Cooper By and Through Cooper v. Aplin

• Citation: 523 So.2d 339
• Parties: Mark J. COOPER, non compos mentis, who sues By and Through his father and next friend, William V. COOPER v. Vester APLIN, et al. 86-1100.
• Decision Date: 26 February 1988
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Page 339

523 So.2d 339

3 A.L.R.5th 1108

Mark J. COOPER, non compos mentis, who sues By and Through his father and next friend, William V. COOPER v. Vester APLIN, et al.

86-1100.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Feb. 26, 1988.

Rehearing Denied April 15, 1988.

Jim L. DeBardelaben of McPhillips, DeBardelaben & Hawthorne, Montgomery, and Joe W. Adams, Ozark, for appellant.

M. Ashley McKathan of Powell, Powell & McKathan, and Vreeland G. Johnson, Andalusia, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

The Issue: Whether the plaintiff, who has recovered and obtained satisfaction of a judgment against his insurer for less than the policy limits under the uninsured motorist provisions of an insurance policy, is foreclosed from suing several alleged joint tort-feasors, one of whom was the uninsured motorist referenced in the former suit.

The Facts: Mark Cooper, through his father William Cooper, as next friend ("plaintiff"), sued Vester Aplin (the uninsured motorist), Sam Cooper, Glendora Cooper, and Scott Cooper ("defendants"), alleging negligence on their part. Each defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the accident made the basis of the suit had been litigated in a previous case. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion and entered a judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff appeals.

Following a motor vehicle accident in 1974, Mark Cooper filed suit through his next friend, his mother, against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"), under two of his father's uninsured motorist insurance coverages. In his complaint, he alleged, in part, the following:

"1. On the 16th day of September, 1974, the plaintiff was riding a motorcycle on the public highway, county road 7 in Covington County, Alabama, and was involved in a collision with a vehicle negligently driven by one Vester Aplin. Mr. Aplin had no insurance on his vehicle.

"2. William V. Cooper, father of the plaintiff, had an insurance policy no. 2187 304 01B, with the defendant company which was in effect at the time of the accident described in paragraph 1. One of the provisions contained in the policy was what is commonly referred to as uninsured motorist coverage. The policy covered the plaintiff. Under the terms of the uninsured motorist provision, the defendant company agreed to pay all sums which the plaintiff would be legally entitled to recover as damages from an owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.

"3. As a result of the negligence of Vester Aplin, described in paragraph 1 above, the plaintiff, Mark Cooper, was caused to suffer the following injuries...."

State Farm answered the complaint by specifically controverting the negligence of Aplin. The court heard the evidence and entered the following judgment:

"The plaintiff, with the consent of the defendant, withdraws his demand for trial by jury; and the parties agree for the court to hear the evidence and determine the cause. The court hears the evidence, finds for the plaintiff and assesses his damages at $1,500.00."

No appeal was taken from this order; and the record reflects that the judgment as entered was fully paid and satisfied.

More than ten years later, the plaintiff filed the instant action, based on the facts of the 1974 accident. The plaintiff, in this action, did not seek to reopen, vacate, set aside, or annul the prior litigation with State Farm, but seeks to recover against the alleged joint tort-feasors.

The Decision: We note at the outset that the plaintiff has devoted his entire brief to the proposition that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are not applicable to the facts of this case, the parties in the two subject suits not being the same. While we agree with this abstract proposition and with each of the cited authorities, the trial court's order granting summary judgment is properly based on an entirely different and well-established legal doctrine:

"It is well settled in Alabama that while a party is entitled to full compensation for his injuries, there can be only one satisfaction therefor. Williams v. Colquett, 272 Ala. 577, 133 So.2d 364 (1961). If a plaintiff recovers judgment against one joint tortfeasor and obtains satisfaction of that judgment, this operates as a discharge of the other joint tortfeasor. Id.; Huey v. Dykes, 203 Ala. 231, 82 So. 481 (1919)."

Maddox v. Druid City Hospital Board, 357 So.2d 974, 975 (Ala.1978).

The plaintiff's 1975 judgment having been satisfied, the defendants, as purported tort-feasors jointly with Vester Aplin, are discharged. See Chambers County Commissioners v. Walker, 459 So.2d 861 (Ala.1984).

