Beckerle v. Moore

• Decision Date: 11 March 2005
• Citation: 909 So.2d 185
• Parties: Robert A. BECKERLE et al. v. Roy S. MOORE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

909 So.2d 185

Robert A. BECKERLE et al. v. Roy S. MOORE.

1040219.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

March 11, 2005.

David Gespass of Gespass & Johnson, Birmingham, for appellants.

Phillip L. Jauregui, Birmingham; and Terry L. Butts of Cervera, Ralph & Butts, Troy, for appellee.

LYONS, Justice.

The plaintiffs below, Robert A. Beckerle and 10 other citizens of the State of Alabama (hereinafter "the taxpayers"), appeal from an order of the Montgomery Circuit Court granting a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, Roy S. Moore. We affirm.

I. Facts and Procedure

This appeal is from the dismissal of a complaint filed in the aftermath of litigation involving Roy S. Moore, the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Alabama. On July 31, 2001, Moore, relying upon his authority as the administrative head of Alabama's judicial system,¹ installed in the rotunda of the Alabama Judicial Building² a granite monument depicting in a place of prominence the Ten Commandments. Shortly after the monument was installed, two actions were filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama against Moore in his official capacity as Chief Justice. The plaintiffs in those actions, three attorneys licensed to practice law in the State of Alabama, sought injunctions requiring the removal of the monument, as well as attorney fees and costs. The two actions were consolidated, and the plaintiffs prevailed in the district court on their request for injunctive relief; a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit unanimously affirmed the judgment of the district court, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review. See Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F.Supp.2d 1290 (M.D.Ala.2002), aff'd, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1000, 124 S.Ct. 497, 157 L.Ed.2d 404 (2003). The monument was ultimately removed from the Judicial Building, and Moore was removed from office by the Court of the Judiciary after proceedings stemming from his failure to comply with the district court's order to remove the monument. The decision of the Court of the Judiciary was affirmed by a Special Supreme Court. See Moore v. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 891 So.2d 848 (Ala.2004).

The plaintiffs in the monument litigation based their claim on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Congress has authorized the recovery of attorney fees and costs by the prevailing parties in such actions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The plaintiffs in the monument litigation, as prevailing parties in an action against a state official sued in his official capacity, claimed attorney fees and costs from the State of Alabama under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.³ The State settled the plaintiffs' claims for the attorney fees and costs by agreeing to pay the sum of $549,430.53. That payment forms the basis of the taxpayers' litigation.

The taxpayers filed an action in the Montgomery Circuit Court on April 30, 2004, requesting that Moore be ordered to repay the State of Alabama the costs incurred as a result of what they say were Moore's "self-serving and heedless actions." They claimed that Moore, during the monument litigation, made statements and arguments that were "calculated to result in his losing the case [and that] he and his counsel failed and refused to assert the only feasible defense available, [i.e.,] that the monolith was a historic, not religious, installation."

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., Moore filed a motion to dismiss the taxpayers' complaint, arguing that the taxpayers did not have standing to sue for the requested relief. The trial court granted that motion, and the taxpayers appealed.

II. Standard of Review

In Nance v. Matthews, 622 So.2d 297, 299 (Ala.1993), this Court set forth the standard of review applicable to an order granting a motion to dismiss:

"The appropriate standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] is whether, when the allegations of the complaint are viewed most strongly in the pleader's favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle her to relief. Raley v. Citibanc of Alabama/Andalusia, 474 So.2d 640, 641 (Ala.1985); Hill v. Falletta, 589 So.2d 746 (Ala.Civ.App.1991). In making this determination, this Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether she may possibly prevail. Fontenot v. Bramlett, 470 So.2d 669, 671 (Ala.1985); Rice v. United Ins. Co. of America, 465 So.2d 1100, 1101 (Ala.1984). We note that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief."

III. Analysis

Moore argues that the taxpayers do not have standing to seek the requested relief. He points out that, in their complaint, the taxpayers cite § 6-5-4, Ala.Code 1975, which provides in subsection (a):

"(a) The Governor may cause actions to be commenced for the recovery of any public moneys, funds or property of the state or of any county which have been lost by the neglect or default of any public officer, which have been wrongfully expended or disbursed by such officer, which have been wrongfully used by such officer or which have been wrongfully received from him."

