Champion Intern. Corp. v. United Paperworkers Intern. Union

• Decision Date: 18 December 1985
• Docket Number: D,No. 371,No. 84-5323,371,84-5323
• Citation: 779 F.2d 328
• Parties: 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2449, 104 Lab.Cas. P 11,757 CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED PAPERWORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION and its Localefendants- Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 328

779 F.2d 328

121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2449, 104 Lab.Cas. P 11,757

CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED PAPERWORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION and its Local No.

371, Defendants- Appellants.

No. 84-5323.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued Aug. 6, 1985.

Decided Dec. 18, 1985.

Mark M. Brooks, argued, United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Nashville, Tenn., for defendants-appellants.

Robert E. Jackson, Labor Counsel, St. Regis Corp., West Nyack, N.Y., Ward DeWitt, Jr., Gary M. Brown, argued, Trabue, Sturdivant & DeWitt, Nashville, Tenn., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before ENGEL and KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judges, and GIBBONS, District Judge. ^*

GIBBONS, District Judge.

This is an appeal from the district court's modification of a labor arbitration award. Plaintiff below, St. Regis Corporation, ¹ filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, seeking to vacate an arbitration award under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 185. Presented with cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court, applying the Tennessee statute of limitations, found that plaintiff's suit was timely filed. The district court then modified the arbitration award, holding that the arbitrator's decision exceeded the scope of the submitted issue. The union appealed and argues before us that the district court was incorrect in its rulings on both issues. We affirm.

This dispute arose in the summer of 1981 out of a change in the work schedule for a two-week maintenance outage at the company's paper mill in Monticello, Mississippi. The company typically schedules maintenance outages on one of its two paper machines at a time. Both machines were scheduled for this particular outage, however, because of poor business conditions and lack of customer orders.

The original schedule provided for a two-week outage from Monday, July 20, to Monday, August 3, with seven 10-hour days in each of the two weeks. Two 10-hour Sundays at double-time wages were included. ² Maintenance crews made up of company employees were to work simultaneously with and for the same number of hours as crews performing the portion of the work which had been contracted out to independent contractors. The terms of this schedule were adopted in accord with the collective bargaining agreement between the parties.

Subsequent to posting of the original schedule, the company realized that, because of poor business conditions, there was no reason to expedite the maintenance work by including two double-time Sundays in the schedule. Therefore, it eliminated the Sundays from the maintenance schedule and replaced them with the Monday and Tuesday following the original two weeks. The normal rotating fire-brigade crew was scheduled to work for the two Sundays.

The union objected to the revision, saying its acceptance of the original schedule had been predicated on inclusion of the Sundays. It asked the company to re-assign some of the contractor work to employee crews for the Sundays. The company refused. The union then objected to scheduling the regular fire-brigade crews on the Sundays and argued that special crews selected on the basis of seniority should receive this work. The company also refused this modification.

After the outage the union filed two grievances. Grievance No. 81-371-63 [Scheduling Grievance] stated that "[t]he Company laid off employees on their normal scheduled work day after contracting normal maintenance for six (6) days to outside contractors," and requested as relief "Pay for all people who lost work." Grievance No. 81-371-62 [Seniority Grievance] stated that "[t]he Company did not follow seniority in working employees on Sunday, July 26, 1981, and Sunday, August 2, 1981," and requested as relief "Pay for all people who lost work." The company denied both grievances.

Prior to arbitration, the union withdrew the seniority grievance. The scheduling grievance, however, was submitted to arbitration. At the arbitration hearing, the union attempted to submit the seniority grievance as well, arguing that it was inherently suggested by and included within the scheduling grievance. The company objected to inclusion of the seniority grievance. It refused to argue the merits of the seniority grievance, both at the hearing and in its post-hearing brief. The union in its post-hearing brief argued the merits of the seniority grievance, but the relief requested was only that for the scheduling grievance.

