Chambers v. State, 53300
| Decision Date | 12 May 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 53300,53300 |
| Citation | 245 S.E.2d 467,146 Ga.App. 126 |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | CHAMBERS v. The STATE. |
Ben Lancaster, Cartersville, for appellant.
Charles Crawford, Dist. Atty., for appellee.
The defendant Chambers was convicted of statutory rape of the daughter of a woman with whom he was living. On appeal, this court reversed the conviction on the basis that there was "no corroborative evidence to the testimony of the alleged victim tending to prove the incident occurred . . ." The Supreme Court reversed on certiorari, holding that "polygraph results were adequate to provide the corroboration of the victim's testimony required by Code Ann. § 26-2018." Famber v. State, 134 Ga.App. 112, 213 S.E.2d 525, which stated that polygraph results are inadmissible and without probative value, was expressly overruled. This case was returned for such further action by this court as may be necessary. We will consider the remaining enumerations of error. Held :
Defendant alleges it was error for the trial court to admit "testimony as to the polygraph test given to Defendant under conditions which were contrary to the stipulation entered into between Defendant and The State." We agree.
Counsel for the defendant and the district attorney entered into a verbal agreement in which "both Defendant and (the girl) were to be given polygraph tests . . . with the results to be used as evidence . . . under the following conditions: . . . (c) Defendant's attorney must be allowed to review each question to be asked Defendant with regards to the crime of which he was accused prior to the time the polygraph test was given . . ." Defendant's attorney was presented with, and approved, a list of questions to be propounded to the defendant during the polygraph test.
Defendant alleged, in his motion to suppress, that contrary to the conditions of the stipulation, the polygraph operator "asked inflammatory and improper questions with regards to sexual activity which had not been agreed to by Defendant's attorney." We agree that the defendant was asked questions by the polygraph operator that were not on the approved set of questions by defendant's counsel. Those questions related to masturbation and unnatural sex acts by the defendant.
It is evident from defendant's argument that he understood the agreement of counsel to mean that he would have prior approval of all questions to be asked of the defendant during the polygraph examination. The state does not contest this assertion. They argue that "(t)he questions complained of . . . were routine questions used by the polygraph operator which were brought out in the trial only on cross-examination of the operator by the defense counsel."
The decision we reach will be determined by whether we use a strict construction of the verbal agreement, as stated by defendant's counsel, or give it a liberal construction. We have found no precedent in this area. The agreement was that defendant's attorney "must be allowed to review each question to be asked Defendant with regards to the crime of which he was accused . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) First, under a strict contractual interpretation, defendant's counsel did not have approval authority only the right to "review" such questions. Secondly, again using a strict interpretation, defendant's counsel had the right to "review" only those questions relating "to the crime of which he was accused . . ." The questions objected to, which related to masturbation and unnatural sex acts of the defendant, did not relate to the crime he was accused of but were "control questions" and "guilt complex" questions used by a polygraph operator as part of his technique in evoking psychological and physiological responses.
From a review of the entire record it is evident that the defendant's counsel is sincere in his assertions that the state's polygraph operator did not comply with counsel's oral agreement. Counsel for the state never disagreed with this assertion. We note that defendant's counsel actually was given the right of prior approval of the questions to be asked, except that those questions did not include the "control questions" or "guilt complex" questions which ultimately were added to the list submitted to counsel. We understand the operator's reason for not submitting such questions to defendant's counsel, for those...
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Rutledge v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 0533
...State, 527 P.2d 169 (Okl.Cr.App.1974) ]; but see State v. Chambers, 240 Ga. 76, 239 S.E.2d 324 (1977), appeal after remand, 146 Ga.App. 126, 245 S.E.2d 467 (1978); State v. Ross, 7 WashApp. 62, 497 P.2d 1343, 53 A.L.R.3d 997 Because the case for other reasons is being remanded for a new tri......
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Reynolds v. State
...provided that both parties abide by the express stipulation. State v. Chambers, 240 Ga. 76, 239 S.E.2d 324 (1977); Chambers v. State, 146 Ga.App. 126, 245 S.E.2d 467 (1978). Clearly these standards were met 5. Error is enumerated on the failure to charge on the credibility of young witnesse......
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State v. Meadows, 89A81
...(1961). The provisions of the stipulation governing admissibility of this evidence must be strictly complied with. Chambers v. State, 146 Ga.App. 126, 245 S.E.2d 467 (1978); see State v. Milano, supra; Butler v. Florida, 228 So.2d 421 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1969); People v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 306,......
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Camp v. State
...the court never signed. Defendant contends that the terms of the agreement were not strictly adhered to as required by Chambers v. State, 146 Ga.App. 126, 245 S.E.2d 467, i.e., never signed by the court or the district attorney. However, the instrument itself shows the initials of the assis......