Chambers County Com'rs v. Walker

• Decision Date: 28 September 1984
• Citation: 459 So.2d 861
• Parties: CHAMBERS COUNTY COMMISSIONERS v. Jon Tracy WALKER, et al. 83-508.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 861

459 So.2d 861

CHAMBERS COUNTY COMMISSIONERS v. Jon Tracy WALKER, et al.

83-508.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Sept. 28, 1984.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing

Oct. 26, 1984.

Robert M. Girardeau of Huie, Fernambucq & Stewart, Birmingham, for appellant.

W.F. Horsley of Samford, Denson, Horsley, Pettey, Martin & Barrett, Opelika, for appellees.

BEATTY, Justice.

Defendants-intervenors, the Chambers County Commissioners (Commissioners), appeal from the grant of plaintiffs' motion for relief from judgment and the court's dismissal of the first lawsuit arising out of an automobile accident. We reverse and remand.

On February 2, 1979, automobiles driven by Jon Tracy Walker and Steve Lamar Green were involved in a collision around 10:00 p.m. on Chambers County Road 87, near Fairfax, Alabama. Jon Tracy Walker suffered severe injuries in the accident. Both drivers were minors at the time.

On February 4, 1980, Jon Tracy Walker, suing through his, parents Johnny M. and Barbara L. Walker, and joined by his parents suing individually, brought an action against defendants Steve Lamar Green and his father, William T. Green. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged negligent and wanton conduct on the part of Steve Lamar Green; however, they did not state a cause of action against William T. Green, although plaintiffs alleged he was the "owner of the vehicle operated by Steve Lamar Green" and demanded "judgment against the Defendants."

Several events and transactions concerning this first lawsuit occurred on March 28, 1980: plaintiffs' counsel was appointed guardian ad litem for Jon Tracy Walker; a settlement agreement was reached between the parties; and a release in full was executed. After a pro ami hearing, a judgment based on the settlement agreement was also entered on March 28 in favor of the plaintiffs in the amount of $17,331. The record indicates that this amount was paid into court on March 28, 1980, and disbursed on April 16, 1980, in two separate checks: one paid to Johnny Walker and Barbara Lynn Walker in the amount of $7,331, and one paid to Barbara Lynn Walker in the amount of $10,000.

In a second action filed December 18, 1981, against the Commissioners, plaintiffs alleged negligence and wantonness in the county's construction, operation, and maintenance of the intersection near where the automobile accident sub judice occurred. The Commissioners moved for summary judgment in this second action, citing as grounds satisfaction of the prior judgment and the release in full executed by plaintiffs.

Later, on March 28, 1983, pursuant to Rules 54(b) and 60(b)(6), A.R.Civ.P., plaintiffs filed a motion for relief from or revision of the judgment entered in the first action exactly three years earlier on March 28, 1980. Thereafter, on May 11, 1983, the trial court permitted the Commissioners to intervene in the plaintiffs' motion, and, on June 20, 1983, consolidated the first action and the second action for all pre-trial proceedings only.

Following a hearing on September 26, 1983, during which evidence and arguments were presented on both the Commissioners' motion for summary judgment in the second action and plaintiffs' motion for relief from or revision of the judgment in the first action, the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion by the following order entered January 24, 1984:

"ORDER GRANTING RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING CASE

"On March 28, 1983, plaintiffs filed their Motion for Relief from Judgment. On September 26, 1983, the Court heard the evidence and oral arguments of the attorneys. The Court has considered the evidence, arguments of the attorneys "It is, therefore, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

and the Briefs filed by the attorneys. The Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that the plaintiffs are entitled to relief from the Judgment entered in this case on March 28, 1980.

"1. The Judgment entered in this case on March 28, 1980, is hereby vacated, set aside, and annulled;

"2. The purported satisfaction of the Judgment of March 28, 1980, is hereby vacated, set aside, and annulled;

"3. This case is hereby dismissed without prejudice."

From this, we may assume that the trial court also entered an order denying the Commissioners' summary judgment motion, although an order to that effect is not contained in the record on appeal. Nevertheless, it is from the grant of plaintiffs' motion that the Commissioners appeal. ¹

The first argument advanced by the Commissioners is that the trial court granted to the plaintiffs Rule 60(b)(6) relief, and, in so doing, abused its discretion, because the grounds set forth by plaintiffs fall not under Rule 60(b)(6) but under Rule 60(b)(1), which carries with it a four-month time limitation. Rule 60(b), in pertinent part, is set forth below:

"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect ... or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than four months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken...."

