Chambers v. Municipal Court

Decision Date10 December 1974
Citation118 Cal.Rptr. 120,43 Cal.App.3d 809
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesTammie Yvonne Aiken CHAMBERS, Petitioner, v. The MUNICIPAL COURT AND SUPERIOR COURT, etc., COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, Respondent; The PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 14304.

Edwin L. Miller, Jr., Dist. Atty., and Terry J. Knoepp, Deputy Dist. Atty., for real party in interest.

Defenders, Inc. by E. Hodge Crabtree, San Diego, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for petitioner.

OPINION

AULT, Associate Justice.

Tammie Yvonne Aiken Chambers seeks a writ of prohibition restraining the Municipal and Superior Courts of San Diego from going forward with a preliminary hearing and possible superior court arraignment on a felony complaint charging her with battery on a peace officer (Pen.Code § 243) and resisting arrest (Pen.Code § 148).

She challenges the constitutionality of Penal Code section 1368.1 (Ch. 1511, enacted as an urgency statute, filed September 27, 1974), 1 arguing she will be denied effective representation and due process if the preliminary hearing is held, for she cannot cooperate with her counsel in the preparation of her defense. She is being held at Community Mental Health with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Her counsel has made this challenge.

Chambers' attorney informed the municipal court on November 6, 1974 she was not mentally competent and asked for a suspension of proceedings under Penal Code section 1368(b). Although both the court and the prosecution agreed with counsel's assessment of his client's mental condition, the motion was denied and a preliminary hearing date was set under the mandate of Penal Code section 1368.1.

Where a doubt arises as to defendant's sanity in a felony case, the new law (Pen.Code § 1368.1) delays the time for suspension of criminal proceedings and the initiation of proceedings to determine mental competence until 'after the information or indictment has been filed.' The previous law permitted that action 'at any time during the pendency of an action and prior to judgment.' Thus, where the People elect to proceed by complaint rather than by indictment, a defendant may be required to go through the procedures provided for in Penal Code section 858 (appearance before a magistrate to be informed of the charges against him and his right to counsel) and a preliminary examination (Pen.Code § 859a et seq.), even where a doubt has arisen as to his sanity at the time.

Undoubtedly the change in procedure reflects the Legislature's concern with the provision in the old law which permitted commitment simply because a defendant was incompetent to proceed to trial without a determination of probable cause to believe he had committed a crime.

Revision of California present sanity procedures resulted from recent decisions by the United States and California Supreme Courts. 2 In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435, the Supreme Court of the United States held the State of Indiana could not 'constitutionally commit the petitioner for an indefinite period simply on account of his incompetency to stand trial on the charges filed against him.' In In re Davis, 8 Cal.3d 798, 106 Cal.Rptr. 178, 505 P.2d 1018, the California Supreme Court adopted the Jackson rule. The California court also pointed out the Jackson court had

'. . . noted the possibility that (the defendant) might, under appropriate (state) procedure, be permitted to raise certain defenses such as insufficiency of the indictment, or make certain pretrial motions, through counsel even though (the defendant) himself remains incompetent.' (In re Davis, 8 Cal.3d 798, 804--805, 106 Cal.Rptr. 178, 183, 505 P.2d 1018, 1023.)

In Davis the court touched upon the issue raised here. Noting the law required suspension of 'all proceedings' when a doubt arose as to the defendant's sanity, it pointed out Davis had sought to require the People to make a 'prima facie' showing that they would be able to proceed on the underlying charge if he were returned to stand trial, but had not properly raised the issue (In re Davis, Supra, 8 Cal.3d 798 809, fn. 9, 106 Cal.Rptr. 178, 505 P.2d 1018).

The issue here, one of first impression, is whether the new statute, which requires Chambers to go through a preliminary hearing when a doubt has arisen as to her present sanity, can withstand constitutional scrutiny. A preliminary hearing serves many functions, 3 and it is a significant stage in the criminal process (Jennings v. Superior Court, 66 Cal.2d 867, 59 Cal.Rptr. 440, 428 P.2d 304). However, its chief purpose is a determination by a magistrate of the question of whether probable cause exists to hold a defendant to answer the charges which have been filed against him (Pen.Code § 872). The Legislature, by passing this urgency measure, has indicated its determination that persons should not be committed for mental incompetence through the criminal process without any independent assessment by a magistrate of the sufficiency of the criminal charges. 4

The power of the court to commit Chambers comes because she is accused of crimes. The new procedure permits Chambers to challenge the criminal charges before she is committed, at least to the extent that counsel can act on her behalf. Since counsel may be able to show at the preliminary hearing that the evidence is insufficient to hold her to answer, or that she has a controlling affirmative defense, it is to her interest that the matter go forward.

Although not specifically provided in the statute, we think suitable safeguards exist to protect Chambers' rights. The preliminary hearing is a critical stage in the criminal process, and one held when the defendant is not mentally competent does not comply with due process of law. A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel at a preliminary hearing, and counsel cannot effectively represent a client who does not understand the nature of the charges against her or who is unable to cooperate in her defense. If Chambers is held to answer, and if she is found mentally incompetent at her superior court hearing, she will not have been lawfully committed to stand...

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13 cases
  • People v. Jones
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • September 9, 1998
    ...the evidence adduced at that hearing is unlawful. [Citation.]" (Id., at p. 930, 154 Cal.Rptr. 476, quoting Chambers v. Municipal Court (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 809, 813, 118 Cal.Rptr. 120.) "The People argue that absent a showing to the contrary by petitioner, it may be presumed that his attorn......
  • People v. Duncan
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • February 28, 2000
    ...enacted in 1974, provided that a competency hearing could not be held until the information was filed. (Chambers v. Municipal Court (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 809, 811, 118 Cal.Rptr. 120.) This prevented an incompetent defendant from being indefinitely committed to a state hospital without the co......
  • Booth v. Superior Court
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • August 18, 1997
    ...competent and asked for a suspension of proceedings under Penal Code section 1368, subdivision (b)." (Chambers v. Municipal Court (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 809, 811, 118 Cal.Rptr. 120.) "Although both the court and the prosecution agreed with counsel's assessment of his client's mental condition......
  • Mary T., In re
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • December 20, 1985
    ...of a preliminary hearing or grand jury hearing." (Ibid., at p. 229, 124 Cal.Rptr. 57, 539 P.2d 817; and see Chambers v. Municipal Court, supra, 43 Cal.App.3d 809, 118 Cal.Rptr. 120.) The significant differences between adult and juvenile present competence procedures lead us to conclude tha......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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