Chambliss v. State, 2015–CP–00263–COA.
| Decision Date | 19 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2015–CP–00263–COA.,2015–CP–00263–COA. |
| Citation | 188 So.3d 1262 |
| Parties | Donald CHAMBLISS a/k/a Donald Gregory Chambliss a/k/a Greg Chambliss a/k/a Donald G. Chambliss, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee. |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
Donald Chambliss, appellant, pro se.
Office of the Attorney General by Jeffrey A. Klingfuss, attorney for appellee.
Before IRVING, P.J., CARLTON and JAMES, JJ.
CARLTON
, J., for the Court:
¶ 1. A Lauderdale County grand jury indicted Donald Chambliss for sale of methamphetamine, as a subsequent and habitual offender.1 Chambliss pled guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to "eight years in the custody of the [Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) ] as a habitual offender under [Mississippi Code Annotated section] 99–19–81
[ (Rev.2015) ] without the possibility of such sentence being reduced or suspended nor to be eligible for early release, with three years suspended, followed by five years of postrelease supervision."2 The trial court further ordered Chambliss to pay fines and court fees.
¶ 2. Chambliss filed a motion for postconviction relief (PCR), which the trial court ultimately dismissed. Chambliss now appeals, raising the following assignments of error: (1) his guilty plea was not entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently; (2) he received an illegal sentence; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court's judgment dismissing Chambliss's PCR motion.
¶ 3. On May 19, 2014, Chambliss pleaded guilty to selling methamphetamine on December 12, 2012, in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 41–29–139
. At the May 19, 2014 plea hearing, Chambliss testified that he submitted his plea freely and voluntarily. During the plea colloquy, Chambliss also confirmed that he sold methamphetamine on December 12, 2012, and admitted that he was convicted of at least two prior felonies.
¶ 4. In his plea petition, Chambliss again affirmed that he entered his guilty plea "freely and voluntarily and of [his] own accord and with full understanding of all matters set forth in the indictment and in [the plea] petition." Chambliss further acknowledged that he believed his attorney "ha[d] done all that anyone could do to counsel and assist" Chambliss, and Chambliss stated that he was "satisfied with the advice and help" from his attorney.
¶ 5. At the July 30, 2014 sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Chambliss to serve "eight years in the custody of the [MDOC] as a habitual offender under [section] 99–19–81
without the possibility of such sentence being reduced or suspended nor to be eligible for early release, with three years suspended, followed by five years of postrelease supervision." The trial judge instructed that after Chambliss served five years in the custody of the MDOC, he is remanded to the supervision of MDOC staff to serve the postrelease-supervision portion of his sentence.
¶ 6. On February 2, 2015, Chambliss filed a PCR motion, which the trial court dismissed. This appeal followed.
¶ 7. Mann v. State, 73 So.3d 564, 565 (¶ 4) (Miss.Ct.App.2011)
.
¶ 8. Additionally, "the burden of proving factual allegations in support of the [PCR] motion is upon the defendant." McClendon v. State, 539 So.2d 1375, 1377 (Miss.1989)
.
¶ 9. Chambliss argues that his guilty plea was not entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Chambliss admits that he signed the plea petition affirming his voluntary, knowing, and intelligent plea, but he contends that no plea colloquy occurred. Chambliss specifically states that he did not receive an opportunity to stand before a judge and enter his plea.
¶ 10. This Court has long recognized that "[a] guilty plea is binding where it is entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." Hill v. State, 60 So.3d 824, 828 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2011)
(citing Alexander v. State, 605 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Miss.1992) ). Determining whether a guilty plea meets this standard depends on whether "the defendant is advised concerning the nature of the charge against him and the consequences of the plea." Id. "Specifically, the defendant must be advised that his guilty plea waives multiple constitutional rights." Id. As the PCR movant, Chambliss bears the burden to show that his plea was not voluntarily entered. Id.
Id. (citing Gardner v. State, 531 So.2d 805, 809 (¶ 10) (Miss.1988)
).
