Pain v. Societe St. Jean Baptiste

• Citation: 172 Mass. 319,52 N.E. 502
• Parties: PAIN v. SOCIETE ST. JEAN BAPTISTE.
• Decision Date: 05 January 1899
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

172 Mass. 319

52 N.E. 502

PAIN v. SOCIETE ST. JEAN BAPTISTE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

January 5, 1899

COUNSEL

L.E. Wood and A.G. Weeks, for appellant.

Hugo A Dubuque, for appellee.

OPINION

HAMMOND J.

The defendant society is a beneficiary organization chartered in 1884, under Pub.St. c. 115, and ever since its incorporation the plaintiff has been a member in good standing. In June 1890, the plaintiff, by reason of sickness, became unable to work, and has so continued to the present time; and during that time he has received benefits at the rate of $5 per week for 13 weeks of each year, down to July 7, 1896; and since the latter date he has received benefits at the rate of $1 only per week for 13 weeks of each year. This suit is brought to recover the additional $4 per week for a period of 9 weeks. Whether the plaintiff can recover depends upon the construction and effect of the amendment of the by-laws which was passed July 7, 1896. If it is applicable to him, he cannot recover; if not, he can. The by-law of 1893 (which, so far as the plaintiff is concerned, was not materially different from that of 1889), under which the plaintiff was receiving aid at the time of the amendment in question, was as follows: "Every member who shall belong to the society for twelve consecutive months, who has paid his dues contributions, fines or other sums assessed by vote or by-law of the society, shall have a right to five dollars per week if he becomes unable to work, in consequence of sickness or accident, during a period not exceeding thirteen weeks in each year, beginning from the date of the first application for benefits." And the amendment of July 7, 1896, was as follows: "Provided, that when a member has received thirty-nine weeks of sick benefits, or one hundred ninety-five dollars, for the same or a different period of disability, then he shall not hereafter receive more than one dollar per week, instead of five dollars, for thirteen weeks of each year, if his sickness shall so long continue; and that during a period of five years, aggregating sixty-five dollars of benefits. Each year reckons from the date of the first application for benefits. If, after that period of five years, he is still unable to work, he is then entitled to five dollars a week for thirteen weeks of each year for three years, as at first. This partial suspension of benefits is established so as to allow, as much as possible, all the members to share more equitably in the disability funds."

The plaintiff concedes that the amendment was duly passed, but in his brief contends, in the first place, that "the defendant society cannot by such amendment, under the circumstances of this case, so change its obligation to the plaintiff," because his "originally contingent right to receive benefits as stated became vested upon the happening of the contingency, i.e. his disability to work, June 7, 1890, and from that time no act of the society, by amendment to its by-laws, could devest him of that right"; and, in the second place, that even if his rights "were not vested, and could be taken away by amendment of the by-laws, such amendment could have no retroactive force," and that "to hold that payments of benefits made before the adoption of the amendment can be applied to benefits accruing under the amendment will make such amendment retroactive in force, and will place the plaintiff in a worse position than the other members of the society at the time of the adoption of the amendment." The plaintiff's contention more briefly expressed, is that the defendant had no power to amend its by-laws so as to affect his rights to future benefits under a disability then existing; and, even if it had such power, this amendment, fairly construed does not affect such rights.

The rights of the plaintiff are determined by the nature of the contract between him and the society, as interpreted by the by-laws under which it was made, and in the light of the surrounding circumstances. The general purpose of the society was to give pecuniary aid to its sick or disabled, and, in case of the death of a member, to provide for the relief of his family. The fund for this purpose was to be raised by monthly dues, and in case of death by an assessment upon the survivors. Of course, the amount of benefits which the society, with due regard to the interest of the sick as well as that of the other members, could properly pay, depended upon many circumstances, such as the number of its members, the actual or relative number of the sick, the promptness with which dues were paid, and others of similar nature; and as these various circumstances might, and probably would, change from...