(Emphasis added.) Moore argues that only the Governor can initiate an action under § 6-5-4, and he points out that the Governor did not order the filing of the instant action. The taxpayers, on the other hand, contend that, as Alabama taxpayers, they have the right to recover state funds wrongfully expended by, or caused to be wrongfully expended by, a public officer, and that, although § 6-5-4 provides a method for the recovery of wrongfully expended funds, it does not provide the exclusive method for the recovery of wrongfully expended funds.

It is well settled that a taxpayer, in certain situations, has standing to challenge a proposed illegal expenditure by a state official. See Turnipseed v. Blan, 226 Ala. 549, 552, 148 So. 116, 118 (1933) (recognizing "the right of a taxpayer to maintain a suit in equity to restrain an officer of a city or county from disbursing funds without statutory authority or under an unconstitutional statute" and holding that the same right applies in the context of suits in equity against state officers (emphasis added)); Goode v. Tyler, 237 Ala. 106, 109, 186 So. 129, 131 (1939) ("[T]his Court is committed to the doctrine that a taxpayer may maintain a suit in equity to restrain a state officer in the unlawful disbursement of state funds." (emphasis added)); Zeigler v. Baker, 344 So.2d 761 (Ala.1977) (upholding an order of the trial court granting the taxpayer-plaintiff an injunction enjoining the comptroller, the finance director, and the treasurer of the State from making payments from public funds under the authority of an unconstitutional act).

The taxpayers argue that, in addition to a taxpayer's right to sue a state official to enjoin him or her from illegally expending public funds, this Court should recognize a taxpayer's right to recover funds that have been wrongfully expended. In Powers v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 Ala. 389, 391, 182 So. 758, 759 (1938), the Court, in framing the issue to be addressed in that case, stated:

"The question thus presented is the right of [the plaintiff] as a citizen and taxpayer to bring suit to recover [wrongfully expended] money for the State as a governmental unit, because of the failure of the State authorities to do so.

"The argument is made that since the taxpayer may enjoin the payment of State funds when it is proposed to pay them on an unconstitutional act, he has the right, on certain conditions, to recover them after they are paid, or to sue the officer or his bondsmen for the official misconduct of his office in thus paying out the money."

The Court in Powers rejected the plaintiff's argument and thus refused to recognize a taxpayer's right to sue to recover funds expended by a state official under the authority of an unconstitutional act. In Doremus v. Business Council of Alabama Workers' Compensation Self-Insurers Fund, 686 So.2d 252 (Ala.1996), this Court held that a taxpayer did not have standing to sue to collect taxes owed the State. In so holding, the Court cited with approval the holding in Powers:

"`We do not think, however, that a citizen and taxpayer has the legal and constitutional right to assume the burden or privilege of enforcing an obligation due to the corporate State, and for its benefit.'"

686 So.2d at 253 (quoting Powers, 236 Ala. at 393, 182 So. at 761) (emphasis added in Doremus).

The holdings in Powers and Doremus preclude the relief requested by the taxpayers. Their status as taxpayers is not sufficient to confer upon them standing to sue a state official to recover public funds allegedly wrongfully expended because of the acts of that official.

The taxpayers argue that Powers has been implicitly overruled, or, alternatively, that we should now expressly overrule it. In support of that argument, the taxpayers cite Knutson v. Bronner, 721 So.2d 678 (Ala.1998). In Knutson, the taxpayers-plaintiffs sought to recover, from the chief executive officer of the Retirement Systems of Alabama, funds allegedly misused by that officer. Before holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing, the Court stated:

"To determine whether a taxpayer has standing, under the standard set out in Zeigler [v. Baker, 344 So.2d 761 (Ala.1977),] and Goode v. Tyler, 237 Ala. 106, 186 So. 129 (1939) ..., we first must determine whether the expenditures challenged in this case were from `state funds,' as they clearly were in both of those cases. If [Retirement Systems of Alabama] funds are not `state funds' within the meaning of Alabama's Constitution and statutes, then the principles of law applied in Zeigler and Goode v. Tyler would not apply here."

721 So.2d at 680 (emphasis added). The Court in Knutson held that the funds involved in ...