Champigny v. Com.

• Decision Date: 07 March 1996
• Parties: Arthur J. CHAMPIGNY & another 1 v. COMMONWEALTH & others. 2
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 931

661 N.E.2d 931

422 Mass. 249

Arthur J. CHAMPIGNY & another ¹ v. COMMONWEALTH & others. ²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Suffolk.

Argued Dec. 7, 1995.

Decided March 7, 1996.

CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on August 28, 1992.

The case was heard by Gordon L. Doerfer, J., on motions for summary judgment.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

James A. Sweeney, Assistant Attorney General, for defendants.

Gregory C. Demakis, Lynn, for plaintiffs.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and ABRAMS, O'CONNOR, GREANEY and FRIED, JJ.

LIACOS, Chief Justice.

The plaintiffs are successors in interest to the Elm Shank & Heel Company, Inc. (Elm Shank), which in January, 1981, received notice that the Commonwealth would take real property from the company by eminent domain. After the taking and while Elm Shank was seeking relocation benefits for its tangible personal property located on the locus (see G.L. c. 79A, § 7[I][A] [1994 ed.] ), the personal property was destroyed by fire. The agreed on relevant appraisal for this personal property was $588,490. This figure the Commonwealth refused to pay. In Elm Shank & Heel Co. v. Commonwealth, 401 Mass. 474, 517 N.E.2d 460 (1988), we held that the intervening fire, and not the actions of the Commonwealth, caused the company's losses of personal property. Therefore, we concluded the company was not entitled to relocation benefits under the relevant language of G.L. c. 79A, § 7(I)(A). See generally id.

In the wake of that decision, the General Court enacted Res.1990, c. 3, entitled "Resolve in favor of the Elm Shank and Heel Company, Inc.," the relevant portion of which we reprint in the margin. ³ When the plaintiffs asserted that the resolve entitled them to compensation, the Commonwealth again refused to pay. This suit followed, and a judge in the Superior Court, on cross motions for summary judgment, ordered NSCC and DCPO to "conduct an evaluation of the financial issues involved within the parameters outlined in the resolve ... in order to comply with the resolve's direction to pay."

The Commonwealth appealed. We transferred the appeal here on our own motion. The Commonwealth now argues for the first time that we must construe the resolve to avoid payment because such payment would not be for a public purpose and would therefore violate art. 10 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. Neither that argument, nor any related claim that the resolve violates art. 30 of the Declaration of Rights, was made to the trial court. Therefore, we will not consider these arguments. See Tamerlane Corp. v. Warwick Ins. Co., 412 Mass. 486, 491, 590 N.E.2d 191 (1992). See also Petition for Revocation of a Judgment for Adoption of a Minor, 393 Mass. 556, 563 n. 12, 471 N.E.2d 1348 (1984) (constitutional claims).

We turn to the Commonwealth's main argument which is based on the language of the resolve itself. The Commonwealth contends that the resolve commands NSCC and DCPO to pay only an amount determined after they "evaluat[e] ... the financial issues" to determine the "financial loss suffered ... as a result of a taking." The intervening fire allegedly precluded any financial loss due to a taking. Hence no payment would be due.

We construe a statute in accord with "the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated," Telesetsky v. Wight, 395 Mass. 868, 872-873, 482 N.E.2d 818 (1985), quoting Commonwealth v. Galvin, 388 Mass. 326-328, 446 N.E.2d 391 (1983), and to avoid imputing a "[b]arrenness of accomplishment," Plymouth County Retirement Ass'n v. Commissioner of Pub. Employee Retirement, 410 Mass. 307, 312, 571 N.E.2d 1386 (1991), quoting Selectmen of Topsfield v. State Racing Comm'n, 324 Mass. 309, 314, 86 N.E.2d 65 (1949). After our decision under the existing statutes in Elm Shank & Heel Co., supra, the company was entitled to no payment for the lost personal property. The result of the Commonwealth's reading of the subsequent resolve would yield the same outcome. The legislative effort would have had no practical effect. We are not inclined to read a statute in such manner. "We will not adopt a literal construction of a statute if the consequences of such construction are absurd or unreasonable. We assume the Legislature intended to act reasonably." Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, 387 Mass. 326, 336, 439 N.E.2d 770 (1982). "[W]hen a literal reading of a statute would be inconsistent with legislative intent, we look beyond the words of the statute." Id. "The object of all statutory construction is to ascertain the true intent of the Legislature from the words used. If a liberal, even if not literally exact, interpretation of certain words is necessary to accomplish the purpose indicated by the words as a whole, such interpretation is to be adopted rather than one which will defeat that purpose." Lehan v. North Main St. Garage, 312 Mass. 547, 550, 45 N.E.2d 945 (1942).

We note one telling difference between the language of the statute we interpreted in Elm Shank & Heel Co., supra, and the resolve. General Laws c. 79A, § 7(I)(A)(2), provides, in part, for payment for "actual direct losses." The resolve instead provides for payment for "financial loss." This change, coupled with our unwillingness to think that the Legislature intended no practical effect, indicates that the Legislature sought to ameliorate the result reached in Elm Shank & Heel Co., supra at 479, 517 N.E.2d 460, under the language of G.L. c. 79A, § 7(I)(A). This conclusion is bolstered when we take note of the title of the resolve, which plainly intends some positive result "in favor of" the plaintiffs' predecessor in interest. See American Family Life...