The plaintiff argues that the Maddox rule has no application because neither Vester Aplin (the uninsured motorist) nor any of the Coopers was a party to the original suit. This argument ignores the fact that the 1975 contract action on the uninsured motorist provision was based on the negligence of Vester Aplin. As stated in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Griffin, 51 Ala.App. 426, 431, 286 So.2d 302, 306 (1973) "In a direct action by the insured against the insurer, the insured has the burden of proving in this regard that the other motorist was uninsured, legally liable for damage to the insured, and the amount of this liability. Note that the insurer would have available, in addition to policy defenses, the substantive defenses that would have been available to the uninsured motorist." (Emphasis supplied.)

Likewise, as observed in Olive v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 456 So.2d 310, 312 (Ala.Civ.App.1984):

"No matter how it is turned, when the insurance company is sued upon its policy[,] which provides that it does not pay unless the uninsured motorist is liable to plaintiff, the responsibility of the uninsured must be established."

Thus, the 1975 suit was based on Aplin's negligence, and the plaintiff has been paid the damages adjudicated to have arisen from that negligence.

In so holding, we are not to be understood as saying that the payment by an insurer of uninsured motorist benefits, either by way of settlement or judgment, necessarily precludes, in every situation, a subsequent claim against the tort-feasor for the same injury. Whether the payment of the policy's maximum coverage, but less than the full damages, bars a further claim against the tort-feasor is a question not here presented, and each such case will be considered and determined on its own facts. See Van Dyne v. McCarty, 166 Cal.App.3d 817, 212 Cal.Rptr. 571 (1985); Thompson v. Milam, 115 Ga.App. 396, 154 S.E.2d 721 (1967); Peoples Bank of La Grange v. Georgia Bank & Trust Co., 126 Ga.App. 768, 191 S.E.2d 876 (1972); Senn v. J.S. Weeks & Co., 255 S.C. 585, 180 S.E.2d 336 (1971). See, also, Batchelor v. Brye, 421 So.2d 1267 (Ala.Civ.App.1982).

AFFIRMED.

JONES, ALMON, SHORES, ADAMS, HOUSTON and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.

TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX and BEATTY, JJ., dissent.

MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).

I agree that the majority has correctly stated the primary issue in this case, ¹ as follows: "Whether the plaintiff, who has recovered and obtained satisfaction of a judgment against his insurer for less than the policy limits under the uninsured motorist provisions of an insurance policy, is foreclosed from suing several alleged joint tort-feasors, one of whom was the uninsured motorist referenced in the former suit."

The majority answers that question in the affirmative. I would answer it in the negative, because of the following reasons: 1) the provisions of Alabama's uninsured motorist statute are not for the benefit of the uninsured driver, 2) the insurer does not stand in the shoes of the tort-feasor, 3) the judgment in the contract action settled only the liability of the plaintiff's insurer, 4) the uninsured motorist, an alleged tort-feasor, was not a party to the action in which the judgment was obtained, and 5) the alleged tort-feasor here should not be allowed to diminish the amount of his liability by pleading payments made to the plaintiff under the terms of a contract between the plaintiff and a third party who was not a joint tort-feasor--to allow him to do so would allow the uninsured tort-feasor to benefit from the plaintiff's prudence in having insurance. ²

Other jurisdictions have considered a similar factual setting involving the effect of a settlement by an insured with his insurer on the maintainability of a negligence claim against the uninsured tort-feasor and have reached the same result that I would reach in this case.

In Van Dyne v. McCarty, 166 Cal.App.3d 817, 212 Cal.Rptr. 571 (1985), the plaintiff, Van Dyne, suffered a knee injury in a pedestrian-automobile accident. Dunn, McCarty, and McDonald were named in plaintiff's complaint as defendants. A default judgment was taken against McDonald, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff against Dunn and McCarty for $50,000. Upon the request of the defendants, the judgment was reduced by $15,000, the amount the plaintiff had received prior to trial from her uninsured motorist insurance policy. Dunn appealed from the judgment finding him negligent, and plaintiff cross-appealed from the order reducing her damages award by the amount she had received from her uninsured motorist coverage.

The Court agreed with the plaintiff, and stated:

"The 'collateral source' rule is an exception to the general rule of mitigation of damages. Where a plaintiff receives compensation from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, his or her recovery is not reduced. (Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Starley (1946) 28 Cal.2d 347, 349, 170 P.2d 448.) That is precisely what occurred here. Uninsured motorist coverage is intended to protect persons lawfully using the highways who are injured through no fault of their own by an uninsured driver. (Fireman's Fund etc. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm. (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 676, 677-678, 38 Cal.Rptr. 336) The provisions of Insurance Code section 11580.2 are not for the...