Chambers v. State

• Decision Date: 17 December 1934
• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Parties: CHAMBERS et al. v. STATE.

158 So. 153

117 Fla. 642

CHAMBERS et al. v. STATE.

Florida Supreme Court

December 17, 1934

En Banc.

Error to Circuit Court, Broward County; George W. Tedder, Judge.

Petition by Isiah (Izell) Chambers and others for a writ of error coram nobis. The petition was denied, and petitioners bring error.

Reversed with direction.

COUNSEL

S. D. McGill and Robert P. Crawford, both of Jacksonville, for plaintiffs in error.

Cary D Landis, Atty. Gen., and Roy Campbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

OPINION

ELLIS Justice.

The case is here on writ of error to an order made by the circuit court of Broward county denying a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, application having been made to this court by petition of the plaintiffs in error for permission to apply to the trial court for such a writ and granted. See Chambers et al. v. State, 111 Fla. 707, 113 Fla 786, 152 So. 437.

Robert Darsey was killed by certain persons in the town of Pompano in Broward county on Saturday night, May 13, 1933, about 9 o'clock. He was attacked, beaten severely, robbed, and left to die on the public highway. The object of the attack was robbery. Money was obtained from the victim of the murderous assault, and he died from the effect of the wounds inflicted.

The persons named as plaintiffs in error in this proceeding were arrested with eight or ten others, all negroes, upon suspicion. After some investigation--judicial or extrajudicial, official or unofficial, does not appear--all were released except the persons named as plaintiffs in error in this proceeding.

Chambers was tried by jury on an indictment charging the four of them with the murder of Mr. Darsey and found guilty of murder in the first degree. The other three pleaded guilty. The evidence which the judge of the court heard in the Chambers Case was by stipulation of counsel used by the court in determining under the statute the degree of guilt of Davis, Williamson, and Woodward, the other three negroes charged jointly with Chambers with the crime and who pleaded guilty. Section 7140, Comp. Gen. Laws.

A statement of the facts as they were disclosed in the case against Chambers appears in the reported case entitled Chambers et al. v. State, 111 Fla. 707, 151 So. 499.

The four accused persons were adjudged to be guilty of murder in the first degree and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. See Chambers et al. v. State, supra.

The convicted persons then lodged in this court a petition to permit them to apply to the circuit court for a writ of error coram nobis. The court held that the petition contained allegations of such nature that warranted this court in granting the petitioner leave to apply to the circuit court for the writ. See Chambers et al. v. State, 111 Fla. 707, 113 Fla. 786, 152 So. 437.

It was held that if the allegations were true they constituted sufficient ground for granting the writ; that the determination of such questions to be presented in the application to the trial court may be had in that court 'under issues duly made for that purpose.'

The purpose of the writ is to enable a party against whom a judgment has been taken to be relieved in the same court by showing error of fact. The fact assigned as error, the writ being allowed, should be tried by a jury. See Tyler v. Morris, 20 N. C. (4 Dev. & B.) 625, 34 Am. Dec. 395.

Some confusion exists as to the nature and purpose of the writ because it is so little used in ordinary practice and in many states has fallen into disuse altogether because of other remedies wholly sufficient prescribed by statute. In this state, however, the writ has in recent years been several times used. The principal difference between an ordinary writ of error and a writ of error coram nobis is that the former is brought for a supposed error in law apparent on the record and takes the case to a higher tribunal where the question is to be decided and the judgment, sentence, or decree is to be affirmed or reversed, while the latter, a writ of error coram nobis, is brought for an alleged error of fact not appearing upon the record and lies to the same court in which the judgment was entered in order that it may correct the error which it is presumed would not have been committed had the fact in the first instance been brought to its notice.

