Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Pruitt
| Citation | 539 S.W.2d 356 |
| Decision Date | 01 July 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 17746,17746 |
| Parties | CHAMPLIN PETROLEUM COMPANY et al., Appellants, v. Travis W. PRUITT, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Civil Appeals of Texas |
Cantey, Hanger, Gooch, Cravens & Munn, and Richard L. Griffith, Fort Worth, for appellants.
King & Massey, Inc., and Marion L. Massey, Fort Worth, for appellee.
This is an appeal by defendants, Champlin Petroleum Company, Robert L. Buttrill, and Employers Casualty Company from a declaratory judgment declaring an instrument dated December 28, 1970, signed by Travis W. Pruitt and Johnson Linen Service and styled 'Release in Full of All Claims' to be inoperative and of no force and effect as to the rights of the plaintiff, Travis W. Pruitt, and that it would in no way prevent a recovery by plaintiff from the defendants, Employers Casualty Company, Champlin Petroleum Company and Robert Buttrill.
The plaintiff, Pruitt, had started the action by suing the above named defendants and also Natatorium Laundry d/b/a Johnson Linen Service, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. Pruitt alleged in part the following:
Pruitt alleged that he sustained serious bodily injury in the wreck and further alleged that
In the action plaintiff first sought judgment setting the release aside and decreeing that it was invalid and ineffective to bar him from suing the other defendants named therein. If he was successful he then sought in that case a recovery of damages in tort against Champlin Petroleum Company and Buttrill arising from injuries he received in the wreck and/or workmen's compensation benefits from defendant, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. Plaintiff further alleged that if the release was valid he had a fraud action for damages against his former employer, the defendant Johnson Linen Service.
In view of the fact that the rights of the parties hinged on the outcome of the declaratory judgment action relating to the validity of the release the trial court ordered a separate trial of plaintiff's case seeking to rescind the release that he had executed in favor of Buttrill, Champlin Petroleum Company and Employers Casualty Company. Pursuant to that order that part of the case went to trial before a jury and the trial resulted in a hung jury. When the hung jury occurred both plaintiff and defendants moved for judgment. The motion for judgment filed by Pruitt was granted, and the motion for judgment filed by appellants was overruled. This resulted in the court rendering the judgment declaring the release to be inoperative and to have no force and effect on the rights of the plaintiff, Pruitt. The three appellants have appealed from that decree. This part of the action was severed from the rest of the case.
The appellants in their brief make the following statement: 'The length . . . of appellants' brief belies the basic simplicity of the primary issue before the Court, to wit: the existence of an adequate consideration to support the release . . ..'
The appellee states the question involved on this appeal this way in his brief: '. . . both parties seem to be in agreement that the only issue to be resolved is a question of law, to-wit: Is the contract (release) supported by valid consideration and therefore binding upon Travis W. Pruitt, Appellee?'
The trial court had it analyzed the same way because the only two issues he submitted to the jury purported to inquire as to whether there was a consideration for Pruitt executing the release.
The judgment appealed from does not state the ground of Pruitt's motion for judgment on which his motion for judgment was granted and upon which the judgment being appealed from was based.
In appellee's petition he had alleged that the release was invalid on the following grounds: (1) Pruitt had signed the release and draft through a mistake; (2) he had received no consideration for signing the release and/or draft; (3) there was a failure of consideration for his signing the release and/or draft; and (4) there was no delivery of the release to Employers Casualty Company with the intention that it become an operative contract against Pruitt.
The appellants' second point of error is that the trial court erred in rendering judgment for Pruitt because the release executed by him on December 28, 1970, in favor of defendants was, as a matter of law, supported by a valid consideration and is a bar to the cause to action asserted against the defendants by Pruitt.
We sustain this point of error and reverse and render the judgment.
