Chambers v. City of Detroit

• Decision Date: 30 March 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 09–11562.
• Citation: 786 F.Supp.2d 1253
• Parties: Carolyn Dianne CHAMBERS, Plaintiff,v.CITY OF DETROIT, a Michigan Municipal corporation; Detroit City Council, a Michigan Municipal corporation; Councilwoman Martha Reeves, individually and in her official capacity; and Thomas Stephens, an individual; jointly and severally, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

786 F.Supp.2d 1253

Carolyn Dianne CHAMBERS, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF DETROIT, a Michigan Municipal corporation; Detroit City Council, a Michigan Municipal corporation; Councilwoman Martha Reeves, individually and in her official capacity; and Thomas Stephens, an individual; jointly and severally, Defendants.

Case No. 09–11562.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

March 30, 2011.

Deborah L. Gordon, Deborah L. Gordon Assoc., Bloomfield Hills, MI, for Plaintiff.Andrew R. Jarvis, Letitia C. Jones, Valerie A. Colbert–Osamuede, Detroit City Law Department, Detroit, MI, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PAUL D. BORMAN, District Judge.

This employment matter comes before the Court on defendants City of Detroit, City Council, Martha Reeves, and Thomas Stephens's (collectively “Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 39.) Plaintiff, Ms. Carolyn Dianne Chambers (“Plaintiff” or “Chambers”), has filed a response (Dkt. No. 41), and Defendants have filed a reply. (Dkt. No. 46.) Oral arguments were heard on March 10, 2011 at 3:00 p.m. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding Plaintiff's state tort claims against the Defendant City of Detroit (“Defendant City”) and Defendant City Council (“Defendant Council”), as well as Plaintiff's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and hostile work environment. The Court also grants Defendant Reeves summary judgment on Plaintiff's tortious interference claim. The Court, however, denies Defendants' motion in all other respects.

I. Background

Ms. Carolyn Dianne Chambers (“Plaintiff” or “Chambers”) was an appointee of the Detroit City Council for then-Councilwoman Martha Reeves (“Reeves”). (Defs.' Br. in Supp. of their Mot. for Summ. J. 1.) Chambers worked as Reeves's office manager from January 2006, when Reeves took office, until Chambers resigned on March 6, 2007. ( Id.; Ex. 2—Plaintiff's resignation.) Although she was the office manager,¹ the formal title of her position was Administrative Assistant–I. (Ex. 3.) This was Plaintiff's second appointment with City of Detroit, having served years before with the administration of Mayor Dennis Archer as a Neighborhood City Hall Manager. (Defs.' Br. 1.)

Plaintiff's starting salary when she was first hired in Reeves's office was $42,500. (Br. in Supp. of Pl.'s Resp. in Opp. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 4.) Plaintiff claims that Reeves originally told her that she wanted to pay her more but did not yet have a budget approved for the 2006–07 fiscal year, but promised she would increase her salary once she did. ( Id. at 3; Ex. 1, Deposition of Carolyn Chambers 19:19–22:17, Apr. 15, 2010.) When her new budget was approved, Reeves increased Plaintiff's pay to $50,000. (Pl.'s Br. 5; Ex. 14.)

There were several other members of Reeves's staff, the most germane of whom were William Ratliff, Defendant Tommy Stephens, Maxine Powell, and Ulysses Council. Ratliff, who is Caucasian, was Reeves's Chief of Staff. Ratliff and Plaintiff were both appointees. (Ex. 14.) Stephens and Council were both contract employees, paid by the hour for the time worked, and did not receive benefits such as paid vacation or sick time. Stephens was a legislative aide who originally made $25.00 an hour, which translated into $52,000 a year, without benefits, if he worked a forty-hour week. (Ex. 14.) Council originally was paid $20.00 an hour, or $41,600 a year. ( Id.) Powell made $16.83 an hour, or $13,127 because she only worked on Tuesdays and Thursdays. ( Id.)

The parties' accounts of the duties of the various employees, and the work they did on a day to day basis, are wildly different. Plaintiff claims that Mr. Council was nothing more than Reeves's driver, who did nothing when he was waiting in the office to take her places except play games and watch movies (including porno at times) on his computer. (Pl.'s Br. 6.) Plaintiff alleges that Stephens's role was “not entirely clear.” ( Id. at 4.) She claims he would routinely arrive late and eat breakfast at his desk, was known to take three to four hour “lunches” to conduct personal business related to the bar he owned and operated, and would at times lie about his whereabouts. ( Id. at 4–5.) Plaintiff claims that Powell, who is in her nineties, would come in on Tuesdays and Thursdays primarily to go to lunch and water the office's plants. ( Id. at 7 n. 7; Ex. 5, Deposition of William J. Ratliff 25:22–26:12, June 10, 2010.)

