Chamberlain v. Brown

• Decision Date: 11 March 1909
• Citation: 120 N.W. 334,141 Iowa 540
• Parties: LYDIA C. CHAMBERLAIN, Appellant, v. WILLIAM L. L. BROWN AND OTHERS, Appellees
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

120 N.W. 334

141 Iowa 540

LYDIA C. CHAMBERLAIN, Appellant, v. WILLIAM L. L. BROWN AND OTHERS, Appellees

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

March 11, 1909

Appeal from Polk District Court.--HON. JAMES A. HOWE, Judge.

ACTION in equity for an injunction to restrain the defendant Brown from certain alleged misuse of leased premises and for damages. Petition dismissed, and plaintiff appeals. The material facts are stated in the petition.--Affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

Robert O. Brennan and Lewis Miles, for appellant.

Read & Read, for appellees.

OPINION

WEAVER, J.

In May 1903, and for some time prior thereto, the plaintiff and D S. Chamberlain, at that time husband and wife were the owners as tenants in common of a lot at the northeast corner of Locust and West Seventh Streets in the city of Des Moines; said lot extending eighty-eight feet on Locust and one hundred and thirty-three feet upon West Seventh. During the year mentioned the plaintiff was living temporarily at least in the city of New York, but the husband was personally engaged in business at Des Moines and appears to have had immediate oversight and management of said property. The defendant Brown being a man experienced in the hotel business, negotiations were opened between him and D. S. Chamberlain looking to the erection of a hotel building on the property above described to be leased and occupied by Brown. The discussion of the project and the settling of the details of the enterprise covered a period of several months. The plaintiff in New York was advised by her husband of the contemplated lease and the general nature of the proposed improvement, and, while but part of the correspondence between them is in evidence, she appears to have consented to the undertaking and to have left the negotiations entirely to him. In April, 1903, Chamberlain wrote his wife that the plans for building a six-story fireproof building, to be known as the Chamberlain Hotel, and to cost $ 200,000, were complete, and that to carry out the scheme it would be necessary for him to raise $ 150,000 by mortgage on the property, which instrument he inclosed with a request for her to execute and return the same, which she appears to have done. In May a preliminary written contract, by which the Chamberlains agreed to erect the building and Brown undertook to lease the same when completed on terms stated therein, was prepared in Des Moines and sent by Chamberlain to his wife, who signed and returned it. In December, following, the building being completed, a formal lease was made and delivered to Brown. This writing was also executed by plaintiff in New York City. Shortly after the lease had been made, a divorce was decreed between plaintiff and husband, and in the settlement of alimony she received a conveyance of his interest in the hotel property. On January 4, 1906, Brown complained that the rent reserved in the lease had proved to be excessive, and plaintiff, after some investigation into the business and into the justice of the complaint, made a written offer to modify the contract, which offer was duly accepted. The modification relates solely to the amount of rent and terms of its payment. This action was begun August 19, 1907. The petition sets up the original contract, the lease, and the modification thereof to which we have referred; alleges that the property was designed to be used for hotel purposes only and was leased to the defendant for such purpose and for no other, but that defendant, in violation of the terms of the agreement, and without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, had made use of the heating and lighting plant, apparatus, and machinery (which had been put in at great expense for the use of the hotel only) to supply heat and light for other buildings on adjacent property and had in other ways made use of the property for purposes not contemplated by the terms of the lease. Upon the case thus stated plaintiff asked for the recovery of damages and for an injunction permanently restraining the lessee from using the heating and lighting plant of the Chamberlain Hotel to supply heat or light to any other property.

