2d 298, 386 N.E.2d 1319; 219 Broadway Corp. v. Alexander's, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 506, 509, 414 N.Y.S.2d 889, 387 N.E.2d 1205; Foley v. D'Agostino, 21 A.D.2d 60, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121).

Moreover, subdivision 1 of section 2801-b of the Public Health Law does not warrant a different result. That subdivision prohibits a hospital from, inter alia, denying a physician reappointment to its staff for reasons "unrelated to standards of patient care, patient welfare, the objectives of the institution or the character or competency of the applicant". However, since subdivision 4 of section 2801-b provides that "[t]he provisions of this section shall not be deemed to impair or affect any other right or remedy", plaintiff is not relegated to challenging only determinations which may be violative under subdivision 1 of section 2801-b.

Therefore, that branch of defendant's motion which sought dismissal of the complaint should be denied and the complaint reinstated.

DAMIANI, J.P., and LAZER and MANGANO, JJ., concur.

TITONE, J., dissents and votes to affirm the order, with the following memorandum:

In my view, plaintiff cannot maintain an action for injunctive relief on the basis of a generalized claim that the defendant violated unspecified provisions of its medical staff by-laws.

At common law, a private proprietary hospital had the unfettered right to bar a physician for any or no reason (Guibor v. Manhattan Eye, Ear and Throat Hosp., 46 N.Y.2d 736, 413 N.Y.S.2d 638, 386 N.E.2d 247; Leider v. Beth Israel Hosp. Assn., 11 N.Y.2d 205, 227 N.Y.S.2d 900, 182 N.E.2d 393). That rule has been tempered by statute (Public Health Law, § 2801-b). While the legislation precludes arbitrary action, it only requires that reasons be given and that "those reasons must relate to legitimate concerns of the hospital" (Fried v. Straussman, 41 N.Y.2d 376, 380, 393 N.Y.S.2d 334, 361 N.E.2d 984). The Legislature did not intend to "[strip] the administrat[or] of a hospital * * * of discretion to make even the most basic personnel decisions" (Fried v. Straussman, supra, p. 383, 393 N.Y.S.2d 334, 361 N.E.2d 984).

Nor can I accept the notion that the staff by-laws constitute an implied contract which limits the hospital's right of termination (cf. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 465, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 443 N.E.2d 441). The complaint is barren of any citation of any provisions in the by-laws which provide for such a limitation and plaintiff failed to submit a copy of the by-laws themselves in opposition to the motion, inter alia, to dismiss. This, in and of itself, warrants an affirmance (Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 305, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86).

But there is even a more fundamental flaw in such a thesis. Injunctive relief is obtainable only by following the avenue of complaint to the Public Health Council after which the "only basis for judicial review is injunctive relief under section 2801-c" of the Public Health Law (Matter of Moss v. Albany Med. Center Hosp., 61 A.D.2d 545, 548, 403 N.Y.S.2d 568 [GREENBLOTT, J.]; see Cohoes Hosp. v. Health Dept., 48 N.Y.2d 583, 588, 424 N.Y.S.2d 110, 399 N.E.2d 1132; Guibor v. Manhattan Eye, Ear and Throat Hosp., 46 N.Y.2d 736, 413 N.Y.S.2d 638, 386 N.E.2d 247 supra; Fried v. Straussman, 41 N.Y.2d 376, 379, 393 N.Y.S.2d 334, 361 N.E.2d 984, supra ). Judicial review is then limited to "a determination whether the purported grounds [for termination] were...