Plaintiff alleges that despite the fact that Council and Stephens were contract employees, their time sheets, which were approved by Reeves, always reported that they had worked a forty hour week regardless of how much they actually worked or if they were out sick or on vacation. (Pl.'s Br. 5.) When Plaintiff found out about this practice, she confronted Stephens about it. ( Id.) Plaintiff claims he told her that he got paid eight hours a day regardless of the amount of time he actually worked. ( Id.) Plaintiff tried to curb this practice by instituting a sign-in/sign-out policy for contract workers. ( Id. at 5.) Stephens and Council both refused to participate, and when Plaintiff or Ratliff would raise the issue of only paying contract workers for the time they actually worked with Reeves, she consistently told them that they should not worry about it and saying “[i]t's my office, I can pay whoever I want what I want.” (Chambers Dep. at 76:22–24.)

This suit centers around an altercation between Plaintiff and Defendant Stephens regarding his time for one pay period in the beginning of March 2007 (the “March incident”). Although Ratliff usually filled out the time sheets for the contract workers, he was on vacation, and therefore Plaintiff was required to do them. (Chambers Dep. at 56:5–13.) Plaintiff testified that when she filled them out she refused to give Stephens credit for three days he was out sick. ( Id. at 57:22–23.) She claimed she knew he was out sick those days because Stephens called up the office to say he was not feeling well and she was the one who answered that phone call. ( Id. at 57:16–19.) When Stephens returned to work the next week, Plaintiff claims that he came up to her and said “you better have paid me for those days I was home.” ( Id. at 58:5–8.) Plaintiff told Stephens that she already submitted the time and that he would have to talk to Reeves if he wanted her to change it. Apparently after going back and forth a bit over whether Plaintiff could change what she originally recorded, Stephens said “you're going to pay, bitch.” ( Id. at 62:4–10.)

When Stephens found out that he did not get paid, Plaintiff alleges he came in screaming at her, “[y]ou white racist. You and [Ratliff] are white racists. You crackers. I'm going to have your job, both of your jobs before this is over. You should have paid me. You're going to pay.” ( Id. at 66:18–24.) After the incident, Plaintiff claims she went to complain to Reeves about it, but Reeves did not want to talk about it. ( Id. at 88:24–89:1.)

The next day, Plaintiff and Ratliff both received letters indicating that their salaries had been reduced. (Ex. 11.) Plaintiff's pay was slashed by $20,000, or forty percent, from $50,000 to $30,000. ( Id.) In the letter Reeves put forth several reasons for why Plaintiff's pay was cut. She claimed that the average Office Manager made $25,000–30,000, that she believed Plaintiff was “overly qualified,” and that there were purchase orders for questionable or missing items. ( Id.) At her deposition, however, Reeves claimed the reduction occurred because Plaintiff's salary was outside of the White Book range and because of budgetary concerns. The record clearly demonstrates, however, that Plaintiff's salary was within the range of salaries for an Administrative Assistant–I set forth in the White Book, which was $27,600–$59,900. (Pl.'s Br. Ex. 7, Deposition of Deborah Richardson 21:24–22:2, Apr. 19, 2010.) In fact, HR wrote the White Book range on the form used to process Plaintiff's raise. (Ex. 14.)

After getting the letter, Plaintiff claims she went to speak with Reeves about it but, again, Reeves did not want to discuss the matter, and told Plaintiff [i]t's my final decision. “I'm not discussing it.” (Chambers Dep. 131:18–20.) Both Ratliff and Plaintiff resigned that day. During their last day, Stephens made several comments to Ratliff and Plaintiff. Allegedly, Stephens said “I told you if I didn't get paid, there was going to be some problems, and no white people are going to decide whether I get paid or not.” (Ratliff Dep. 37:1–6.)

In addition to the March incident, Plaintiff's disparate treatment claim focuses on another altercation between Plaintiff and Stephens in October 2006 (the “October 2006 incident”). Plaintiff claims that Stephens made it known that he did not think that Ratliff and Plaintiff, who are both white, should be representing a black Councilwoman in the community. (Chambers Dep. 96:9–22.) During the October 2006 incident, Plaintiff contends that Stephens said “[y]ou f-ing white people shouldn't be running an office for a black Councilwoman” and “[y]ou shouldn't be out in the community, you crackers, for representing her. It should only be black people in this office representing a black Councilwoman.” ( Id.)

On December 27, 2007, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants with the EEOC alleging race discrimination and retaliation for complaining about being subjected to racial discrimination. (Pl.'s Br. Ex. 16.) Plaintiff confined her complaint to events occurring between March 2 and March 6, 2007. ( Id.)

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is only appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of...