¶ 12. The record before us contains a transcript of the May 19, 2014 plea hearing. The transcript shows that the trial judge reviewed the charges against Chambliss as set forth in his indictment, and the trial court explained the possible sentence Chambliss could receive as a habitual offender. The trial judge also informed Chambliss of the rights Chambliss waived by pleading guilty. When asked, Chambliss affirmed under oath that he submitted his plea freely and voluntarily. During the plea colloquy, Chambliss also admitted under oath the following: that he knew he was selling methamphetamine on December 12, 2012; that no one forced him to sell the methamphetamine; and that he was convicted of at least two felonies prior to the charge at issue. Chambliss also admitted that he had recently used the drugs Lortab
and Xanax. He also explained that he did not have a drug problem and that he was not under the influence of any alcohol or drugs during the plea hearing.
¶ 13. In its order dismissing Chambliss's PCR motion, the trial court provided that the transcript from the guilty-plea hearing "clearly establishes that the [trial] court adequately questioned [Chambliss] and established a factual basis for the guilty plea, [and Chambliss] confirmed his desire to plead guilty in open court, repeatedly admitted to the elements of the crime, and did so freely and voluntarily." The trial court ultimately found that Chambliss "freely, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his guilty plea."
¶ 14. We agree, and find that this issue lacks merit.
¶ 15. Chambliss also argues that the trial court misapplied the sentencing requirements found in House Bill Number 585; and as a result, he claims that the trial court incorrectly sentenced him to serve eight years in the custody of the MDOC, with three years suspended. Chambliss provides that House Bill Number 585, codified in section 41–29–139
, became effective on July 1, 2014, nearly two months before he was sentenced.
¶ 16. The record shows that Chambliss pled guilty in May 2014. At the time Chambliss pled guilty, the applicable sentencing statute, section 41–29–139(b)(1)
, provided:
In the case of controlled substances classified in Schedule I or II, as set out in [s]ections 41–29–113 and 41–29–115, except thirty (30) grams or less of marihuana or synthetic cannabinoids, and except a first offender as defined in Section 41–29–149(e) who violates subsection (a) of this section with respect to less than one (1) kilogram but more than thirty (30) grams of marihuana or synthetic cannabinoids, such person may, upon conviction, be imprisoned for not more than thirty (30) years and shall be fined not less than [f]ive [t]housand [d]ollars ($5,000.00) nor more than [o]ne [m]illion [d]ollars ($1,000,000.00), or both[.]
(Emphasis added). The July 2014 revision to section 41–29–139
, however, provided that Chambliss could "be imprisoned for not more than eight (8) years or fined not more than [f]ifty [t]housand [d]ollars ($50,000.00), or both." The trial court sentenced Chambliss in August 2014. In the sentencing order, the trial judge acknowledged that the sentencing statute was modified on July 1, 2014. The trial court sentenced Chambliss to serve "eight years in the custody of the [MDOC] as a habitual offender under [section] 99–19–81 without the possibility of such sentence being reduced or suspended nor to be eligible for early release, with three years suspended, followed by five years of postrelease supervision."
¶ 17. Our review of the record reflects that Chambliss received an illegally lenient sentence. The trial court suspended part of Chambliss's sentence, despite the fact that Chambliss was sentenced as a habitual offender pursuant to section 99–19–81
. As a result, Chambliss's sentence was more lenient than authorized by statute. Jurisprudence establishes that a defendant may not complain of an illegally lenient sentence, and his assignment of error is without merit. Hamberlin v. State, 165 So.3d 491, 495 (¶ 24) (Miss.Ct.App.2015) ; Burkhalter v. State, 179 So.3d 67, 73 (¶ 23) (Miss.Ct.App.2015).
¶ 18. Chambliss next asserts that he failed to receive effective assistance from his defense counsel. Chambliss claims that his defense counsel failed to inform him of his potential sentence prior to pleading guilty.
¶ 19. In Chamberlin v. State, 55 So.3d 1046, 1050 (¶¶ 4–5) (Miss.2010)
, the supreme court recited the test for ineffective assistance of counsel:
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