Chambers v. Tibbs

• Decision Date: 07 September 2007
• Docket Number: 2060480.
• Citation: 980 So.2d 1010
• Parties: Hermie CHAMBERS and Delores Chambers, individually and as parents and/or legal guardians of Hermiesha D. Chambers, a minor v. Suzann TIBBS, Barry R. Sadler, and the Eufaula Board of Education.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

980 So.2d 1010

Hermie CHAMBERS and Delores Chambers, individually and as parents and/or legal guardians of Hermiesha D. Chambers, a minor

v.

Suzann TIBBS, Barry R. Sadler, and the Eufaula Board of Education.

2060480.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

September 7, 2007.

Hermie Chambers and Delores Chamber, pro se.

Mark S. Boardman and April B. Danielson of Boardman, Carr & Hutcheson, P.C., Chelsea, for appellees.

BRYAN, Judge.

Hermie Chambers ("the father") and his wife, Delores Chambers ("the mother"), individually and as parents and/or legal guardians of their minor child, Hermiesha D. Chambers ("the child"), appeal from the dismissal of their action by the circuit court. The father and the mother are acting pro se. We dismiss part of the appeal on the basis that the father and the mother, who are not attorneys, may not prosecute the action as the child's attorneys, and we affirm the remaining portion of the circuit court's order dismissing the action because the father and the mother did not specifically state any claims of their own in the complaint. In resolving this appeal, we make no comment as to whether the child may have a valid claim.

The child in this case was enrolled in Bluff City Elementary School ("the school"), in Barbour County, at the time the action was filed. According to the complaint, in February 2006, the mother, the father, and the child (collectively "the family") received two parental-consent forms and two medical-release forms from the school. The forms pertained to two separate field trips the child's class had been scheduled to take the following month. The first field trip was to a middle school, and the second trip was a "positive behavior reward" field trip to a park in Dothan.

The father and the mother signed the consent forms and the medical-release forms, but they crossed out the sections of those forms that stated that the "sponsor" and the Eufaula Board of Education would be released from "any liability in case of accident or injury." The father and the mother received a letter from the school dated March 7, 2006, stating that unless they signed the release forms the child would not be allowed to attend the field trips, which had been scheduled for March 9, 2006, and March 17, 2006, respectively. The father and the mother sent letters to Suzann Tibbs, the principal of the school ("the principal"); Louise Conner, the President of the Eufaula Board of Education for that year; and Dr. Barry R. Sadler, the superintendent of the Eufaula city school system ("the superintendent"), asking to be informed as to which rules, policies, or laws they had violated. The complaint does not allege that the father and the mother signed the unaltered forms at any time.

The family contends that the principal, the superintendent, and the Eufaula Board of Education ("the Board") prohibited the child from attending both the March 9 field trip and the March 17 field trip. Subsequently, the father and the mother, acting pro se, filed suit, as individuals and as parents and/or guardians of the child, against the principal, the superintendent, and the Board. The complaint alleged various theories of relief that stem from the fact that the child was not allowed to attend the field trips; those theories include: "cruel and unusual punishment," wantonness, conspiracy, the tort of outrage, discrimination, contributory negligence, "exceeding authority by statute," and "punishment without due process." The family also sought to recover at least $50,000 in damages from the defendants. Additionally, on the same day that they filed suit, the family also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction to, among other things, prohibit the defendants from requiring the completion of the parental-consent forms and medical-release forms.

The defendants initially moved to dismiss the action on the basis that the father and the mother could not represent the child in the action because they were not licensed attorneys. The defendants then moved to dismiss the father's and the mother's alleged individual claims on the basis that each of the claims set out in the complaint pertained to claims of the child, not to the father and the mother as individuals. The defendants later moved to dismiss the entire action on the basis that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. After denying the family's motion for a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction, the circuit court entered an order stating, in pertinent part:

"The first motion to dismiss, which seeks to dismiss the minor plaintiff's claims is granted without prejudice. The second motion to dismiss, which seeks to dismiss the adult plaintiffs' claims is granted with prejudice, subject to any amendment rights in the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. The third motion to dismiss concerns claims brought by the adult plaintiffs and by the minor plaintiff. The claims brought by the adult plaintiffs are dismissed with prejudice, subject to any amendment rights in the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. A portion of the third motion to dismiss that seeks to dismiss the minor's claims is conditionally granted with prejudice, but only if it should be determined that the granting of the first motion to dismiss was erroneous.

