Chambers v. Chambers

• Decision Date: 01 March 1910
• Citation: 127 S.W. 86,227 Mo. 262
• Parties: CHAMBERS v. CHAMBERS.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

127 S.W. 86

227 Mo. 262

CHAMBERS v. CHAMBERS.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

March 1, 1910.

1. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1009) — REVIEW OF EVIDENCE — SUIT IN EQUITY.

A suit to cancel a deed as a cloud on title being an equity case, the Supreme Court may defer to the trial court in weighing and applying the evidence, but is not bound thereby, nor by his finding of facts, though it is pursuasive and advisory.

2. QUIETING TITLE (§ 51) — RELIEF TO DEFENDANT — ABANDONMENT AND WAIVER THEREOF.

Defendant, in a suit by her father to quiet title, may abandon and waive in open court, by leave of the court itself, relief by way of possession of the land during his lifetime.

3. DEEDS (§ 67) — DELIVERY — EFFECT.

The operative force and effect of a deed from a father to his daughter, once delivered, could not be avoided by a change in his feelings toward her resulting from her subsequent misconduct.

4. DEEDS (§ 54) — DELIVERY — NECESSITY.

Delivery is the life of a deed, and without it it is merely a dead scroll.

5. DEEDS (§ 56) — DELIVERY — WHAT CONSTITUTES.

Delivery is consummated when the grantor, by act, word, or both, parts with domination over the instrument, with intent to make it operative, which is accepted by grantee, and such intent is of the essence thereof.

6. DEEDS (§ 66) — DELIVERY — QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT.

Whether there is delivery is usually a mixed question of law and fact, determined by all the facts and circumstances of the concrete case.

7. DEEDS (§ 56) — DELIVERY — DETERMINATION ON FACTS.

Delivery is not controlled by any fixed and arbitrary rule, but must be worked out with reference to all the facts in judgment, and in this regard the personnel of the parties is of some weight.

8. EVIDENCE (§ 151) — COMPETENCY — TESTIMONY AS TO INTENT.

When the intention, a state of mind, is to be determined as an issue, the actor or doer knows more about the processes of his own mind than any one else; and, so long as his secret intention is not so weighted down and drowned by his acts as to mislead other persons to their injury, and thereby estop him, he may testify to his secret intention when called as a witness.

9. EVIDENCE (§ 589) — WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY — TESTIMONY OF PARTY AS TO INTENT.

Testimony of a party, many years after an event, as to his secret intent at the time goes only for what it is worth, and is not conclusive, though it is somewhat otherwise where intent is clearly disclosed by spoken word at the time of the act itself; for such word becomes a verbal act, is part of the res gestæ, and molds and stamps the character of the act itself.

10. DEEDS (§ 59) — DELIVERY — RECORD — EFFECT OF REGISTRATION ACT.

The effect of the registry act is to make the record of a deed take the place of the common-law livery of seisin, and it is a solemn proclamation to the world, of which it must take notice, that there has been a transfer of title from grantor to grantee, precisely as in olden times there was a symbolical public transfer by delivery of a twig, a clod, or a key.

11. DEEDS (§ 208) — DELIVERY — EVIDENCE — REGISTRATION.

The record of a deed is most cogent evidence of delivery.

12. DEEDS (§ 64) — DELIVERY — ELEMENTS — ACCEPTANCE.

Acceptance by grantee is an essential element of delivery.

13. DEEDS (§ 194) — DELIVERY — ACCEPTANCE — PRESUMPTION.

Acceptance of a deed recorded by grantor will be presumed where the grant is beneficial, and so, where grantee is an infant child of grantor, and the grant is beneficial, acceptance is presumed to give operative effect to the conveyance recorded by grantor.

14. DEEDS (§ 194) — DELIVERY — REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION.

The presumption of delivery of an unconditional deed recorded by grantor is rebuttable.

15. DEEDS (§ 208) — NONDELIVERY — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY.

The rule in equity is that to divest title, declare a trust, or cancel a deed, the testimony must not be loose or inconclusive, but so clear and convincing as to remove all reasonable doubt; and the same character of evidence is called for to overturn a deed, put of record by grantor, by showing nondelivery.

16. EVIDENCE (§ 313) — ADMISSIONS — EFFECT — STATEMENTS AGAINST INTEREST.

Statements against interest are presumptively true.

17. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (§ 172) — VALIDITY AS BETWEEN PARTIES.

Courts of equity are reluctant to help litigants who voluntarily convey land to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.