The error always assigned is not for any fault in the court but for some defect in the process or default in the ministerial officers, or because of the existence of a fact of which if the court had been duly advised the judgment could not have been properly entered. Such an error of fact is not an error of the judge; therefore reversing the judgment by the judge pronouncing it is not a reversing of his own judgment, nor was it so considered at common law. It is as if the judgment sought to be reversed by the proceeding is wanting in a necessary element without which no valid judgment could be entered. Many conditions may exist which would render it impossible that a valid judgment could be entered, as, for instance, where a judgment is entered against a person who had no notice of the institution of the suit; where a judgment is entered upon a plea which the defendant was coerced through fear of personal violence to make, or where through some fraud or deception practiced by a ministerial officer of the court, a judgment is procured which would not have been entered had the judge been informed of the true state of facts.

The writ is not regarded as a writ of right and is not allowed as of course, but only upon its being made to appear with reasonable certainty that there has been some error of fact. The application is usually made on sworn petition and on notice to the opposite party. Notice is necessary because the writ of error coram nobis is in the nature of a new suit to annul and revoke the former judgment. The former practice requires an assignment of errors in the nature of a declations stating the errors of fact relied upon. The defendant in error may demur or plead to the assignment. The common plea in error is nulla est erratum, which admits the truth of the error but insists that in law it is not error. If it is desired to deny the truth of the error in fact assigned, the defendant in error traverses it by plea and takes issue thereon, which issue is tried by a jury, or he may plead specially any matter in confession and avoidance. 2 Tidd's Practice, 1175; 3 Bac. Abr. title Error.

If the judgment is for the plaintiff in error, it is that the former judgment be recalled, revoked, and annulled; if for the defendant in error, it is that it be affirmed.

In such an attack upon a judgment it is the proceedings only that are complained of as erroneous that are reversed. The plaintiff may after reversal continue the original action without being compelled to commence de novo. In the case at bar, for example, if the judgment should be reversed for the alleged error of fact set out in the petition, the defendants in the criminal case would be required to enter their pleas to the indictment and the cause would proceed upon the new pleas to final disposition of the case. For a full note on the subject, see the case of Holford v. Alexander, 12 Ala. 280, as reported in 46 Am. Dec. 253, with note. Also 3 Chitty Blackstone's Com. P. 406; 2 R. C. L. 305.

The writ has not been abolished by statute in this state and is applicable in criminal as well as civil cases, as this court has in several cases recognized. Therefore when the writ is used the procedure at common law in connection with its use is not only appropriate but proper.

The practice has prevailed in this state that when a judgment in a criminal case has been affirmed by the Supreme Court and the convicted persons desire to attack the judgment because of the existence of a fact which had the court known would have precluded the entry of the particular judgment, application must be made to the Supreme Court for leave to file a petition for the writ in the trial court because the judgment which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court becomes the judgment of that court and no other state court can examine its proceedings and annul its judgment, therefore it has been expressly held that the Supreme Court in such case has power to review its own judgment rendered on appeal through a writ of error coram nobis. See Dows v. Harper, 6 Ohio, 518, 27 Am. Dec. 270.

The rule may be subject to some modification as affected by the loss of jurisdiction by expiration of the term, about which, however, no opinion is expressed. It is therefore proper and entirely consistent with principle that this court after affirming a judgment of conviction should require a convicted person desiring a writ of error coram nobis to submit his petition to this court wherein he shall set forth the facts which were not brought to the attention of the trial court and which he asserts would have precluded the entry of the particular judgment had they been known or had been brought to the court's attention. In such case this court then determines the legal effect of such alleged facts as affecting the judgment, and if it deems them sufficient in legal effect if established, it grants permission to the applicant to apply to the trial court for the writ of error coram nobis. That course was followed in this case. Chambers et al. v. State, supra.

When the Supreme Court has made its order upon a petition duly presented allowing the petitioner to apply to the trial court for a writ of error coram nobis, it is equivalent to an order or mandate that the lower court allow the writ to the end that the question of fact may be inquired into, and if it be found that it is true, then the judgment entered should be annulled and the proceedings in the cause be...