Chambers v. State
| Decision Date | 10 August 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. O-80-811,O-80-811 |
| Citation | 649 P.2d 795 |
| Parties | David CHAMBERS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma |
David Chambers, appellant, was convicted of Feloniously Pointing a Weapon, After Former Conviction of a Felony, in Texas County District Court, Case No. CRF-77-217, and received a sentence of ten (10) years' imprisonment with seven (7) years suspended. He appeals from the revocation of the suspended sentence. AFFIRMED.
David Luther Woodward, Sp. Counsel Appellate Public Defender Project, Norman, for appellant.
Jan Eric Cartwright, Atty. Gen., Susan McNaughton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, for appellee.
The appellant, David Chambers, pleaded guilty to Feloniously Pointing a Weapon, After Former Conviction of a Felony, in Texas County District Court. He received a sentence of ten (10) years' imprisonment, seven (7) of which were suspended by the trial judge. On May 27, 1980, the State filed a petition to revoke Chambers' suspended sentence. Pursuant to a hearing held on June 13, 1980, the district court revoked the appellant's suspended sentence.
The facts leading to the appellant's revocation are somewhat involved. On April 3, 1980, a police-operated ambulance was summoned to the appellant's Guymon home to aid Corbin Kibler who had taken an overdose of drugs. Kibler was transported to the hospital and the appellant was asked to aid in determining what drugs had been taken. At the hospital, the appellant became belligerent, apparently due to a state of inebriation, and he was placed under arrest for public intoxication. A vial containing two amphetamines was confiscated from his shirt pocket. Chambers then turned to a companion and told her to "get rid of the amphetamines."
Subsequently, based on these facts, a warrant was issued authorizing police to search Chambers' home. During the search, several containers of marijuana were discovered along with several devices used in the processing and preparation of marijuana and hashish.
Later, on May 23, 1980, the appellant was involved in a traffic accident. When police arrived to investigate, Chambers was incoherent and was having difficulty walking. A strong odor of alcohol emanated from within the appellant's automobile leading the investigating officer to believe that he was intoxicated. Chambers was placed under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. A wrecker was summoned to tow away his car. Prior to the time the wrecker arrived, the contents of Chambers' car were inventoried. Among various articles found in the car, police discovered forty-nine (49) amphetamine capsules and a small quantity of marijuana seeds.
Based on these incidents, the State filed an application to revoke the appellant's suspended sentence alleging that he had committed the crimes of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, driving under the influence of drugs, and possession of unlawful amphetamines on two occasions. After a hearing, a demurrer to the charge of driving under the influence of drugs was sustained. The appellant was found to have committed the remainder of the charges and his suspended sentence was revoked.
The principle issue involved in this appeal concerns the admission of evidence seized in an allegedly improper search.
Initially, the State argues that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not be applied to revocation proceedings. 1 This issue was resolved in Michaud v. State, 505 P.2d 1399 (Okl.Cr.1973). We find that the reasoning expressed in Michaud, supra, i.e. that the exclusionary rule applies to revocation hearings is still viable in this jurisdiction.
The appellant's challenge to the May 23, 1980, inventory search of his car may be reduced to the contention that the arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol and the subsequent impoundment and inventory of his car served as a mere pretext to allow the police to search the car. He argues that since his head had struck the windshield of his car during the accident, his post-accident incoherence was not necessarily due to intoxication. Further, citing Bowen v. State, 606 P.2d 589 (Okl.Cr.1980), the appellant contends the search, in this case, was not sufficiently comprehensive to support the State's assertion that the search was an inventory of the car's contents.
In regard to the appellant's first contention, we believe the Guymon police officer had sufficient reason to place the appellant under arrest. At the time of the arrest, it was apparent that the appellant's car had rammed into the side of another automobile under inexplicable circumstances. The appellant appeared incoherent and the odor of alcohol was detected within the car. Under these circumstances it was reasonable to believe that the appellant was intoxicated. This is not altered by the fact that he had struck his head during the collision since that would only account for the appellant's incoherence but not his erratic driving nor the smell of alcohol. Finally, the subsequent dismissal by the hearing judge of the DUI charge does not discount the propriety of the arrest since the judge had the benefit of laboratory tests which indicated the absence of drugs or alcohol. Accordingly, based upon the facts before the officer at the time, probable cause supported the appellant's arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol.
With the appellant properly under arrest, no one was immediately available to operate his car which was stalled in the middle of the intersection. Even if someone had been available, it appears the car was inoperable. Under these circumstances, the only proper action was to impound the car and remove it from the path of traffic.
Finally, the inventory of the contents of the car was proper. We have previously upheld inventory searches...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Primeaux v. State
...offered is not to establish any assertions made by the challenged evidence, it is not hearsay. Chambers v. State, 1982 OK CR 123, ¶ 16, 649 P.2d 795, 798, overruled on other grounds in Richardson v. State, 1992 OK CR 76, 841 P.2d 603. Conversely, if the purpose of offering the statement is ......
-
Williams v. State
...was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted â that the victim actually delivered food to the homeless. Chambers v. State, 649 P.2d 795, 798 (Okl.Cr. 1982) (if the purpose for which the statement is offered is not to establish any assertion made by the challenged evidence, it i......
-
Richardson v. State
...revocation proceedings. This Court acknowledges that this holding represents a departure from our previous decisions in Chambers v. State, 649 P.2d 795, 797 (Okl.Cr.1982), and Michaud v. State, 505 P.2d 1399, 1402-03 (Okl.Cr.1973). In those cases, we held that the exclusionary rule does app......
-
Miller v. State
...is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted is not hearsay. 12 O.S.2001, § 2801(A)(3); Chambers v. State, 1982 OK CR 123, ¶ 16, 649 P.2d 795, 798, overruled on other grounds in Richardson v. State, 1992 OK CR 76, ¶ 7, 841 P.2d 603, 605. What the officers said to Barnes moments befor......