18. DEEDS (§ 15) — WANT OF CONSIDERATION — MATERIALITY.

That no consideration was paid for land deeded by a father to his daughter amounts to nothing as between the parties to the deed, in an action to cancel it and remove the cloud on grantor's title arising from its record.

19. DEEDS (§ 208) — DELIVERY — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY.

Evidence held insufficient to show that a recorded deed was not delivered.

20. EVIDENCE (§ 419) — PAROL EVIDENCE — CONSIDERATION OF DEED AS OPEN TO INVESTIGATION.

The consideration of a deed is open to investigation.

21. EVIDENCE (§ 432) — CONSIDERATION OF DEED — PAROL EXPLANATION.

The clause in a deed, acknowledging payment of the purchase money, is somewhat in the nature of a receipt, and is subject to parol explanation for some purposes; but, in absence of fraud or mistake of fact, it should not be pressed so as to defeat its operative words as a grant.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Grundy County; G. W. Wanamaker, Judge.

Suit by A. J. Chambers against Lillian Chambers. From a decree for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Flansburg & Williams and Hall & Hall, for appellant. Hubbell Bros., for respondent.

LAMM, P. J.

Plaintiff, claiming to own the W. ½ of the S. W. ¼ of section 9, township 62, range 24, in Grundy county, sues to cancel his deed conveying the same to Lillian, his daughter, and to remove the cloud on his title arising from its record.

In one view of it the suit is under section 650 to determine title, but there are allegations involving equity jurisdiction, and equitable relief is asked. The deed bore date July 28, 1891, and was recorded promptly in the office of the recorder of deeds of said county. The grounds in the petition on which relief is predicated are that it was neither delivered nor accepted; that it (quoting) "was signed and acknowledged and recorded only for the prospective purpose of putting the plaintiff in the position to temporarily provide for his family, and it never at any time became expedient for the plaintiff, or any one else, to make use of said deed for any purpose, and no exigency for which said deed was signed and acknowledged had ever arisen"; and that (quoting) "said deed, so signed and acknowledged, was wholly without consideration, and totally ineffective as a conveyance of title, and is void, and was signed and acknowledged and recorded without the knowledge of defendant, and without any agreement or contract between any parties with respect to signing, acknowledging, or recording of said deed." The petition also counts on adverse possession under a claim of ownership as against defendant for more than 10 years. The answer is in two counts. The second is a cross-action in ejectment, with conventional averments. The first states a defense, in substance, that the deed was executed and recorded by plaintiff to make provision for defendant, at the time an infant of tender years, and conveyed an absolute and unconditional title. The reply averred, by inference a least, that at the time of making the deed plaintiff, through mental derangement, was incapable of transacting ordinary business. On motion this allegation was struck out. Other allegations in the reply are that his wife had died some time before; that his dwelling house had been consumed by fire; that he had a family of children, of which defendant was the youngest; that housekeeping was abandoned, and a return to Illinois undertaken, as a result of this combination of misfortunes. Plaintiff puts himself on that journey, and while en route what happened is described in the replication as follows: "* * * Anxiety for the welfare of his family, and especially for the welfare of this defendant, so oppressed plaintiff that he decided to so arrange his affairs that he could promptly and effectively protect and provide for defendant, should his own life be endangered by the condition of his health or accident of any kind. Plaintiff accordingly signed, acknowledged, and caused to be recorded the deed in question, with the intention, understanding, and belief that the instrument would become effective as a conveyance when, and only when, he had delivered it, or caused it to be delivered, to defendant or to some one for her. Plaintiff did not intend for any delivery to take place, or for said deed to be delivered to defendant, unless the aforesaid contingency or emergency should arise in such a way as to make it expedient for him to make such disposition of his property. No such emergency or contingency ever arose, and no delivery of the said deed was ever made to the defendant, or to any one for her. From the date of said deed until now plaintiff has continuously, notoriously, and adversely occupied said land, claiming it as his own, paying taxes thereon, making improvements thereon, and taking rents and profits thereof for his own exclusive use and benefit." On hearing, the chancellor took much time to consider, presently entering a decree for plaintiff on the theory of no delivery of the deed. From that decree, defendant appeals.

1. Certain subordinate questions will be disposed of at the outset to clear the way for the main controversy.

(a) It is argued here by plaintiff's counsel (as we gather it) that it was their intention to ask formal declarations of law below, but that the court throughout the trial so satisfactorily ruled as to indicate a correct understanding of the law of the case. Therefore no such declarations were asked. And that, as the court found the facts relating to delivery of the deed against defendant,...