"On December 1, the plaintiff[s] filed a 41-page `Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate a Judgment.' This motion, which is very similar to `Plaintiff Opposition to Defendant Second and Third Motion to Dismiss [sic],' never identifies what judgment the plaintiff[s] seek[] to change. The Court denied, by Order of November 8, 2006, plaintiffs' `Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction.' The Court has also denied plaintiffs' Motion to Shorten Time and Motion to Compel. Each of those orders were properly entered. Therefore, plaintiffs' Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate a Judgment is denied.

"All other pending motions are rendered moot by this Order.

The family then timely filed a motion to clarify or, in the alternative, to alter, amend, or vacate the circuit court's order dismissing the action. The circuit court denied that motion; the family then timely appealed to our Supreme Court, which transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to § 12-2-7, Ala.Code 1975.

Our Supreme Court has explained the standard of review to apply to a trial court's order dismissing an action as follows:

"`The appropriate standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] is whether, when the allegations of the complaint are viewed most strongly in the pleader's favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle her to relief. Raley v. Citibanc of Alabama/Andalusia, 474 So.2d 640, 641 (Ala.1985); Hill v. Falletta, 589 So.2d 746 (Ala.Civ.App. 1991). In making this determination, this Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether she may possibly prevail. Fontenot v. Bramlett, 470 So.2d 669, 671 (Ala.1985); Rice v. United Ins. Co. of America, 465 So.2d 1100, 1101 (Ala. 1984). We note that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.'"

Beckerle v. Moore, 909 So.2d 185, 187 (Ala.2005)(quoting Nance v. Matthews, 622 So.2d 297, 299 (Ala.1993)). Additionally, a trial court's order dismissing an action for a failure to state a claim is reviewed de novo by this court. Bay Lines, Inc. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 838 So.2d 1013, 1017 (Ala.2002).

The family raises numerous issues in its brief to this court; however, we may distill the issues in this appeal to three issues, the first two of which are dispositive: (1) whether the father and the mother may represent their child when neither parent is a licensed attorney; (2) whether the father and the mother have stated any cause of action on their own behalf against the principal, the superintendent, or the Board; and (3) assuming that the father and the mother have stated a cause of action on their own behalf against the defendants, whether any such cause is a claim upon which relief could be granted.

The father and the mother cite Rule 17(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., to support the proposition that they should be allowed to represent their child's interests in this action despite the fact that they are not licenced attorneys; however, that argument is unpersuasive. Rule 17(c) provides in part that "[w]henever a minor has a representative, such as a general guardian or like fiduciary, the representative may sue in the name of the minor." This phrase is similar to a phrase in Rule 17(c),¹ of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.² When interpreting Rule 17(c), Fed.R.Civ. P., the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated that Rule 17(c) "permits authorized representatives, including parents, to sue on behalf of minors, but does not confer any right upon such representatives to serve as legal counsel." Devine v. Indian River County Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 581 (11th Cir.1997) (citing Osei-Afriyie v. Medical Coll. of Pennsylvania, 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir.1991); Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir.1990); and Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir.1986)); see also Tindall v. Poultney High Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir.2005) ("[i]t is thus a well-established general rule in this Circuit that a parent not admitted to the bar cannot bring an action pro se in federal court on behalf of his or her child"). We similarly conclude that Rule 17(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., does not confer upon a representative of a minor a right to practice law on behalf of that minor.

Further, although there does not appear to be an Alabama case directly on point, in Ex parte Ghafary, 738 So.2d 778 ...