Chamberlain v. State

Decision Date17 June 2004
Docket NumberNo. SC02-1150.,SC02-1150.
Citation881 So.2d 1087
PartiesJohn CHAMBERLAIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Gregg S. Lerman, West Palm Beach, FL, for Appellant.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Debra Rescigno, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Chamberlain appeals his convictions and sentences of death after a jury found him guilty of three counts of first-degree murder and one count of armed robbery for participating in a 1998 West Palm Beach triple homicide.1

FACTS

Four persons — Chamberlain, Thomas Thibault, Jason Dascott, and Amanda Ingman — took part in this triple homicide. Thibault, the admitted triggerman, pled guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to death. Dascott pled guilty to second-degree murder. Ingman was not charged. Thibault, Dascott, and Ingman all testified against Chamberlain at trial. The relevant facts are as follows.

Sometime in October or November of 1998, Ingman began trying to locate Thibault, her drug supplier and "occasional pimp," to purchase some cocaine. After hearing that Ingman was looking for him, Thibault telephoned Ingman at a house on Norton Avenue in West Palm Beach, where she lived with the victims in this caseBryan Harrison, Charlotte Kenyan, and Daniel Ketchum. Harrison, who was Ingman's boyfriend, became angry at Thibault for calling Ingman. In the early morning hours of November 26, 1998, which was Thanksgiving Day, Thibault enlisted Dascott and Chamberlain to go with him to the Norton Avenue house to deliver some cocaine to Ingman and to attempt to resolve the argument with Harrison. Thibault told Chamberlain that there might be a confrontation. Although Chamberlain did not personally know anyone at the Norton Avenue house, Thibault testified that Chamberlain responded that he "had [Thibault's] back and he was down to go." Chamberlain drove Thibault and Dascott in a car belonging to Chamberlain's father. A .45 caliber handgun and ammunition belonging to Chamberlain's father were in the trunk of the car. En route, the men stopped at a gas station, where Chamberlain showed Thibault the gun. The argument between Thibault and Harrison was resolved quickly after Thibault, Chamberlain, and Dascott arrived at the Norton Avenue house. Chamberlain, Thibault, Dascott, Ingman, and Harrison then snorted cocaine together in Ingman's bedroom. At some point, Ketchum, another resident of the Norton Avenue house, entered the room and mentioned to Thibault that he had some electronic equipment to sell for cocaine. Harrison and Ingman also said they wanted more cocaine. Thereafter, Chamberlain, Thibault, Dascott, Ingman, and Harrison drove to the house of a drug dealer for more cocaine and to offer to sell Ketchum's electronic equipment. Thibault went inside alone and obtained more cocaine. Thibault testified that the supplier was not interested in buying the electronic equipment, and at that point Thibault began thinking about just "taking" the equipment.

Upon returning to the Norton Avenue house, Harrison and Ingman went inside while Thibault, Chamberlain, and Dascott remained outside and discussed robbing the residents of the house. The three then went inside. At some point, while in Ingman's bedroom, Thibault, Chamberlain, Dascott, and Ingman devised a robbery plan in which either Ingman or Dascott would persuade Ketchum to open a safe that was located in the living room. Thibault testified that Chamberlain then suggested that Thibault use the gun to announce the robbery and put Harrison and Ketchum in the bathroom because Thibault was physically the largest. Ingman, Dascott, and Chamberlain would then loot the house.

Either Ingman or Dascott persuaded Ketchum to open the safe. Thibault then ordered Ketchum and Harrison into the bathroom. Chamberlain helped move Ketchum and Harrison into the bathroom by striking Ketchum on the leg2 with a baton-like weapon, later identified as an asp.3 While Thibault held Ketchum and Harrison at gunpoint in the bathroom, Ingman, Dascott, and Chamberlain began removing electronic items such as televisions and radios from the house and putting the items in Chamberlain's car. Meanwhile in the bathroom, Ketchum rushed Thibault. Thibault shot and killed Ketchum during the ensuing struggle.

Thibault left the bathroom and told the others that he had killed Ketchum. Thibault and Ingman testified that Chamberlain then said "no more witnesses," and encouraged Thibault to kill Harrison or else they were "all going to die," and were "all going to the electric chair." Thibault also testified that he left the decision up to Ingman, who said to "go ahead and get rid of the other witnesses." Ingman and Thibault then awakened Charlotte Kenyan, who had been sleeping in a back bedroom, and placed her in the bathroom with Harrison. Thibault testified that he "emptied the gun" into Harrison and Kenyan while Chamberlain stood by his side. Chamberlain then picked up the shell casings because they had his fingerprints on them. Chamberlain and Thibault noticed that Harrison was not dead, so Chamberlain went to the car, retrieved more bullets, and reloaded the gun. Thibault again "emptied the gun" into Harrison and Kenyan.

After the killings, Chamberlain drove Ingman and Dascott to Chamberlain's parents' house. The three unloaded the car, and went into the house. Subsequently, Thibault arrived at Chamberlain's house in a taxi. Chamberlain, Thibault, and Dascott then took the stolen items to the house of Donna Garrett. Shortly thereafter, Chamberlain and Dascott separated from Thibault.

