Chamberlin v. Thorne
Decision Date | 10 April 1937 |
Docket Number | 33319. |
Citation | 145 Kan. 663,66 P.2d 571 |
Parties | CHAMBERLIN et al. v. THORNE et al. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Questioning of validity of decree of adoption in any proceeding other than a direct appeal or petition to set aside the adoption is a "collateral attack," as regards question of sufficiency of evidence.
Suit to establish title to property of deceased, for an accounting and to cancel certain deeds on ground that decree of adoption was invalid constituted a "collateral attack," as regards question of sufficiency of adoption proceedings.
Decree of adoption has benefit of presumption of jurisdiction which attaches to judgments of courts of general jurisdiction since probate courts, as to orders of adoption, are courts of general jurisdiction.
Mere silence of record as to existence of facts essential to jurisdiction of probate court in adoption proceedings is not sufficient to defeat judgment of adoption on collateral attack.
Record of probate court need not set forth all evidence introduced in adoption proceeding (Gen.St.1935, 38-105, 38-107; Rev St.1923, 38--106).
Where record in adoption proceeding did not purport to set forth all evidence introduced, presumption existed in favor of validity of order of adoption (Gen.St.1935, 38-105, 38-107; Rev.St.1923, 38--106).
On collateral attack, necessary presence, proper residence and consent of parties would be presumed in support of judgment of adoption, where contrary did not appear front record (Gen.St.1935, 38-105, 38-106, 38-107; Rev.St. 38--106).
Petition to establish title to property of deceased and for other relief attempting to set aside judgment of adoption on ground that proceedings were void because court lacked jurisdiction held demurrable.
1. The questioning of the validity of a decree of adoption in any proceeding other than a direct appeal or a petition to set aside the adoption is a collateral attack.
2. A probate court, in this state, relative to an order of adoption, is a court of general jurisdiction; the failure of the record to show affirmatively the existence of facts essential to jurisdiction is not sufficient to defeat the judgment upon a collateral attack; where the record is merely silent, the presumption is that the necessary jurisdictional facts existed.
3. The statutes of this state do not require that the record of a probate court should set forth all the evidence introduced in an adoption proceeding; the record in the instant case did not purport to do so and the presumption is in favor of the validity of the order of adoption and not against it.
4. The petition in a collateral action brought to establish title to property of a deceased person, and for other relief, by attempting to set aside a judgment of adoption on the ground the proceedings were void because of the court's lack of jurisdiction, examined and held, the demurrer thereto was properly sustained.
Appeal from District Court, Johnson County; Garfield A. Roberds Judge.
Action by Tunis D. Chamberlin and others against Robert L. Thorne and others. From an adverse judgment, plaintiffs appeal.
Charles W. Gorsuch and John L. Kirkpatrick, both of Olathe, for appellants.
S. D Scott and Howard E. Payne, both of Olathe, for appellees.
This action was brought by collateral heirs against Robert L. Thorne, an adopted son, H. M. Beckett, administrator of the estate of Ada C. Thorne, deceased, and H. M. Beckett, trustee. Four causes of action were pleaded for the respective purposes of establishing title to property of the deceased, for an accounting, to cancel certain deeds held by the trustee and for the ejectment of defendants from property owned by the deceased. Against the petition defendants lodged a demurrer. The demurrer was on four grounds. The third ground was the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. On that ground the demurrer was sustained and that ruling is the sole basis of this appeal.
The real question is the sufficiency of the adoption proceedings as against this collateral attack. We shall first narrate the substance of a few general facts disclosed by the petition:
Plaintiffs below, appellants here, are a brother, a sister and nephew of the deceased, Ada C. Thorne, who died intestate. Deceased had no direct heirs unless it be the defendant, Robert L. Thorne, the validity of whose adoption is challenged in this action. Robert L. Thorne was the child of Blanche Parson, a single woman. The adoptive parents, John R. Thorne and Ada C. Thorne, residents of Johnson county, Kan., acquired custody of the child when it was two weeks old, and about a quarter of a century before this action was commenced. The adoptive father died in the year 1931. The adoptive mother died in August of 1935. This action challenging the validity of the adoption was filed in December of 1935.
Parts of the petition are not quoted in the abstract before us but appear in abstracted form. We are, therefore, obliged to set forth those abstracted portions as presented to us. The portions of the petition challenging the adoption proceedings are as follows:
The deed of adoption attached to the petition reads:
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Wilcox v. Fisher
... ... Such proceedings are judicial ... in their nature, and are unassailable by collateral ... See, ... also, Chamberlin v. Thorne, 145 Kan. 663, 66 P.2d ... Consequently, ... consideration of this case must proceed upon the [163 Kan ... 78] conclusion that ... ...
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Jones v. Jones
...adoption in any proceeding other than a direct appeal or a petition to set aside the adoption is a collateral attack. (Chamberlin v. Thorne, 145 Kan. 663, 66 P.2d 571.) Where an adoption decree is given a standing of the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction, the lack of jurisdiction ......
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In re Estate of Moore
... ... procedural steps having been taken does not require a ... striking down of the judgment or order. See Chamberlin v ... Thorne, 145 Kan. 663, 66 P.2d 571. In the above opinion ... 'A ... probate court, in this state, relative to an order of ... ...
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