Chambers v. City of St. Louis

• Decision Date: 31 March 1860
• Citation: 29 Mo. 543
• Parties: CHAMBERS et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Respondent.^a1
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

29 Mo. 543

CHAMBERS et al., Appellants,

v.CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Respondent.^a1

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1860.

1. The City of St. Louis, under its charter and the general law concerning corporations, has power to acquire and hold such land beyond the limits of the city as may be necessary for the purposes of the corporation; the right of the city to hold land beyond the city limits is not restricted to the specific purposes mentioned in the second section of the first article of the charter of St. Louis of March 3, 1851.

2. The question whether a municipal corporation, authorized to purchase and hold real estate for certain purposes, transcends the exact limits of its power, and acquires land that it is not authorized to hold for any of the purposes of the corporation, can only be raised and determined in a proceeding instituted at the instance of the state.

3. Municipal corporations may hold property in trust for charitable uses; they may be compelled in equity to administer and execute the trusts imposed upon them.

4. The statute of 43 Elizabeth concerning charitable uses is, it seems, in force in this state.

5. Gifts to charitable uses were valid and binding dispositions previous to the passage of the statute 43 Elizabeth, ch. 4; the law of charities did not derive its existence from said statute. The jurisdiction of courts of equity over charitable uses and devises is not grounded, in this state, upon said statute, but upon the common law.

6. In the year 1849 one Bryan Mullanphy made his last will in the following words: “I, Bryan Mullanphy, do make and declare the following to be my last will and testament: One equal undivided third of all my property, real, personal and mixed, I leave to the City of St. Louis, in the state of Missouri, in trust, to be and constitute a fund to furnish relief to all poor emigrants and travelers coming to St. Louis on their way bona fide to settle in the west. I do appoint Felix Costé and Peter G. Camden executors of this, my last will and testament and of any other will or executory devise that I may leave. All and any such document will be found to be olograph, all in my own handwriting. In testimony whereof witness my hand and seal. [Signed] Bryan Mullanphy (seal).” The testator died in 1851, leaving a large estate, valued at more than a million and a half dollars, the greater part of which consisted of lands situate in St. Louis county, beyond the limits of the city. The will was duly admitted to probate. Held, that the devise was a good and valid devise; that the City of St. Louis was capacitated to take and hold all the property embraced within the terms of the will upon the trusts therein indicated, and to execute and administer said trusts, subject to the control of a court of equity.

Appeal from St. Louis Land Court.

This was a suit for partition of the real estate belonging to the estate of Bryan Mullanphy, deceased. Charles Chambers and Jane Chambers his wife were plaintiffs, and Richard Graham and Catherine Graham his wife and others, the heirs of said Bryan Mullanphy, together with the City of St. Louis, were defendants. The petition set forth the will of said Mullanphy and insisted that the devise therein to the City of St. Louis was void, and that the heirs were entitled to the whole estate. The court decided that the devise to the city was valid, and assigned one-third of the real property to the city and two-thirds to the heirs. The greater portion of the real estate embraced in the will is situate in the county of St. Louis and beyond the limits of the city. The heirs appealed to the supreme court. The will is set forth below in the opinion of the court.

Field & Shepley, for appellants. Mr. Shepley, in a printed brief, presented the following points:

I. The City of St. Louis is not competent to take the trust attempted to be created by this will, neither the personalty nor the realty. It can not take the realty for, 1st. The purposes for which the city can take and hold any real estate are enumerated in the first article of the amended charter of 1851. The power to receive and hold property within the city is unrestricted in terms, but beyond the city limits it can only take and hold for certain specific objects only, none of which are included in this trust; so that, 2d. The city can not take that portion beyond the city limits, because it is not claimed for any use mentioned in the charter. 3d. If not expressly conferred by its charter, nor necessary for the exercise of the powers given in it, then by the third section of the act concerning corporations any such power is denied. (R. C. 1845, p. 232.) The clause in the general corporation law applies only to cases where land is necessary for the exercise of corporate powers as land, and not to hold as a fund to get an income to defray corporate expenses. It can take neither the personalty nor realty, for, 4th. In order to enable the city to take this trust, it must be within the scope of its powers conferred by its charter. This would seem to be obvious enough, as a municipal corporation, as any other corporation, is but the creation of the legislature, with just as much vitality, with just so long a period of existence, and with just such powers and functions, as its creator chose to confer, and no more. (See Vidal v. Girard's Exec'rs, 2 How. 128; in the matter of Howe, 1 Paige, Ch. 214; Jackson v. Hartwell, 8 John. 422; Andrew v. The New York Bible & P. B. Society, 4 Sand. S. C. 185; Ayres v. Methodist Church, 3 Sand. S. C. 351; Ins. Co. v. Ely, 2 Cow. 678; Trustees of N. M. Sem. v. Peaslee, 15 N. H. 317; Greene v. Dewins, 6 Conn. 294, 304; 2 Kent's Com. 279, 280; People v. Utica Ins. Co. 15 John. 383; Angel & Ames on Corp. § 111; Octavia Boyce et al. v. City of St. Louis et al., in the supreme court of New York.) 5th. The subject or the objects of the trust are not within any of the powers conferred on the city by its charter. The delegated powers are specified in the third article of the amended charter. In neither of these are any powers conferred to which this trust can attach. The city is no eleemosynary institution. It was not created to distribute charities. It has none of the machinery for any such object. The distinction between civil and eleemosynary corporations is important. The case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Whea. ____, turned upon it. An eleemosynary corporation implies a contract with the founder, and the corporation is above the power of the legislature to repeal or alter.

II. Even if the trustees could take, yet the trust as declared by this will is so vague, uncertain and indefinite as to be void. It will scarcely be asserted that, if this was the case of an ordinary trust, it could be for a moment maintained; but it is attempted to be supported on the ground that it is a charity, and as such, that different principles apply to such a class of trusts from those that affect ordinary trusts; and it is asserted that both by the statute of 43 Elizabeth, and also by the general powers belonging to a court of chancery, a trust like this is legalized and supported. To this we say--

1st. That before the passage of the 43 of Elizabeth it is certain that, when the objects of the charity could not, like any other cestui que trust, come into court and claim the interference of the court, the trust could not be supported. The case of a superstitious use was the only exception. By statute 23 Henry 8, c. 10, the uses therein mentioned were declared to be within the statute of mortmain. Of course the king could have the benefit of them. So the statute 1 Ed. 6, ch. 14, enacted that the uses declared to be superstitious should vest in the king. Perhaps these statutes against superstitious uses were the origin of the royal prerogative to dispose of certain charities by sign manual. By this we mean that, if you admit that charitable trusts existed and could be enforced prior to the act of 43 of Elizabeth, yet they were just such trusts, and none other, as could be enforced in cases of ordinary trust. They were either cases where the cestui que trust was a corporation, or where the recipients of the bounty were so distinctly pointed out that in their own names they could file a bill to have the trust enforced. (Baptist. Ass. v. Hart's Exec'rs, 4 Wheat. 1, 387; 3 Peters' Appendix, 481; Ayres v. Trustees of Meth. Ch. 3 Sand. S. C. 367; Wheeler v. Smith et al., 9 How. 55; Gallego v. The Att'y Gen'l, 3 Leigh, 450; D'Osbriel v. Att'y Gen'l, 5 Harris & Johns. 398; Chittenden v. Chittenden et al., 1 vol. Am. Law Reg. 538, 545; Owens v. Missionary Soc., &c., 14 N. Y. 387, 399.)

2d. The statute of 43 Elizabeth is not in force in this state. Our statute provides that the common law of England and all the statutes and acts of Parliament made prior to the fourth year of the reign of James the First, and which are of a general nature, not local to that kingdom--which common law and statutes are not repugnant to or inconsistent with the constitution of the United States, the constitution of this state, or the statute laws for the time being--shall be the rule of action and decision in this state. This statute is both local to the kingdom and repugnant to our constitution and laws. That statute is of local policy and connected with local establishments. This is sufficiently evident from the act itself. It arose out of the peculiar circumstances in which England was placed by the suppression of the monasteries, and is part of the same system as the poor laws framed at the same time, and which have never been regarded as being in force in America. (See also Witman v. Lex, 17 Serg. & R. 88, 91; Dashiell v. Att'y Gen'l, 5 Har. & Jo. 401-2; Gallego v. Att'y Gen'l, 3 Leigh, 450; 2 Kent's Com. 282, 287; Gray et al. v. Allen et al., 5 Humph. 206.) The machinery with which it acts is no part of our system. It is legislative not upon ordinary or extraordinary powers belonging to a court of chancery, but upon...