In their motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(6), plaintiffs alleged the following grounds:

"2. Plaintiff's attorney ... informed Plaintiff that judgment in the above styled action would not prevent an action against Chambers County or the Chambers County Commission.

"3. That plaintiff, his attorney, the attorney for Defendants, and the Judge presiding over said proceedings, engaged in a discussion whereby Plaintiff was assured that he could proceed in this cause with an action against Chambers County and the Chambers County Commission arising out of the same facts as the instant action.

"4. None of the parties involved in the above styled case intended or perceived that a judgment in the same would bar an action against Chambers County or the Chambers County Commission.

"5. All Plaintiffs in the above styled action were advised and informed that a judgment in said case would not preclude an action against Chambers County and Chambers County Commission or they would not have consented to judgment in this cause.

"6. Plaintiff Jon T. Walker suffered injuries and damages that result in the accident giving rise to this suit so that to make it obvious that the sum received in this particular action to be full compensation for all injuries received by Plaintiff and Plaintiffs request leave of court to present evidence at a hearing in this cause [sic].

"7. Jon T. Walker was, at the time of the Court's order, a minor who was suffering from numerous disabilities and his right to a suit against Chambers County and Chambers County Commission were not adequately protected."

We agree with the Commissioners in their contention that the grounds set forth "Q. --by Order of Judge Avary on March 28th you were appointed Jon Tracy Walker's guardian ad litem.

above, under Rule 60(b), except paragraph number six, amount to a claim of mistake and/or inadvertence on the part of plaintiffs' counsel as to the effect the settlement, release, and judgment in the first action would have on any subsequent suit plaintiffs sought to maintain against the Commissioners. Therefore, if plaintiffs' right of action against the Commissioners was not "adequately protected," it was due to the mistake and/or inadvertence of plaintiffs' counsel. Indeed, plaintiffs' counsel ² as much as admitted this in response to questions asked by counsel for the Commissioners at the September 26, 1983, hearing on the motions:

"A. O.K. Then I just didn't recall. I don't have any question about that but that was not the sole basis of my representation of him was the guardian ad litem.

"Q. But one of the factors of your representation was in the capacity as guardian ad litem?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. And, as guardian ad litem you looked out for the interests of the person whom you're representing?

"A. Yeah.

"Q. And that person, according to the Order, is Jon Tracy Walker.

"A. That's correct.

"Q. All right. Have you read the case of Williams vs. Woodman?

"A. I'm afraid so.

"Q. And had you been aware of that line of cases which Williams vs. Woodman is based upon, you would not have gone through with this pro ami, would you?

"A. No, sir. I would have withdrawn and immediately had additional counsel brought in."

The case of Williams v. Woodman, 424 So.2d 611 (Ala.1982), referred to in the above quote by counsel for the Commissioners, held:

" 'The discharge or satisfaction of a judgment against one of several persons each of whom is liable for a tort, breach of contract, or other breach of duty, discharges each of the others from liability therefor.' Restatement of Judgments § 95 (1942). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886 (1979)." 424 So.2d at 613.

Furthermore, in addressing the grounds set forth in number six of plaintiffs' Rule 60(b)(6) motion, which seems to allege that plaintiffs received insufficient damages, we note that Woodman, supra, also makes it clear that the prior judgment operated as a bar to any subsequent action plaintiffs sought to maintain against the Commissioners, even if, as plaintiffs allege, "full compensation" was not received in the first action:

"Where a judgment against a defendant liable for the entire harm is satisfied, that extinguishes the obligation of another wrongdoer, and 'the fact that the plaintiff recovered only part of the damages to which he was entitled is immaterial.' 2 Freeman on Judgments § 578, p. 1225." 424 So.2d at 614.

The categories for relief under Rule 60(b) are mutually exclusive, and grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(1) cannot be valid grounds under Rule 60(b)(6), in the absence of aggravating circumstances sufficient to permit the trial court to say that the case is properly within 60(b)(6)--(...