Fischer v. Kipp

• Decision Date: 11 December 1954
• Docket Number: No. 39521,39521
• Citation: 177 Kan. 196,277 P.2d 598
• Parties: Charles M. FISCHER, Appellee, v. Alyce KIPP and Gertrude Kipp, also known as Peggy Kipp, Appellants.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 598

277 P.2d 598

177 Kan. 196

Charles M. FISCHER, Appellee, v. Alyce KIPP and Gertrude Kipp, also known as Peggy Kipp, Appellants.

No. 39521.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Dec. 11, 1954.

Syllabus by the Court

In an action upon three judgments rendered in a sister state by a court of record, having original jurisdiction in the civil cases in which such judgments were rendered, the defendants demurred to plaintiff's evidence and stool upon their demurrer with the result judgment was rendered on the foreign judgments. On appeal from the trial court's judgment the record is examined and, under the conditions and circumstances set forth at length in the opinion, it is held:

1. That the court rendering the judgments sued on is to be regarded as a court of general jurisdiction.

2. That such judgments were entitled to full faith and credit and when duly authenticated copies thereof were introduced in evidence they were before the trial court with all the presumptions ordinarily accorded to judgments of courts of general jurisdiction and made out a prima facie case which, absent any evidence on the part of the defendants, entitled the plaintiff to judgment.

3. That the trial court did not err in overruling the demurrer to the evidence or in rendering judgment against the defendants.

Horace A. Santry, Salina, argued the cause, and John I. Young, Salina, was with him on the briefs for appellants.

George D. Miner, Ellsworth, argued the cause, and Paul L. Aylward, Ellsworth, was with him on the briefs for appellee.

PARKER, Justice.

This was an action upon three judgments rendered by the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, State of California, against the defendants, Alyce Kipp and Gertrude Kipp, upon which a new judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff by the district court of Ellsworth County, from which the defendants appeal.

The action was commenced in the district court by the filing of a petition containing three causes of action. The sufficiency of this pleading is not challenged and for present purposes it suffices to say each cause of action therein set forth, to which an authenticated copy of the particular judgment involved was attached, contains allegations sufficient to warrant the granting of the relief therein prayed for.

Defendants appeared in the action. Following this appearance they filed a second amended answer in which they denied generally all allegations of the petition and specifically denied the judgments sued on were entitled to full faith and credit. Other matters pleaded in the answer, subsequently denied by a reply, are not involved and need not be detailed.

With issues joined as heretofore indicated the cause came on for trial by the Court. Plaintiff then submitted his cause on evidence consisting of the pleadings, the files of the case and, over defendants' objections, authenticated copies of each of the involved judgments. Thereupon defendants demurred to plaintiff's evidence. At the same time they announced they would offer no evidence and stand upon their demurrer. Following this action the Court took the case under advisement. Later it overruled the demurrer, found that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment against the defendants upon the authenticated copies of the judgments sued on, specified the amounts due on each such judgment, and then rendered judgment against defendants in accord with its findings. After rendition of this judgment defendants filed a motion for new trial. When it was overruled they appealed from that ruling; from the ruling on their demurrer to the evidence; and from the judgment.

At the outset the issues will be simplified by stating that appellants recognize the general rule of universal application, long since established by this court, see French v. Pease, 10 Kan. 51, and courts of other jurisdictions, see, e.g., 31 Am.Jur., Judgments, 141, § 533, that a properly authenticated judgment rendered by a court of one state is under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution Article 4, Section 1, entitled in the courts of another state to the force, the effect, and the full faith and credit, it has by law in the courts of the state where the judgment was rendered. Moreover, with the view of further simplifying the issues it may be stated appellants concede the judgments relied on in the instant action were authenticated in the manner required by existing statutes, both Federal, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738, and State, G.S.1949, 60-2853.

Upon careful analysis of the record it can be stated in a general way that the essence of the over-all, and for that matter the paramount, question raised by appellants relates to the degree of proof required to sustain appellee's causes of action on the judgments sued on. Specifically, although they concede the rule to be that a judgment rendered by a sister state court of general jurisdiction is presumed to be valid and the introduction of its judgment in evidence in a court of this state makes out a prima facie case, their position on this point is (1) that the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, State of California, is a court of inferior jurisdiction and (2) that judgments of courts of inferior jurisdiction are not entitled to the presumptions accorded courts of general jurisdiction, hence the trial court erred in overruling their demurrer and rendering judgment against them on the basis of the evidence presented by appellee.

In view of what has been stated and is to be presently related we are not disposed to here attempt to discuss or distinguish the myriad decisions dealing with the presumptions to be given judgments entitled to full faith and credit. However, in passing we desire to point out we are inclined to the view that under our own decisions, see, e.g., French v. Pease, supra; Dickson v. Patterson, 106 Kan. 794, 189 P. 912; Denton v. Miller, 110 Kan. 292, 203 P. 693; Poorman v. Carlton, 122 Kan. 762, 253 P. 424; Chamberlin v. Thorne, 145 Kan. 663, 66 P.2d 571; In re Estate of Moore, 163 Kan. 147, 159, 181 P.2d 299; Anderson-Prichard Oil Corp. v. Unknown Successors, etc., Okla. Royalty Corp., 167 Kan. 432, 207 P.2d 417, as well as other well recognized authorities, see 31 Am.Jur., Judgments, 86, 172, §§ 424, 425, 571; 50 C.J.S., Judgments, §§ 884, 893, pp. 463, 500 to 502, Incl., the rule recognizing the presumptions on which appellants rely is not limited solely to courts of general jurisdiction but extends to and includes judgments of all courts of record. Be that as it may the question now under consideration can and will be disposed of on appellants' factual contention relating to the status and/or rank of the foreign courts rendering the involved judgments.

Mindful of the mandate of our statute, G.S.1949, 60-2878, relating to judicial notice of foreign laws and providing courts shall take judicial notice of the common law and statutes of every state, territory and other jurisdiction of the United States, also the rule, 50 C.J.S., Judgments, § 869, p. 444; 31 Am.Jur., Judgments, 144, § 534, that in an action on a foreign judgment its validity and finality are to be tested by the law of the jurisdiction where such judgment was rendered, we have little difficulty in concluding appellants' contention the Municipal Court of Los Angeles is not a court of general jurisdiction cannot be upheld.

Article 6, Section 12 of the Constitution of California provides:

'The Supreme Court, the district courts of appeal, the superior courts, the municipal courts, and such other courts as the Legislature shall prescribe, shall be courts of record.'

Statutes of California 1951, Chapter 861, page 2370, now appearing as Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, reads:

'I. Municipal courts shall have original jurisdiction of civil cases and proceedings as follows:

'(a) In all cases at law in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to three thousand dollars ($3,000) or less, except cases which involve the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll or municipal fine.'

In the early case of Hahn v. Kelly, 34 Cal. 391, 94 Am.Dec. 742, the supreme court of California, in a general discussion of the subject now under consideration, said:

'* * * The use of the words 'superior' and 'inferior,' or 'limited' and 'general,' and 'proceeding according to the course of the common law,' in the statement of the rule in question, however apt they may have once been, are less so at this time and place, and their duties, in view of our system and mode of procedure, would be better performed by the terms 'Courts of record' and 'Courts and tribunals not of record.' If anything further is added, the phrase 'proceeding according to the course of the statute which regulates proceedings in civil cases' should be employed instead of the phrase under consideration, for ...