The defendant, admitting plaintiff's title to the property subject to his lease, denies that he has in any manner or form violated the terms of his tenancy. He admits that he has from the exhaust steam of the boiler on the leased premises furnished heat to certain rooms in a building known as the Turner property facing on Seventh Street immediately north of his hotel, and further says that, in connection with the hotel leased from plaintiff, he conducts what is known as the Aberdeen Hotel or Chamberlain Annex, standing on the same block, but facing to the north, and that he has furnished and is furnishing to said annex heat, light, and hot water from the boilers and machinery in the Chamberlain. Defendant further alleges that all of his negotiations for the lease of the property owned by plaintiff were had with D. S. Chamberlain only, whom he then supposed to be the owner of the entire estate, subject only to the marital rights of the plaintiff, and that with the knowledge and consent of Chamberlain, and in anticipation of leasing the new house to be built, he acquired the Aberdeen with the purpose of operating it in connection with the Chamberlain Hotel, being advised so to do by D. S. Chamberlain, who pointed out to him that he could supply both houses with heat and light from a single plant. He further alleges that said Chamberlain acquiesced in said plans and purposes, and that in pursuance of such agreement and understanding, and at defendant's request, said Chamberlain, when putting in the heating and lighting plant, put in the connections necessary to enable the plaintiff to conduct heat, water, and electricity therefrom to said adjoining property; the extra cost and expense thus occasioned being paid by the defendant. He further denies that the use he has made of the machinery and appliances upon the leased property in furnishing heat, light, and water to the other buildings mentioned has in any manner occasioned injury to the plaintiff or to the leased property, and avers that the use to which he has put the property is such only as was contemplated by the parties in making the lease, and that plaintiff is therefore barred and estopped to maintain this action.

After hearing the evidence offered upon the issues joined, the trial court found: That the original contract and lease for the Chamberlain property was negotiated by the said D. S. Chamberlain for himself as a joint owner of the property and as the authorized agent and representative of the plaintiff; that the heating and lighting plants on the leased premises were made and constructed by said Chamberlain with a view to their use by defendant in supplying adjacent property if he should elect so to do, but not in excess of the rated capacity of said plant; and that it was upon that basis and in consideration of the building, machinery, and appliances as thus constructed that the lease was made and the rent charge fixed. It further found that from the time defendant entered into possession of the leased premises he made use of the heat, steam, and electrical appliances in supplying said additional property with the full knowledge of Chamberlain and with his consent, and that defendant was in the enjoyment of said use openly and notoriously before and at the time the lease was made, and has ever since been in such possession and use. It further found that, the plaintiff having accepted the benefits of the arrangement and agreement made between her husband and the defendant, she is estopped now to deny their binding obligation upon herself. The prayer for an injunction and other relief was therefore denied, and the appeal dismissed. From this decree the plaintiff has appealed. The proposition underlying the appellant's case is that the property was let for hotel purposes only, and that in supplying heat and light therefrom to the other property mentioned appellee has violated the terms of his lease. Whether this be so depends, of course, upon the construction to be placed upon the writing, and to that question, in the varying forms in which it is presented by counsel in argument, we now give attention.

I. The right of a lessor to restrict the use of leased property to a particular or specific purpose, if clearly expressed in the lease, is not disputed, and, if the case before us were one of this kind, its decision would involve no doubt or difficulty; but the lease we have to construe contains no express restriction or prohibition of any kind concerning the use of the premises, except such as may be found in the agreement of the lessee that he will not underlet the premises or make any changes therein and will not suffer waste or any unlawful, improper, or offensive use thereof. Indeed, there is no express statement in the lease itself to indicate that the building is constructed or intended for use as a hotel. It is true that the preliminary contract made in May, 1903, provides that Chamberlain and wife will erect a hotel on the site mentioned and supply it with certain machinery, appliances, and conveniences, and that when finished the property will be let to the appellee for a stated period on terms as contained in the lease subsequently executed. This prior contract may properly be considered among the circumstances in the light of which the lease is to be construed; but it constitutes no part of the lease itself, and, if the latter instrument when thus construed does not restrict the use of the machinery and appliances solely to the convenience and requirements of the Chamberlain Hotel, then the trial court was not in error in denying the relief demanded in the petition. It...