The following facts were undisputed: Travis Pruitt was an employee of Natatorium Laundry, d/b/a Johnson Linen Service; he was a route man, driving one of his employer's trucks to cover his route; while engaged in his employer's business his employer's truck that the he was driving was in collision with an automobile belonging to Champlin Petroleum Company that was being driven by R. L. Buttrill, an employee of Champlin's; the wreck occurred on November 19, 1970, in Fort Worth; Employers Casualty Company carried the liability insurance on the automobile belonging to Champlin Petroleum Company; the truck was damaged in the wreck and Travis Pruitt's left leg was injured; Pruitt's leg hurt after the wreck and at his boss' insistence he went, after the wreck, to the Coffey Clinic where his leg was x-rayed; the nurse at the Clinic told him to return the next day, but he did not return then because his boss indicated that they could not spare him; at first he thought that his injuries were minor and Pruitt testified that it was not until three or four weeks after the wreck that he realized he had more than a minor injury; Pruitt continued to work after the wreck past the time that he endorsed the two drafts invovled on January 15, 1971; following the wreck Employers Casualty Company's employees viewed the laundry truck and had an estimate made on the damages it sustained in the wreck; those damages were estimated at $1,849.76; one of their adjustors negotiated a settlement of the claim with the president of Johnson Linen Service; a release was prepared and mailed to Johnson Linen Service; Employers Casualty Company advised that Johnson Linen Service and Travis Pruitt should both execute the release and return it to Employers Casualty Company, which Company would then send drafts to pay for the release; the release was dated December 28, 1970; it read as follows:
'RELEASE IN FULL OF ALL CLAIMS
'FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the payment to JOHNSON LINEN SERVICE and TRAVIS PRUITT of the sum of--ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY-NINE AND 76/100 --- Dollars ($1,849.76), the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I/we, being over 21 years of age, do hereby release, acquit and forever discharge CHAMPLIN PETROLEUM COMPANY and ROBERT L. BUTTRILL and any other persons, firms or corporations of and from any and all actions, causes of action, claims, demands damages, costs, loss of service, expenses and compensation, on account of, or in any way growing out of, any and all known and unknown personal injuries and property damage resulting or to result from an accident that occurred on or about the 19th day of November, 1970, at or near Lipscomb and W. Daggett, Ft. Worth, Texas.
'I/we do hereby declare and represent that the injuries sustained are permanent and progressive and that recovery therefrom is uncertain and indefinite, and in making this release it is understood and agreed that I/we rely wholly upon my/our own judgment, belief and knowledge of the nature, extent and duration of said injuries as well as the liability questions involved, and that I/we have not been influenced to any extent whatsoever in making this release by any representations or statements regarding said injuries, or liability, or any other matters, made by the persons, firms or corporations hereby released, or by any person(s) representing, or acting for him or them, or by any physician or surgeon by him or them employed.
'It is further understood and agreed that this settlement is the compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim, and that the payment of said sum is not to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of Champlin Petroleum Company and Robert L. Buttrill by whom liability is expressly denied.
'This release contains the ENTIRE AGREEMENT between the parties hereto, and the terms of this release are contractual and not a mere recital.
I/we further state that I/we have carefully read the foregoing release and know the contents thereof, and I/we sign the same as my/our own free act.
'WITNESS our hand and seal...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Williams v. Glash
...disapprove Lawson v. Ulschmid, 578 S.W.2d 434 (Tex.Civ.App.--Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Pruitt, 539 S.W.2d 356 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Berry v. Guyer, 482 S.W.2d 719 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); and M......
-
Solomon v. Greenblatt
...or sustains some legal injury as the inducement for the agreement, this will be sufficient. Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Pruitt, 539 S.W.2d 356, 361 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Lassiter v. Boxwell Bros., Inc. 362 S.W.2d 884 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1962, no In the......
-
Martin v. Lou Poliquin Enterprises, Inc.
...to one party or a forbearance, loss, responsibility, or detriment to the other party. Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Pruitt, 539 S.W.2d 356, 361 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Garcia v. Villarreal, 478 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus Christi 1971, no writ); Sanders v. ......
-
Buddy L, Inc. v. General Trailer Co., Inc.
...on the trailer which was represented by the invoice made out to Buddy "L", Inc. As stated in Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Pruitt, 539 S.W.2d 356, 361 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.): The law controlling the determination of this consideration question before us is stated in ......