Chambers v. Supreme Tent of Knights of the Maccabees of World

• Decision Date: 17 July 1901
• Docket Number: 142
• Citation: 200 Pa. 244,49 A. 784
• Parties: Chambers, Appellant, v. Supreme Tent of the Knights of the Maccabees of the World
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

49 A. 784

200 Pa. 244

Chambers, Appellant,

v.

Supreme Tent of the Knights of the Maccabees of the World

No. 142

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

July 17, 1901

Argued April 30, 1901

Appeal, No. 142, Jan. T., 1901, by plaintiff, from judgment of C.P. Erie Co., Nov. T., 1899, No. 39, for plaintiff on case stated in case of Cora F. Chambers v. Supreme Tent of the Knights of the Maccabees of the World. Affirmed.

Case stated to determine liability for death benefits.

WALLING P.J., filed the following opinion:

In my opinion the plaintiff is entitled to recover the sum of $70.60 with interest from December 30, 1898, and no more. Plaintiff's husband, George F. Chambers, on whose life the beneficiary certificate in question was issued, joined the order April 24, 1894. He committed suicide, while insane on September 30, 1898. The by-laws of the order in force at the time of his death provided that no benefit should be paid on account of death of a member from suicide within five years after admission "whether the member taking his own life was sane or insane at the time." Such a provision is valid: Tritschler v. Benefit Association, 180 Pa 205; Bigelow v. Berkshire Life Insurance Co., 93 U.S. 284; Travelers' Insurance Co. v. McConkey, 127 U.S. 661. It is true that at the time he joined the order the provision in the by-laws as to suicide was only for one year and that more than a year after he became a member the by-laws were amended extending such provision for five years as above referred to. It is also true the beneficiary certificate, on which this action is founded, and which formed his contract with the defendant, stipulates for the payment of the benefit in controversy to plaintiff "provided he (George F. Chambers) shall have in every particular complied with the laws of the order now in force or that may hereafter be adopted." It was a part of his contract that he would comply with bylaws thereafter adopted. That by-laws so made are valid, both as to the member and his beneficiary, in cases exactly like this, has been held by many courts of high authority. See 3 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.), p. 1065, Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. La Malta, 95 Tenn. 157; s.c. 30 L.R.A. 838, Supreme Commandery Knights of Golden Rule v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436; s.c. 46 Am. Rep. 332; Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Kutscher, 179 Ill. 340; s.c. 70 Am. St. Rep. 115, Fullenwider v. Supreme Council of the Royal League, 180 Ill. 621. s.c. 72 Am. St. Rep. 239; and Pain v. Societe St. Jean Baptist, 172 Mass. 319. The defendant is a beneficiary order and not an insurance company. No right became vested in the plaintiff by virtue of said certificate until the death of her husband. The defendant's obligation to pay the benefit was conditioned upon the member's compliance with the laws of the order then in force or that might thereafter be adopted. This case is very different from Hale v. Equitable Aid Union, 168 Pa. 377. In that case the certificate of membership stipulated that at the expiration of twelve years the member, if living and in good standing, should receive one half of the amount of his certificate, and while there the right to amend the by-laws was reserved to the order, it was held that such specific agreement to pay a certain amount at a certain time was not necessarily a part of the constitution and by-laws and that such contract could not be nullified by a change of the by-laws. And besides as I understand that case, the by-laws in question were not changed until after plaintiff's rights had become vested. In the case at bar had said George F. Chambers died before the amendment to the by-laws, a different case would be presented. Then the case of Becker v. Berlin Beneficial Society, 144 Pa. 232, would be in point. For it is there held...