Champieux v. Miller

• Decision Date: 09 March 1953
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 43323,43323,1
• Citation: 255 S.W.2d 794
• Parties: CHAMPIEUX v. MILLER et al
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 794

255 S.W.2d 794

CHAMPIEUX v. MILLER et al.

No. 43323.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

March 9, 1953.

E. W. Collinson, Turner White, Springfield, for appellant.

Neale, Newman, Bradshaw, Freeman & Neale, F. B. Freeman, Ransom A. Ellis, Jr., Springfield, for respondents.

COIL, Commissioner.

Appellant, plaintiff below and so referred to herein, has appealed from a judgment for respondents, defendants below and so referred to herein, resulting from the trial court's action in sustaining defendants' motion for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's evidence in her suit for $10,000.

The evidence stated most favorably from the standpoint of plaintiff was such that the jury could reasonably find the facts and circumstances in evidence to be as here summarized. On May 18, 1950, at approximately 9:15 p. m., on a dark, rainy night, plaintiff was driving toward Springfield, southwardly on north and south Highway 65, when, at a place about three miles north of the city, she noticed that, some 100 feet ahead, something was blocking the road. She drove closer, stopped and observed: that a truck was completely across the paved portion of the highway, its front to the west; that an automobile (referred to as the Atterberry car), on the west side of the highway and facing southeast, was adjacent or close to a portion of the truck. Due to rain the shoulders and adjacent ditches were muddy and plaintiff thought she could not safely pass. She finally stopped her car within two or three feet of the rear of the Atterberry car, her right wheels as far off on the west shoulder as she felt it safe to have them; probably one-half of her automobile was on the pavement and one-half off. There were no lights of any kind burning on the truck; one headlight on the Atterberry car was burning. The taillights and headlights on plaintiff's automobile were burning, and after stopping she turned on and left burning the dome light inside her car. Plaintiff's brother-in-law, a passenger in her automobile, got out to render assistance in what apparently had been a collision between the truck and the Atterberry car. The truck driver was defendant Miller who was operating the truck on behalf of his employer, defendant Lipscomb Grain and Seed Company. Flares in good operating condition were in defendants' truck. These were not used prior to plaintiff's injuries. Defendant Miller was physically able to have used them.

All vehicles remained in the positions noted for a period of 20 to 30 minutes when, without warning, an automobile, driven by one Sam Stewart southwardly on the highway, ran into the rear of plaintiff's automobile. As a result plaintiff was injured.

From the place of collision northwardly for about .6 miles the highway is straight; about halfway in this straight stretch is a dip, so that one approaching from the north travels up a slight incline. Plaintiff's witness, a state highway patrolman, testified that on a dark, rainy night the low-beam headlights of an automobile disclosed his patrol car for a distance of 300 feet, when it was parked at about the same place where plaintiff's car stood at the time of the collision.

The issue here has been narrowed to the question of whether the trial court correctly declared as a matter of law that any negligence of defendants was not a proximate cause of injury to plaintiff. This, because it is tacitly conceded by defendants that the facts in evidence would justify submission of an issue to a jury as to whether defendants were negligent in permitting the truck to remain across the highway for a period of 30 minutes without warning or sufficiently warning oncoming motorists of the dangerous situation there existing. And there would appear to be no question but that a jury issue was presented by the facts and circumstances in evidence as to whether defendants were negligent in failing to furnish a warning to oncoming motorists by available flares or otherwise of the dangerous situation existing by reason of the blocked highway.

It is defendants' position, however, that their negligence, if any, furnished at most only 'a condition or circumstance upon which the subsequent negligence of Sam Stewart acted, to create a new, independent and intervening cause of appellant's injury'; that when Stewart 'became aware or should have become aware of the potential danger ahead, and thereafter continued to drive into the rear end of appellant's car, this act became the proximate cause of appellant's injuries, and respondents' negligence was merely incidental'; that Stewart's act 'insulated and rendered remote any antecedent negligence of the respondents in failing to warn'; and 'if there was any contributing cause, it was appellant's own neglignec in stopping' where she did.

Defendants argue in support of their position: that plaintiff's headlights disclosed to her at a distance of at least 100 feet that something was blocking the highway; that plaintiff slowed and stopped without difficulty short of the obstruction; that plaintiff's automobile by its presence at the scene with headlights, tailights, and dome light burning warned of the potential danger and made the situation in the highway even...