Chambers v. City of Mount Vernon
| Decision Date | 03 June 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 1911--I,1911--I |
| Citation | 522 P.2d 1184,11 Wn.App. 357 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Mary Susan CHAMBERS et al., Respondents, v. CITY OF MOUNT VERNON, a municipal corporation, Appellant, and Allied Aggregates & Asphalt Paving, Inc., a Washington corporation, Defendant. |
Boynton Kamb, Mount Vernon, for appellant.
Paul N. Luvera, Jr., K. R. St. Clair, Mount Vernon, for respondents.
The City of Mount Vernon (City) and Allied Aggregates & Asphalt Paving, Inc. (Allied), codefendants below, entered into a lease, over the unanimous objection of the city park board, whereby Allied could conduct a rock quarrying operation on certain city park property. Plaintiff's Chambers and Day brought suit as taxpayers and residents of the City of Mount Vernon, claiming that the lease was void and illegal primarily because (1) the City did not comply with the state Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA), and (2) inasmuch as management of the park land in question had been previously delegated to the city park board, the city council had no authority to enter into the lease without the park board's approval. Plaintiffs Darvill, Poppe and Robbin, though not residents of the City, joined the lawsuit as residents of Skagit County living near the park property and added the allegation that the operation of the rock quarry as authorized by the lease would constitute a public nuisance within the meaning of RCW 7.48.
The trial court found that the City had failed to comply with SEPA and had entered into the lease without the approval of the city park board to which the City had delegated the authority to control and supervise all city parks. In addition, the trial court found that
the operation of the rock quarry pursuant to the terms of the lease is injurious to the health and offensive to the senses as well as an obstruction to the free use of neighboring property so as to essentially interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life and property and further constitutes a trade or manufacturing process which occasions obnoxious exhalations and is otherwise offensive and dangerous to the health of individuals and the public in general and, therefore, constitutes a public nuisance.
Finding of fact No. 6, in part. The court also found that
an unreasonable amount of dust from time to time falls on those property owners who live on Hickox Road. The operation of noisy machinery during the week and on weekends contrary to the terms of the lease have taken place. Blasting of rock periodically as well as unscheduled blasting and blasting on weekends without any particular pattern as far as timing is concerned have occurred. This has resulted in a loss of enjoyment of homes and yards as well as constituted an injurious environment to the seventy-one children living in the immediate area. A loss of sleep on weekends or other mornings due to loud machinery noises at 6:30 and 7:00 A.M. have occurred. The operation of a rock auarry three-eighth's (3/8's) of a mile to one-half (1/2) a mile from these homes puts an unreasonable burden upon these property owners and in balancing the interest of all of the parties hereto, the operation of the rock quarry is unreasonable and should be abated and enjoined.
Finding of fact No. 7, in part.
The trial court concluded that the quarry operation under the lease should be permanently enjoined and abated on three grounds: (1) that it is a public nuisance; (2) that it was commenced without authority of the park board and therefore is illegal; and (3) the City failed to comply with SEPA, specially RCW 43.21C.030(1)(c) requiring an environmental impact statement. The trial court's decree provides in part that the City and Allied are
permanently enjoined from this date forward from in any way or manner, directly or indirectly, . . . operating any quarry operation or carrying out the terms of the lease in any manner involved in this litigation.
Only the City appeals.
The City presents three basic contentions based upon its assignments of error to certain findings of fact, conclusions of law, and portions of the decree and permanent injunction entered by the trial court: First, the trial court erred in determining that the lease in question was void because it was not approved by the city park board. Second, the trial court erred in concluding that the City failed to comply with SEPA. Third, the trial court erred insofar as it held that the City was a party to the objectionable rock quarry operation and that the City should therefore be permanently enjoined from operating 'any quarry operation' as distinguished from the one in question which was conducted by Allied and found by the trial court to be a public nuisance.
Our disposition of the first...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
City of Burlington v. Kutzer, 6558-I
...See, e. g., Mathewson v. Primeau, 64 Wash.2d 929, 395 P.2d 183 (1964) (involving a hog farm and junk yard); Chambers v. Mount Vernon, 11 Wash.App. 357, 522 P.2d 1184 (1974) (involving a quarry). In view of the finding that Kutzer's operation violates an applicable zoning ordinance, the fact......
-
Chapter § 19.3 Public Nuisance
...denied, 141 Wn.2d 1031 (2000) (concluding junkyard in violation of city zoning codes was a nuisance). Chambers v. City of Mount Vernon, 11 Wn. App. 357, 522 P.2d 1184 (1974) (finding rock quarrying operation on park leased from city to be a (c) Recreational activities Washington Supreme Cou......
-
Table of Cases
...15.3(4) Cedar River Water and Sewer Dist. v. King Cnty., 178 Wn.2d 763, 315 P.3d 1065 (2013): 8.10(6) Chambers v. City of Mount Vernon, 11 Wn. App. 357, 522 P.2d 1184 (1974): 19.3(5)(b), 19.5(2) Champa v. Wash. Compressed Gas Co., 146 Wash. 190, 262 P. 228 (1927): 19.2(1), 19.2(2)(d), 19.2(......
-
Chapter § 19.5 Remedies for Nuisance and Trespass
...its abatement altogether. See State ex rel. Tollefson, 25 Wn.2d 476; Payne v. Johnson, 20 Wn.2d 24, 145 P.2d 552 (1944); Chambers, 11 Wn. App. 357; see also Tinsley, 2 Wn. App. 675. Hoover v. Warner, 189 Wn. App. 509, 528, 358 P.3d 1174 (2015) (injunction impermissibly broad where defendant......