Chambers v. Owens-Ames-Kimball Co.

• Decision Date: 22 May 1946
• Docket Number: 30517.
• Citation: 146 Ohio St. 559,67 N.E.2d 439
• Parties: CHAMBERS v. OWENS-AMESKIMBALL CO. et al.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

67 N.E.2d 439

146 Ohio St. 559

CHAMBERS v. OWENS-AMESKIMBALL CO. et al.

No. 30517.

Supreme Court of Ohio

May 22, 1946

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The phrase, 'as a condition of being so employed,' as used in Section 1345-6 e (1), General Code, which provides that no individual, otherwise qualified to receive state unemployment compensation benefits, shall lose his right to benefits by reason of a refusal to accept new work if 'as a condition of being so employed,' he would be denied the right to retain membership in and observe the lawful rules of any labor organization, means that, as a requisite of being employed, an individual shall be denied by his prospective employer the right described, and does not refer to any result which may affect such individual in his right to benefits by virtue of the imposition of some rule or regulation of a labor organization of which he is a member.

2. An interpretation of the terms of Section 1345-6 e (1), General Code, which would permit a member of a labor organization to refuse an offer of work on the ground that its acceptance would violate the rules of his organization and still remain eligible for unemployment compensation benefits, while a nonmember of a labor organization by virtue of the terms of the same statute would not be eligible for such benefits if he refused to accept the same work tendered under the same circumstances, would result in an unconstitutional operation of the statute.

Appeal from Court of Appeals, Franklin County.

Harvey Edward Chambers, the appellee, has been a member of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America for 27 years. Being 72 years of age and having been out of employment for five months, he, on April 30 1943, filed a claim for benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Act. His claim was allowed and compensation paid beginning April 4, 1943.

On June 2, 1943, he was referred to a job as carpenter with the U.S Roofing Company, which referral he refused to accept. His only objection to the proffered employment was that it was a nonunion job and that he could not work with nonunion labor because to do so would be in violation of the rules of his union.

Section 7, paragraph 'C' of the trade rules of his local union of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America provides: 'No members of the local union No. 200 will be permitted to work on jobs where nonunion carpenters are working, or for employer who employs nonunion carpenters, * * * under penalty of a fine as may be determined by local union No. 200.'

Section 55, paragraph 'C' of the constitution and by-laws of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America provides: 'Any officer or member who wilfully * * * violates the trade rules of the locality in which he is working * * * may be fined, suspended or expelled, as the local union may decide.'

Upon appellee's refusal to accept this referral of work, the Unemployment Compensation Bureau Board of Review, after the various rehearings and appeals provided by statute, suspended the benefit rights of appellee.

The appellee then appealed to the Common Pleas Court of Franklin county, which court affirmed the decision of the board of review.

The appellee then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which court reversed the judgment of the Common Pleas Court.

A motion of appellant to certify the record of the Court of Appeals to this court was allowed.

Hugh S. Jenkins, Atty. Gen., and John M. Woy, of Columbus, for appellant.

Dale Stump and C. J. Wardlaw, both of Columbus, for appellee.

HART Judge.

The appellee refused to accept the referral of the bureau to a nonunion employment because, as he claims, working therein would have resulted in a violation of the rules of his union and might have subjected him to disciplinary action by the union.

The validity of his excuse for refusal to accept new employment, as it affects his right to receive unemployment compensation, depends upon his fitness for the work made available to him. In turn, his fitness for employment was specifically fixed by the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Act.

Section 1345-6 a(4)(5), General Code, 119 Ohio Laws 836, provided:

'a. No individual shall be entitled to any benefits unless he or she * * *

'(4) is able to work and available for work in his usual trade or occupation, or in any other trade or occupation for which he is reasonably fitted; and

'(5) is unable to obtain work in his usual trade or occupation or any other employment for which he is reasonably fitted including employments not subject to this act.'

Section 1345-6 d (2), General Code, 119 Ohio Laws 836, provided:

'd. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, no individual may * * * be paid benefits for the duration of any period of unemployment with respect to which the administrator finds that such individual: * * *

'(2) has refused to accept an offer of work for which he is reasonably fitted; * * *.'

The act then describes certain specified circumstances of employment under which a refusal to accept new work will not operate to deny the applicant's right to receive benefits. The non-disqualification provision under consideration in the instant case is found in Section 1345-6 e (1), General Code, which reads as follows:

'e. No individual otherwise qualified to receive benefits shall lose the right to benefits by reason of a refusal to accept new work if:

'(1) As a condition of being so employed, he would be required to join a company union, or to resign from or refrain from joining any bonafide labor organization, or would be denied the right to retain mumbership in and observe the lawful rules of any such organization.'

The Board of Review of the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation placed its interpretation on these statutes in the following language: 'We believe that the word 'condition' as used in Section 1345-6 e (1) refers to restrictions and qualifications contained in the offer of employment made by the employer to the prospective employee, and that it should not be interpreted to mean the 'result' of being so employed, as contended by claimant. In other words, if, as in the present case, the offer of work is unconditional, the employee cannot justify his refusal thereof for the sole reason that his acceptance of said work would result in disciplinary action by his union. In our opinion, the Legislature did not intend to delegate to labor unions, through the medium of their rules and regulations, the power and authority to determine that a member should not accept a referral to work and thereby qualify such member for unemployment compensation to which he would otherwise not be entitled because of the refusal of such a referral.'

In passing, it will be noted that the standard provision in the unemployment compensation acts as to availability is that a worker must be 'able to work and available for work.' Fourteen of fifty-one jurisdictions require more than mere availability for work. One of that minority is Ohio in which the statute provides that no benefits shall be payable to one who 'has refused to accept an offer of work for which he is reasonably fitted.' 22 North Carolina Law Review 189, 191. In other words, the Ohio statute requires the bureau to consider and determine whether the applicant is so qualified by training and experience for the work offered and refused as to preclude unemployment benefits, rather than his suitability or appropriateness for the work or the suitability of the work for him as measured by his appraisal of it. See Stella v. Downyflake Restaurant, 126 Conn. 441, 11 A.2d 848.

In the phrase, 'as a condition of being so employed,' incorporated in our statute, the word 'condition' is the equivalent of 'requisite' or 'requirement.' In legal signification, the term 'condition' denotes something attached to and made a part of a grant or privilege. State ex rel. Fanger v. Board of Public Works, 42 Ohio St. 607.

There follows in the statute certain named requisites which if the employer imposes upon the applicant for employment as a condition or requisite of being employed, a refusal by the applicant of such employment will not bar him from unemployment benefits. By the language of the statute, these named requisites are directly connected with and referable to the condition of being employed. They are: (1) The employee so employed shall be required to join a company union; (2) he shall be required to resign from, or to refrain from joining, a bona fide labor organization; and (3) he shall be denied the right to retain his membership in any labor organization, or the right to observe its lawful rules.

Appellee concedes the interpretation here suggested as to the first two requisites named in subparagraph (1) of Section 1345-6 e, General Code, but claims that the third requisite named in such subparagraph should be so construed as not to bar from unemployment benefits an unemployed person who refuses to accept any employment which might result in the denial of his right to retain membership in his labor organization through prospective disciplinary action on the part of the organization itself.

In our view, this is a strained and untenable interpretation of the statute. This observation is made apparent from the fact that if the employment should result in the loss of the employee's membership in his union by action of the union itself, the provision of the statute with reference to a denial of the right to 'observe the lawful rules of any such organization' would be superfluous and meaningless. Obviously, the union itself would not deny him the right to observe the rules of the union.

Furthermore the interpretation of appellee would make the operative effect of a...