Chambers v. Appellate Div. Of Superior Ct.
Decision Date | 26 November 2007 |
Docket Number | No. S143491.,S143491. |
Citation | 42 Cal.4th 673,68 Cal.Rptr.3d 43,170 P.3d 617 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | Tariq CHAMBERS, Petitioner, v. APPELLATE DIVISION OF the SUPERIOR COURT of San Diego County, Respondent. San Diego Police Department, Real party in Interest. |
Mary Greenwood, Public Defender (Santa Clara) and Kelley Paul Kulick, Deputy Public Defender, for California Public Defenders Association and Public Defender of Santa Clara County as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Michael J. Aguirre, City Attorney, and David M. Stotland, Deputy City Attorney, for Real Party in Interest.
Dennis Barlow, City Attorney (Burbank) and Juli C. Scott, Chief Assistant City Attorney, for League of California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
Here we consider whether derivative information, developed by independent investigation after Pitchess1 disclosure in an earlier case, is subject to a protective order under Evidence Code2 section 1045,3 subdivision (e) (section 1045(e)). We hold that derivative information is not generally subject to the statutorily required protective order when a subsequent defendant files his or her own Pitchess motion and receives the name of the same complainant to which the derivative information pertains. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeal's judgment.
Defendant Tariq Chambers was charged with one count of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer. (Pen.Code § 148, subd. (a)(1).) According to the police report, on July 29, 2004, Officer E. and his partner responded to a report of domestic violence at Chambers's residence. Chambers became belligerent and rushed toward Officer E. three times. Officer E. used pepper spray to protect himself.
In January 2005, Chambers filed a Pitchess motion, seeking information in Officer E.'s personnel file regarding "excessive force, aggressive conduct, unnecessary violence, unnecessary force, false arrest or detention, false statements in reports, false claims of probable cause or reasonable suspicion or any other evidence of, or complaints of dishonesty, by Officer [E]." Defense counsel filed a supporting declaration asserting that Officer E. overreacted and used excessive force by spraying Chambers with pepper spray. Chambers denied rushing at or physically threatening the officers, and asserted Officer E. lied when he reported that conduct. After Chambers had been disabled by the spray, both officers allegedly had their guns drawn and threatened to shoot him. Judge Willis found good cause to inspect Officer E.'s personnel file, but found no relevant information to disclose.
In August 2005, Chambers filed a supplemental Pitchess motion through his public defender Kristin Scogin. After being assigned to Chambers's case, Scogin was assigned to take over a case involving a Ms. Washington (People v. Washington (Super. Ct. San Diego County, No. M947152) (Washington).). As a result, Scogin learned Pitchess information about Officer E. that was ordered disclosed in the Washington case, along with derivative information that had been independently developed.
The trial court in the Washington case had imposed a protective order limiting "[u]se of the information ordered disclosed from the officer's personnel files" to "the defense of this criminal matter."4 On Chambers's behalf, and as relevant here, Scogin asked the court to release the name of one of the complainants that had been disclosed to Washington. She also asked permission to use, on behalf of Chambers, the derivative information independently developed after the complainant had been disclosed to Washington. In a sealed declaration, Scogin described that derivative information, but did not refer to the complainant by name.
The city attorney opposed the supplemental motion, and Chambers ultimately sought reconsideration of his original Pitchess motion. The trial court concluded the defense was "precluded from using information developed in other Pitchess motions," but reexamined the personnel file "to make sure that [it] did not miss anything." The trial court again found no relevant information regarding other complainants.
Defendant's petition for writ of mandate to the superior court appellate division was denied, but he obtained writ relief from the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal held that information regarding the complainant disclosed in the Washington case should be disclosed by the trial court to Chambers subject to an appropriate protective order under section 1045(e). It further held that because it was ordering disclosure of the complainant's identity to Chambers, the deputy public defender would not violate the section 1045(e) protective order in the Washington case if she used the derivative information acquired during investigation of the Washington matter in the Chambers case.
We granted the San Diego Police Department's petition for review.
In Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305, "we held that a criminal defendant has a limited right to discovery of peace officer personnel records in order to ensure `a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.'"5 (Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1037, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228, fn. 3 (Alford).) "In 1978, the California Legislature codified the privileges and procedures surrounding what had come to be known as 'Pitchess motions' ... through the enactment of Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8 and Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045."6 (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 81, 260 Cal.Rptr. 520, 776 P.2d 222, fns. omitted (Santa Cruz).)
A Pitchess motion must describe "the type of records or information sought" and include "[affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality there of to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records." (§ 1043, subds. (b)(2) & (3).) If the defendant establishes good cause, the court must review the records in camera to determine what, if any, information should be disclosed. (§ 1045, subd. (b); People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 482, 36 P.3d 21.) In providing for in camera review, "the Legislature balanced the accused's need for disclosure of relevant information with the law enforcement officer's legitimate expectation of privacy in his or her personnel records." (Mooc, at p. 1220, 114 Cal. Rptr.2d 482, 36 P.3d 21.)
"`As a further safeguard,'" an order of disclosure ordinarily involves revelation of only the "`name, address and phone number of any prior complainants and witnesses and the dates of the incidents in question.'"7 (Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1039, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228.) Section 1045(e) requires the court to impose a protective order providing that the "records disclosed or discovered may not be used for any purpose other than a court proceeding pursuant to applicable law."8 (§ 1045(e).)
The (Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 83-84, 260 Cal.Rptr. 520, 776 P.2d 222.)
We consider a situation in which defense counsel has obtained complainant information through the Pitchess process, and defense investigators have interviewed that complainant. If that counsel later represents another defendant and, pursuant to Pitchess, discovers the same complainant information, may the lawyer refer to the derivative information obtained during the earlier follow-up investigation without violating the section 1045(e) protective order?
As noted, section 1045(e) provides that when a court permits disclosure pursuant to section 1043, it must also "order that the records disclosed or discovered may not be used for any purpose other than a court proceeding pursuant to applicable law." (§ 1045(e).) In Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1033, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228, we held the language "`a court proceeding pursuant to applicable law'" refers to the statutory Pitchess scheme, and restricts "use of the disclosed information to the proceeding in which it was sought." (Id. at pp. 1040, 1042, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228, italics added.) This "interpretation of section 1045(e) harmonizes the entire statutory scheme and retains its effectiveness by furthering the legitimate interests of both the defendant and the peace officer." (Id. at pp. 1042-1043, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228)
In reaching our conclusion, we rejected Alford's argument that an order limiting use of Pitchess material to the case in which it is sought "undermines fair representation and encourages inefficiency and duplication of effort, in that members of the public defender's office must feign ignorance of Pitchess information personally known to them and instead file repeated Pitchess...
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