Chamberlain v. City of Bridgeport
| Decision Date | 17 July 1914 |
| Citation | 91 A. 380,88 Conn. 480 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | CHAMBERLAIN v. CITY OF BRIDGEPORT. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Howard J. Curtis, Judge.
Suit by John C. Chamberlain against the City of Bridgeport to restrain defendant from levying a tax. From an order sustaining a demurrer to the bill, and directing a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, judgment set aside, and cause remanded for further proceedings.
John C. Chamberlain and Thomas M. Cullinan, both of Bridgeport, for appellant. William H. Comley, Jr., of Bridgeport, for appellee.
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is the owner of upwards of 250 acres of farm land in the town of Bridgeport, most of which Is rough pasture, swamp, and woodland, and all of which lies outside the bounds of the city as they existed prior to the passage of the act consolidating the town and city of Bridgeport, and after the act within the limits of the first district (The act divided the city into two taxing districts.) It alleges that the land is without the benefit of sewers, lights, fire and police protection, and much of it is above the water supply of the city, and none of it can be benefited by the expenditures made for the second district as designated by that act, and that the benefits for which the city of Bridgeport proper, or the second district, has been bonded have not been enjoyed by this land, or the first district in which it lies, and that the bonded indebtedness of the city comprising the second district was not incurred by or for the benefit of the first district. The plaintiff further alleges that the defendant purposes raising a revenue by taxation upon this land, which it purposes expending in the second district, and prays for an injunction restraining the defendant from levying a tax upon his land for the purpose of raising money to meet any expense except for such as said land would have borne prior to consolidation and for the support and care of the public library. The defendant demurs to the complaint; its grounds are in reality two: (1) The defendant is authorized by its charter and under the law to levy such taxes; (2) the plaintiff has a complete remedy at law.
The town and city of Bridgeport prior to the consolidation act of 1889 were independent political entities, charged with independent duties and burdens. The tax levy of town and city covered different territories, and of necessity each had a different grand list and tax levy. This act (10 Sp. Laws, p. 854) transferred to the city control of the annexed territory, and imposed upon it the duties, burdens, and expenses formerly borne by the town. The city assumed the debt of the town, whose rights and property were vested in the city.
The first charter of the city of Bridgeport gave it power to levy taxes within its limits "for such purposes as it shall think proper." This identical provision is found in the several Revisions up to 1895. It was in the charter as revised in 1887 (S. L. 1887, p. 510), and existed at the time of the passage of the consolidation act. That act amended the charter by imposing upon the city the additional burden of meeting all burdens and expenses theretofore imposed by law upon the town. These several burdens were specified in section 4.
By section 7 of this act:
"Said city in legal meeting assembled shall have power to levy taxes on the polls and estate within the limits of said city for such purposes as said city is by law authorized."
The city had had the power to levy taxes for its own purposes of government, and these of necessity included without detailed specification all powers of government committed to it. This section reaffirmed that power. For all such the levy of taxes was "authorized by law." The act imposed the burdens and expenses of the town upon the city. The city meeting was thus empowered to levy taxes within the limits of the city, and these now comprised the entire town, for the governmental purposes of the city as its limits had been, which may be called the old city limits, and for the burdens and expenses theretofore imposed upon the town. Neither from its terms nor by implication can the burdens and expenses referred to in section 4 be construed to include those of the old city as distinguished from those of the town. For purposes of taxation the territory of the new city was divided into two districts; the first district comprised the entire city, the second, all the territory that lay within the limits of the city on January 1, 1889. The power of the city meeting to levy taxes was limited by the act.
Appropriations must be made for each district of the city from the revenues of that district, and taxes levied therefor upon the grand list of that district. This was effected by section 6. "All the inhabitants, and property within the limits of the first district shall be liable to taxation to defray the burdens and expenses imposed upon said city by this act, to the same extent as they would be liable if said burdens, expenses, duties, and powers had not been transferred from said town to said city," and in addition certain other expenses; "and all other burdens and expenses of said city shall be met by taxation levied upon the inhabitants and property within the limits of the second district." Moneys raised by taxation in the first district could only be used for purposes which prior to consolidation were within the corporate authority of the town. The inhabitants and property of the first district outside the bounds of the city as they existed prior to consolidation could be taxed only for purposes for which the town could be taxed prior to consolidation. These could not be taxed for purposes which were within the corporate authority of the city prior to consolidation. For purposes of taxation the inhabitants and property within the limits of the new city, and those of the city as it existed before consolidation were two independent entities.
By section 7 the grand list of the town for 1888 is made the grand list of said city for said first district, and the grand list of the city is made the grand list for the second district.
The burdens and expenses referred to in section 6 were those transferred from the town to the new city, and were the same burdens and expenses imposed upon the town by, and specifically described in, section 4.
In section 6 is also a specific provision that all other burdens and expenses of said city shall be met by taxation levied upon the inhabitants and property within the limits of the second district. These provisions clearly define the limitation upon the right of taxation as to each district.
The burdens and expenses which must be met by the second district would have been necessarily implied without particular specification from the power of the city to levy taxes contained in section 7, and from the limitation of liability of the first district to the town burdens and expenses. The reasons which led the framers of the act to make this limitation are not hidden. More of the territory of the town lay outside the city, as it was, than within it. Agricultural and waste land ought not to bear a rate of taxation identical with city property having the advantages of municipal improvements and benefits. The General Assembly were familiar with this principle of taxation and its acts not infrequently had recognized it. A part consideration of this transfer of the territory of the town to the city may well have been the provisions for exemption from the city debt and for freedom from liability to be taxed for purposes serving the city and not imposed by law upon the town.
In 1893 (11 Sp. Laws, p. 278) the General Assembly created a board of apportionment for the city of Bridgeport, and invested it with power "to levy taxes on the polls and estate within the limits of said city, for such purposes as said city is by law authorized." In this board was vested the power to levy taxes and make appropriations theretofore exercised by the city in legal meeting assembled under section 7 of the consolidation act. Its power to levy taxes was subject to certain limitations just as the action of the city meeting had been. It must make appropriations for each district from the revenues of that district, and levy the tax therefor upon the grand list of that district. This limitation upon its power was as definite as those providing that appropriations must be made for lawful purposes and in the method prescribed by law, that the expenditures of the city in any year could not exceed its revenues, and that no appropriation could be made unless funds for the same were provided by tax, or from revenues on hand, and not otherwise disposed of, or from both. The board was thus vested with power to levy taxes to meet the burdens and expenses imposed by law, including those theretofore imposed upon the town which were as they had been, and as specified in section 4.
The consolidation act was, we incline to believe, in its method of treatment a piece of constructive legislation, for we have not discovered an exactly similar treatment of this governmental problem in any jurisdiction. Its framers have had their handiwork either copied or its main features adopted in every one of the numerous acts of consolidation passed by our General Assembly since its enactment. These several acts have in many cases adopted the language of sections 4 and 6 of the Bridgeport consolidation act, or else limited the rate of taxation of the districts outlying the limits of the city. In every instance called to our attention, with a single exception, a distinction has been made between the land outside the city proper, and constituting the territory outside the city subject to town government, and that within the city limits. Agricultural and waste lands are placed upon a different basis of taxation from...
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