Chalkley v. Tuscaloosa County Comm'n, 1070767.
Decision Date | 30 September 2009 |
Docket Number | 1070767. |
Parties | Shirley Shepard CHALKLEYv.TUSCALOOSA COUNTY COMMISSION. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
[34 So.3d 667 669]
Isaac P. Espy of Espy, Nettles, Scogin & Brantley, P.C., Tuscaloosa, for appellant.
Dennis Steverson, Tuscaloosa, for appellee.
Shirley Shepard Chalkley appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of the Tuscaloosa County Commission (“the Commission”) on her complaint seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages related to Tuscaloosa County's refusal to maintain a storm sewer that runs underneath her property. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The parties agree that, for the purposes of this appeal, the facts are undisputed. Chalkley is the owner of an interest in lot 98 of the Mallard Creek subdivision (“the subdivision”), located in an unincorporated area of Tuscaloosa County (“the County”). The plat of the subdivision was approved by the County engineer on September 28, 1987, and was filed for record on November 2, 1987. A note on the plat provided:
A 20-foot-wide drainage easement designated in the plat extends across lot 98 and also across lots 97, 99, 100, and 101. A concrete storm sewer was installed in the drainage easement by the developer of the subdivision. The storm sewer runs through a part of lot 98.
On February 24, 1993, the Commission adopted a resolution that provided, in pertinent part:
The parties agree that on the face of the resolution the Commission accepted for maintenance only those parts of the storm-
[34 So.3d 667 670]
drainage system that are located within the street rights-of-way in the subdivision.
A large sinkhole developed in Chalkley's property, which Chalkley alleges was cased by the failure of the storm drain running underneath the property. Chalkley notified the County of the problem, but it declined to investigate or to repair the damaged storm drain on the basis that the County did not accept the responsibility for maintaining the parts of the storm drain located on private property.
Chalkley subsequently sued the Commission, alleging that the failure of the storm drain created a dangerous condition on her property and asking that the trial court declare that the County was responsible for repairing the storm drain and for damage to her property. The Commission filed a motion for a summary judgment on the basis of the February 24, 1993, resolution; Chalkley opposed the motion.
Chalkley contends that the storm-drainage system was installed when the subdivision was built and that it should be viewed as a single, continuous structure for public benefit. She argues that because the storm-drainage system is one structure, the Commission, as a matter of public policy, should not be allowed to accept responsibility for parts of the system rather than the system as a whole. Chalkley contends that the law and existing precedent require this result.
Specifically, Chalkley first argues that the County is the proprietor of a “dominant tenement” in relation to the easement that runs through her property and that, therefore, the County has the duty to maintain and to repair the drainage system built on the easement. In support of this proposition, Chalkley cites Mountain Brook Estates, Inc. v. Solomon, 247 Ala. 157, 23 So.2d 1 (1945), and, specifically, a portion of that opinion in which the Court stated:
247 Ala. at 162, 23 So.2d at 4.
In Solomon, Mountain Brook Estates, Inc. (“the developer”), at one time owned all the property upon which the Mountain Brook Estates subdivision was built. The developer divided the property into lots for the purpose of building residential estates and selling them for a profit. Pursuant to this goal, the developer built a drainage ditch across the entire property and reserved an easement on each lot on which the drainage ditch was located. The developer then sold the lots, eventually selling one to David Solomon 13 years after the drainage ditch had been installed. When water from the drainage ditch backed up on Solomon's property, he filed an action for injunctive relief against the developer, contending that the drainage ditch was inadequate for draining the amount of water the area received and asking the trial court to order the developer to repair the drainage ditch.
This Court, in the course of explaining the law of easements, stated the above-quoted rule concerning the responsibility of the dominant estate of an easement. The Court went on to explain, however:
247 Ala. at 162, 23 So.2d at 4-5.
Thus Solomon itself explains why Chalkley's argument that the County holds a dominant estate that would make it responsible for maintaining and repairing the storm-drainage system fails. First, it is debatable that a “dominant estate” exists in the situation presented here. Further, there is no doubt that the easement does not exist “solely” for the benefit of the County; it clearly benefits Chalkley and every other owner of a lot in the subdivision. Consequently, the duty to maintain and repair the storm-drainage system does not fall upon the County merely because the County also benefits from the easement.
Chalkley also contends that this Court's precedent supports the idea that the County cannot accept only in part a dedication of property for public use and that, if the County accepted part of the property, it must be said to have constructively accepted the responsibility for the whole of the property. 1 In so arguing, Chalkley misreads our cases.
Chalkley is correct that the approval of the subdivision plat by the County engineer, along with the notation in the plat stating that “[a]ll easements on this
[34 So.3d 667 672]
plat are for public utilities, sanitary sewers, and storm ditches, and may be used for such purposes to serve property both within and without the subdivision,” constituted a dedication of property for public use. See, e.g. Montabano v. City of Mountain Brook, 653 So.2d 947, 949 (Ala.1995) ( ). “A ‘dedication’ is a donation or appropriation of property to the public use by the owner.” City of Fairfield v. Jemison, 283 Ala. 462, 464, 218 So.2d 273, 275 (1969).
It also is true that a grantor is limited in the types of restrictions that can be placed on a dedication of property for public use.
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