Chambliss/Jenkins Associates v. Forster
| Decision Date | 06 May 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 81CA0644,81CA0644 |
| Citation | 650 P.2d 1315 |
| Parties | CHAMBLISS/JENKINS ASSOCIATES, a Partnership, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. Louise FORSTER, M.C. Schumann, Betty June Schumann, Harold W. Reeder, Ann Reeder, Alfred B. Carrick, Eula B. Carrick, La Villa Grande, Inc., a non-profit corporation, Bethesda Care Centers, a Nebraska corporation, Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants, Columbine Village, Inc., a non-profit corporation, Columbia Savings & Loan Association, First National Bank-North in Grand Junction, Grand Junction Drainage District, David C. Edwards, Jack R. Haney, d/b/a J.R. Haney & Associates, and Gena Harrison, Public Trustee, Defendants. . III |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
William M. Kane, Grand Junction, for plaintiff-appellant and cross-appellee.
Dufford, Waldeck, Ruland, Wise & Milburn, Amanda D. Bailey, Grand Junction, for defendants-appellees and cross-appellants.
This appeal involves a summary judgment entered by the trial court. Plaintiff architectural firm, Chambliss/Jenkins Associates (CJA), appeals the dismissal of its complaint and the denial of its motion to amend the complaint. Defendants, Louise Forster, M.C. Schumann, Betty June Schumann, Harold W. Reeder, Ann Reeder, Alfred B. Carrick, Eula B. Carrick, La Villa Grande, Inc., and Bethesda Care Centers, cross-appeal the dismissal of their counterclaims. 1 We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The record reveals the following facts. In the early 1970s, Forster, the Schumanns, the Reeders, the Carricks, and La Villa Grande, Inc., (owners) 2 purchased certain real property in Mesa County, Colorado. They constructed a nursing home on a portion of the property and then proposed to build a retirement center on the remainder. In late 1976, however, they concluded that they could not obtain appropriate financing for the project.
During 1976, the owners came into contact with defendant Columbine Village, Inc., (Columbine) a non-profit corporation formed by persons who also desired to develop a "life care" retirement center in Mesa County. In 1977, the owners and Columbine entered into the first of several option agreements for the purchase of the nursing home and adjoining property.
Columbine ultimately decided to obtain its financing through the sale of tax-exempt municipal bonds. It engaged the services of Municipal Bond Advisors of America (MBA) for this purpose and obtained new options from the owners extending through July 31, 1979. These options provided for early termination in the event Columbine did not submit written evidence to owners, by May 10, 1979, that MBA had obtained a commitment for the sale of the bonds.
On May 10, 1979, Columbine received a letter from MBA stating that MBA had secured a commitment to purchase the bonds and that MBA awaited the "receipt of properly signed documents as previously outlined." Columbine immediately forwarded this letter to the owners. On May 11, the owners' selling agent, Edwards, wrote a letter to Columbine that contained the following pertinent language:
....
The letter was hand-delivered to and accepted by Columbine that same day.
On May 12, 1979, Columbine executed a written contract with CJA which required CJA to prepare architectural plans and drawings for the proposed life care center in return for a fee of $95,400. In August 1979, owners and Columbine agreed to extend the options through October 1, 1979. The bonds were not purchased when offered for sale, and Columbine elected to forego its options.
When Columbine failed to pay for the architectural plans and designs which had been prepared, CJA filed a mechanic's lien against the interests of the owners, Edwards, and Bethesda Care Center (Bethesda) in the subject property. (Bethesda purchased a portion of the subject property from La Villa Grande, Inc., in 1980.) CJA also filed this foreclosure suit against Columbine, owners, Edwards, Bethesda, others not party to this appeal, and Jack R. Haney, d/b/a J.R. Haney & Associates (Haney), an unpaid subcontractor of CJA who had filed his own mechanic's lien on the property. (CJA obtained a default judgment against Columbine; the dispute between CJA and Haney has been resolved.)
The owners and Bethesda jointly filed a motion for summary judgment requesting dismissal of CJA's complaint and of Haney's cross-claim on the ground that the asserted mechanic's liens were invalid. CJA filed a motion for partial summary judgment, requesting an adjudication of the validity of its lien statement. No party requested summary judgment on the counterclaims and cross-claims of the owners and Bethesda against CJA and Haney.
Ruling that CJA had not established any right to impose a mechanic's lien on the subject property, the trial court granted the motion of the owners and Bethesda to dismiss CJA's complaint. The trial court also dismissed defendants' counterclaim "as unproven." The trial court did not rule on Haney's cross-claim, as requested by the owners and Bethesda in their summary judgment motion. And, contrary to the statements of the owners, Bethesda, and Edwards in their appellate briefs, the record reveals that the trial court did not dismiss their cross-claims against Haney. In denying post-trial motions filed by the owners, Bethesda, and Edwards and by CJA, the trial court held "that this determination shall provide a final judgment at the trial court level for all purposes of appellate review." We conclude that this language sufficiently complies with the requirements of C.R.C.P. 54(b).
CJA contends that the trial court erred in dismissing its complaint against the owners and Bethesda. We agree.
C.R.C.P. 56 permits the entry of a summary judgment when the pleadings and other evidentiary documents establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jones v. Dressel, Colo., 623 P.2d 370 (1981). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of fact in order to prevail, and any doubts as to the existence of such an issue must be resolved against the moving party. Primock v. Hamilton, 168 Colo. 524, 452 P.2d 375 (1969).
Section 38-22-101(1), C.R.S. 1973, upon which CJA relies, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"[A]rchitects, ... who have furnished designs, plans, plats, maps, specifications, drawings, ... or who have rendered other professional or skilled service, ... or work done or to be done, ... shall have a lien upon the property upon which they have ... rendered service ... for the value of such ... services rendered ... whether at the instance of the owner, or of any other person acting by his authority or under him, as agent, contractor, or otherwise ...."
This statute permits architects who, at the request of a property owner, have provided plans for proposed property improvements, to file a lien against the owner's property. James H. Stewart & Associates, Inc. v. Naredel of Colorado, Inc., 39 Colo.App. 552, 571 P.2d 738 (1977).
While an owner is not subject to an architect's lien under this statute unless he or a person authorized by him has contracted for the architect's services, an owner who, as here alleged, directly authorizes another to hire an architect to draft plans for improvements on the owner's property may be subject to such a lien. See Colorado Gold Dredging Co. v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 60 Colo. 412, 153 P. 765 (1916).
CJA concedes that the owners did not directly request the performance of architectural services here. CJA contends, however, that the May 11, 1979, letter...
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