Champlin Refining Co. v. Cooper
| Decision Date | 20 December 1938 |
| Docket Number | 27157. |
| Citation | 86 P.2d 61,184 Okla. 153,1938 OK 652 |
| Parties | CHAMPLIN REFINING CO. v. COOPER. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The violation of a statute may of itself be a negligent act, but unless the injury complained of is the proximate result thereof, and the person injured a member of the class intended to be protected by such statute and the injury of the kind the statute intended to prevent, the violation of the statute does not constitute actionable negligence.
2. The fundamental rule of construction of legislative enactment is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the statute under consideration.
3. Section 9006, O.S.1931, 4 Okl.St.Ann. § 131, was enacted by the Legislative Assembly of Oklahoma Territory to protect agricultural crops from damages by domestic animals, and motorists traveling upon the public highways are not members of the class which the legislature intended to protect nor are injuries sustained from collisions with domestic animals by motorists the kind of injuries the legislature intended to prevent by enacting said statute.
4. Proof of the presence of a horse upon a public highway, at large and unattended, in violation of the Herd Law, Sections 8986-9045, O.S.1931, 4 Okl.St.Ann. §§ 91-184, which imposes a positive duty upon the owner of preventing such an animal from running at large and unattended and makes said owner liable for all damages done while wrongfully remaining at large upon the public highway or upon the lands of another is not prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of such owner and will not in itself sustain an action for property damage to a motorist's automobile resulting from a collision with said horse.
Appeal from District Court, Okfuskee County; Arthur Cochran, Judge.
Action by Althair Cooper against the Champlin Refining Company for damage to plaintiff's automobile allegedly resulting from a collision with a horse belonging to the defendant. From a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
Nathan Scarritt and E. S. Champlin, both of Enid, Biggers & Biggers of Wewoka, for plaintiff in error.
Leon C Phillips and J. Walter Long, Jr., both of Okemah, for defendant in error.
The plaintiff herein recovered judgment against the defendant in the District Court of Okfuskee County for damage to his automobile resulting from a collision with a horse belonging to said defendant. The defendant appeals from that judgment. We refer to the parties as they appeared in the trial court. The case was tried before a jury.
The evidence discloses that plaintiff's automobile was being driven by another party at a speed of approximately thirty-five miles per hour upon a public highway, U.S. No. 75, and upon rounding a curve in said highway suddenly came upon and ran into a horse belonging to the defendant, and as a result plaintiff's automobile was damaged. The collision occurred in the night time at approximately 8 o'clock P. M. The horse had wandered upon the highway from defendant's premises. Both parties agree that the presence of the horse upon the highway, at large and unattended, was a violation of the Herd Law, Sections 8986-9045, O.S.1931, of this State, 4 Okl.St.Ann. §§ 91-184. The foregoing is substantially all of the evidence and is undisputed.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, as set forth above, the defendant demurred thereto and upon said demurrer being overruled defendant moved for a directed verdict. The trial court also denied the motion for a directed verdict in favor of the defendant, and, when the defendant rested without introducing any evidence, submitted the case to the jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
The defendant assigns as error the action of the trial court in overruling the demurrer to plaintiff's evidence and denying the motion for directed verdict as well as certain instructions to the jury. Counsel agree, however, that the question presented on this appeal is whether the presence of a domestic animal, at large and unattended, upon a public highway, in violation of a statute which imposes a positive duty upon the owner thereof of preventing such an animal from running at large and unattended, is prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of said owner, and, if not rebutted, sufficient to sustain an action for damages for injuries resulting therefrom, if the other elements of actionable negligence concur.
The trial court held the unlawful presence of the horse upon the highway established a prima facie case of negligence against the defendant under Section 9006, O.S.1931, 4 Okl.St.Ann. § 131, part of the Herd Law of this State, which provides "The owner of any stock or domestic animal prohibited by law, from running at large or prohibited by police regulation adopted by vote of any stock district from running at large within the district at any of the times shall be liable for all damages done thereby while wrongfully remaining at large upon the public highway or upon the lands of another; which damages may be recovered by action at law; or the party injured may at his option, distrain the trespassing animals and retain the same in some safe place, at the expense of the owner, until damages are paid, as provided in this Article, said damages to be assessed pro rata per head, and each owner, if more than one owner, shall be liable for the pro rata amount, and each owner shall have the right to discharge his stock from distraint by paying the said pro rata amount to the person damaged, together with his pro rata share of the costs of such distraint: Provided, However, that no stock or domestic animal prohibited from running at large by virtue of such police regulation shall be considered as running at large so long as the same is upon unimproved and uncultivated lands of the owner of said stock and the immediate care and control of the...
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