On April 2, 1983, the arbitrator issued an opinion deciding both grievances. He held that the seniority grievance was "inherently suggested by the result of the Sunday-deletion decision," that the issue would have emerged without the existence of the seniority grievance, and that withdrawal of that grievance should not operate to bar an appropriate remedy. The arbitrator awarded pay to those employees who would have worked in the fire brigade on either or both Sundays had seniority been applied.

The first issue presented on appeal is whether the district court erred in finding that the company's suit was timely by applying a Tennessee rather than a Mississippi or a federal limitations period. The union's argument about the timeliness of the action centers on the district court's failure to apply the Tennessee borrowing statute. Tenn.Code Ann. Section 28-1-112 (1980). The statute provides:

Where the statute of limitations of another state or government has created a bar to an action upon a cause accruing therein, while the party to be charged was a resident in such state or such government, the bar is equally effectual in this state.

The union contends that application of this statute would have mandated use of the Mississippi limitations period for actions to vacate or modify arbitration awards. ³ If the Mississippi period applies, the company's action is barred, under the union's interpretation of the Mississippi statute.

The company responds by arguing that its action was timely. It asserts that the district court was correct in applying the ninety-day Tennessee limitations period for filing actions to vacate or modify arbitration awards. ⁴ Alternatively, it contends that the three-month period of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Section 12, applies.

We first reject the company's argument that a federal limitations period applies. The Supreme Court has not specifically decided what limitations period should apply in a Section 301 action by an employer against a union to vacate or modify an arbitration award. The Court has held, however, that as a general rule courts should borrow the most analogous state statute of limitations when there is no federal limitations period expressly applicable to a federal cause of action. DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158-60, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2287-88, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983); Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704-05, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 1112-13, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966).

The Supreme Court decision in DelCostello does not require an exception to this general rule. In DelCostello the court was presented with a hybrid Section 301 claim involving allegations by an employee that the employer breached the collective bargaining agreement and that the union breached its duty of fair representation. In the absence of a state limitations period applicable to an analogous cause of action, the Court concluded that the six-month statute of limitations of 29 U.S.C. Section 160(b) provided the most analogous limitations period under state or federal law. Id., 462 U.S. at 169, 103 S.Ct. at 2292. Here the laws of both Tennessee and Mississippi provide a statute of limitations governing state actions to vacate arbitration decisions. The state and federal actions to vacate arbitration awards are analogous. Therefore, an appropriate limitations period can be selected from state law.

Furthermore, other factors which compelled application of a federal limitations period in DelCostello are not present here. The court in DelCostello noted that state limitations periods for challenging arbitration awards were generally too short for an employee contemplating a hybrid Section 301 claim to analyze the quality of union representation and prepare a suit against both the union and employer. Id. at 165-66, 103 S.Ct. at 2291. Such considerations are not relevant here since the employee is not a party and this is not a hybrid Section 301 action. Unlike individual employees, the parties here are sophisticated in collective bargaining agreement litigation. Id.

We find that the general rule applies and that the district court properly selected a state limitations period governing vacation of arbitration awards for application in this suit under Section 301 to modify or vacate an arbitrator's award. See United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 1020 v. FMC Corp., 724 F.2d 815 (9th Cir.1984); Derwin v. General Dynamics Corp., 719 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.1983); International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, Local 1013 v. Ingram Mfg. Co., 715 F.2d 886 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 928, 104 S.Ct. 1711, 80 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984); Service Employees International Union, Local No. 36 v. Office Center Services, Inc., 670 F.2d 404 (3d Cir.1982); Sine v. Local No. 992, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 644 F.2d 997 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965, 102 S.Ct. 507, 70 L.Ed.2d 381 (1981); I.U.B.A.C. Local 31 v. Anastasi Bros. Corp., 600 F.Supp. 92 (S.D.Fla.1984).

The union further argues, however, that Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 67 S.Ct. 1340, 91 L.Ed. 1602 (1946), requires us to apply Tennessee's borrowing statute rather than Tennessee's statute of limitations for vacation of arbitration awards. The union contends, in essence, that state choice of law rules invariably govern selection of a limitations period for federal claims. We disagree. ⁵

In Cope the Court...