Ingman testified that she sneaked out of a window of Chamberlain's house, went to the house of Harrison's father, and told him of the murders. She returned with Harrison's father to the Norton Avenue house, where they called the police. Alerted to Chamberlain's involvement by Ingman, the police searched Chamberlain's house in the early evening of November 26 pursuant to a search warrant. Chamberlain was not present at that time. He later surrendered to the police on Sunday, November 29, 1998.

At trial, the theory of the State's case was that Chamberlain was instrumental in instigating the murders. The State specifically relied on Chamberlain's use of the asp to push the victims into the bathroom and his statement, "no more witnesses," to support its theory of Chamberlain's involvement. Chamberlain's defense was that the other participants conspired to place the blame on Chamberlain, and their motive to blame Chamberlain increased when the State offered them plea agreements. The jury found Chamberlain guilty of three counts of first-degree murder.

Chamberlain waived a penalty phase jury prior to trial. The penalty phase hearing was therefore held in front of the trial judge. In the sentencing order, the trial judge found six aggravating factors: (1) the murder was committed while Chamberlain was under the supervision of the Department of Corrections; (2) Chamberlain had prior violent felony convictions (the contemporaneous murders and robbery); (3) the murders were committed while Chamberlain was engaged in a robbery; (4) the murders were committed to avoid arrest; (5) the murders were committed for pecuniary gain; and (6) the murders were cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP). The trial judge found in mitigation that Chamberlain had the ability to form loving relationships and other factors in the defendant's past, including the fact that Chamberlain had some parental neglect and he was teased by older cousins who lived with Chamberlain's family for a while.4 The trial court gave the mitigators slight weight. Determining that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators, the trial judge sentenced Chamberlain to death for each murder.

In this appeal, Chamberlain raises eleven issues for review: (1) death qualification of the jury; (2) denial of Chamberlain's motion to disqualify the trial judge; (3) comments on Chamberlain's credibility; (4) an out-of-court identification of Chamberlain; (5) an alleged violation of the rule of sequestration; (6) use of prior consistent statements; (7) use of a demonstrative aid; (8) constitutionality of the felony-murder jury instruction; (9) sufficiency of the evidence of first-degree murder; (10) constitutionality of the murder in the course of a felony aggravator; and (11) sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding of aggravating factors and the rejection of mitigating factors. We address each of these issues, and also address whether the death penalty is proportional in this case.

GUILT PHASE
Death Qualified Jury Voir Dire

The first issue arises from Chamberlain's waiver of the penalty-phase jury. Unlike Thibault v. State, 850 So.2d 485 (Fla.2003), in which we reversed the death sentence of Chamberlain's codefendant because of the absence of an affirmative waiver of a penalty-phase jury, see id. at 487, Chamberlain does not contest the validity of the waiver itself. Rather, Chamberlain argues that because he waived his right to a penalty-phase jury before the guilt phase of the trial, the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to question the potential jurors regarding their feelings on the death penalty.

During jury selection, the jurors were informed over defense objection that although the judge alone would decide on the sentence, death was an option. The questioning permitted by the trial court was more limited than if the voir dire had been conducted to death qualify the jury to participate in both the guilt and penalty phases. The trial court then granted nine challenges for cause against jurors who stated that they would have difficulty finding a defendant guilty of first-degree murder if their verdict might lead to the death penalty.5

This Court has repeatedly held that "[t]he scope of voir dire questioning rests in the sound discretion of the court and will not be...

To continue reading

Request your trial
99 cases
  • Braddy v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • April 10, 2013
    ...motions on June 18, 2007, was timely.2. Merits We review the trial court's ruling on a motion to disqualify de novo. Chamberlain v. State, 881 So.2d 1087, 1097 (Fla.2004). “A motion to disqualify will be dismissed as legally insufficient if it fails to establish a well-grounded fear on the ......
  • Lynch v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • November 6, 2008
    ...Whether a motion to disqualify the judge is legally sufficient is a question of law we review de novo. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. State, 881 So.2d 1087 (Fla. 2004); Barnhill v. State, 834 So.2d 836, 842 (Fla.2002). Such a motion will be deemed legally insufficient if it fails to establish a ......
  • Davis v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • October 20, 2005
    ...course of a felony aggravator in the instant case because both were merged and considered as a single aggravator. See Chamberlain v. State, 881 So.2d 1087, 1106 (Fla.2004) (stating that when a homicide occurs during the of a robbery, it is improper for the trial court to find as aggravation......
  • Salazar v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • July 10, 2008
    ...the killing. An unnecessary, execution type, killing is the type of killing for which this aggravator was intended. [See Chamberlain v. State, 881 So.2d 1087 (Fla.2004).] The facts of the case, as recounted throughout this sentencing order, as well as the jury verdict interrogatory, clearly......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Witness examination: basic issues
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Florida Family Law Trial Notebook
    • April 30, 2022
    ...in the court proceedings. The rule is designed to prevent witnesses from hearing the testimony of other witnesses. Chamberlain v. State , 881 So.2d 1087 (Fla. 2004). J.R. v. State The rule of sequestration does not authorize excluding a juvenile’s parents from hearings in juvenile delinquen......
  • Other physical proof
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Florida Family Law Trial Notebook
    • April 30, 2022
    ...determination of whether to allow the use of demonstrative aid is a matter within the trial court’s discretion. Chamberlain v. State , 881 So.2d 1087 (Fla. 2004). Valdes v. Valdes Summary should not have been admitted into evidence because it violated the trial court’s earlier decree that o......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT