Chambers v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 19 February 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-7098,19-7098
• Citation: 988 F.3d 497
• Parties: Mary E. CHAMBERS, Appellant v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

988 F.3d 497

Mary E. CHAMBERS, Appellant

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee

No. 19-7098

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued November 20, 2020

Decided February 19, 2021

David A. Branch argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant. Johnnie L. Johnson III entered an appearance.

Eric S. Dreiband, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Tovah Calderon, Washington, DC, and Anna M. Baldwin, Attorneys, Jennifer S. Goldstein, Associate General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and Sydney A.R. Foster, Assistant General Counsel, were on the brief for amicus curiae United States of America in support of appellant.

Megan Browder, Attorney, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause for appellee. On the brief were Karl A. Racine, Attorney General, Loren L. AliKhan, Solicitor General, Caroline S. Van Zile, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Carl J. Schifferle, Deputy Solicitor General, and Holly M. Johnson, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Before: Tatel and Garland,^* Circuit Judges, and Ginsburg, Senior Circuit Judge.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge Tatel and Senior Circuit Judge Ginsburg.

Per Curiam:

Over the years, the District of Columbia's Office of the Attorney General (OAG) denied Mary Chambers's multiple requests for a lateral transfer to a different unit within OAG. Chambers alleges that under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, those lateral transfer denials constituted unlawful sex discrimination and unlawful retaliation for filing discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The district court, relying on circuit precedent, granted summary judgment to the District because Chambers failed to show materially adverse consequences arising from the denials of her purely lateral transfer requests. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

In 2000, Chambers became a Support Enforcement Specialist within OAG's Child Support Division. Although initially assigned to the Interstate Unit, Chambers later sought transfers to the Intake Unit, also within OAG's Child Support Division. Those requests were denied. Chambers filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC in August 2010 based on those denials.

In September 2010, Chambers sent an e-mail to her supervisors, asking them to reconsider her transfer request. They denied her request the next day, explaining that transferring her did "not fit into management's immediate plans." Joint Appendix (J.A.) 75. Chambers filed another charge of discrimination with the EEOC in March 2011, alleging that the transfer denial constituted sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. Charge of Discrimination, J.A. 101.

In September 2011, Chambers again asked her supervisors for a transfer. J.A. 103. This time, Chambers offered to switch positions with an employee in the Intake Unit. Id. Hours later, Chambers's Division Director denied this request too. Id.

In 2014, Chambers sued the District of Columbia, alleging gender discrimination under Title VII. Following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to the District. Chambers v. District of Columbia , 389 F. Supp. 3d 77 (D.D.C. 2019). The court found that her discrimination and retaliation claims arising from the denial of lateral transfers were not actionable under circuit law because she "failed to show that a genuine issue of material fact exist[ed] as to whether she suffered an adverse action." Id. at 93. This appeal followed and is limited to the discrimination and retaliation claims associated with the lateral transfer denials.

Summary judgment is appropriate only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is not "genuine" unless "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Minter v. District of Columbia , 809 F.3d 66, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

II.

Title VII makes it unlawful for private-sector employers to "discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII also requires that "[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees ... in those units of the Government of the District of Columbia having positions in the competitive service ... shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). Although these provisions differ, our court has held that "the two contain identical prohibitions." Czekalski v. Peters , 475 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

Title VII also includes an antiretaliation provision that makes it unlawful for a private-sector employer to "discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Although Title VII contains no antiretaliation provision for federal government or District of Columbia employers, the Supreme Court has "assume[d] without deciding that it is unlawful for a federal agency to retaliate against a civil servant for complaining of discrimination." Green v. Brennan , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 n.1, 195 L.Ed.2d 44 (2016).

Discrimination and retaliation claims supported by circumstantial evidence are evaluated under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Walker v. Johnson , 798 F.3d 1085, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2015). "A plaintiff must first establish her prima facie case." Id. To do so, the plaintiff must "allege she is part of a protected class under Title VII, she suffered a cognizable adverse employment action, and the action gives rise to an inference of discrimination." Id. Once the plaintiff clears that hurdle, the "burden shifts to the employer to identify the legitimate, non-discriminatory or non-retaliatory reason on which it relied in taking the complained-of action." Id. at 1092. And if the defendant satisfies that burden, the plaintiff, to defeat summary judgment, must produce "sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer's asserted nondiscriminatory or non-retaliatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated or retaliated against the employee." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The threshold question in this case is whether Chambers established that she suffered an adverse employment action. As the district court correctly noted, generally "[t]he standard for what constitutes an adverse action differs under Title VII's anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions." Chambers , 389 F. Supp. 3d at 92. The district court also correctly described our circuit precedent regarding whether a lateral transfer—or denial thereof—without diminution in pay or benefits qualifies as an adverse action, which applies the same standard under Title VII's antidiscrimination and antiretaliation provisions. Id. at 93. Specifically, in Brown v. Brody , 199 F.3d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1999), our court held that for cases involving purely lateral transfers, "a plaintiff ... does not suffer an actionable injury unless there are some other materially adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment or her future employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the plaintiff has suffered objectively tangible harm." Id . at 457.

Chambers urges us to revisit Brown ’s interpretation of Title VII's antidiscrimination provision because, she argues, it is incompatible with the plain text of that provision and inconsistent with a later Supreme Court decision, Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White , 548 U.S. 53, 64–65, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006). Of course, "[o]ne three-judge panel does not have the authority to overrule another three-judge panel of the court." LaShawn A. v. Barry , 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996). We shall therefore evaluate Chambers's discrimination and retaliation claims under the same standard the district court applied, and we reach the same conclusion: no reasonable jury could conclude that Chambers suffered materially adverse consequences associated with the denial of her lateral transfer requests for purposes of her discrimination or retaliation claim.

Discrimination Claim

Chambers makes two arguments for why her transfer denial qualifies as an adverse action under Title VII's antidiscrimination provision. Neither has merit.

First, she argues that the denial "resulted in lost awards and career advancement opportunities" because a male colleague who was transferred to her desired unit subsequently received a promotion and incentive awards. Appellant's Br. 9. But her only evidence to support this argument is a timeline of that male colleague's career progression, which states that the colleague won awards after he was transferred out of the Intake Unit. J.A. 137. Based on this evidence alone, no reasonable jury could find that the District's refusal to transfer her resulted in lost awards or career opportunities. See Burley v. National Passenger Rail Corp. , 801 F.3d 290, 301 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting "all of the relevant aspects of [a plaintiff's] employment situation [must have been] nearly identical to those of the [comparator]" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Second, Chambers argues that the denial...