Champness v. Glenn L. Martin Co.
| Decision Date | 19 May 1949 |
| Docket Number | 154. |
| Parties | CHAMPNESS v. GLENN L. MARTIN CO. et al. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; Robert France, Judge.
Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Thomas H Champness opposed by the Glenn L. Martin Company and others. The State Industrial Accident Commission found against claimant and its ruling was affirmed by superior court, and claimant appeals.
Order affirmed.
Leonard S. Bernstein, Baltimore (Bernstein & Shapiro Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.
Daniel E. Klein, Baltimore (Donald F. Aubrey, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.
Before MARBURY, C. J, and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, HENDERSON, and MARKELL, JJ.
This is a case arising under the Workmen's Compensation Law. The question is whether there was enough evidence to justify the uninstructed submission to the jury of the issue whether the claimant filed his claim within the time required by law. The State Industrial Accident Commission found he did not so file, and, on appeal, the judge sitting in the Superior Court of Baltimore directed the jury to answer the issue 'no,' and affirmed the ruling of the Commission. The claimant appeals here.
The claimant was employed at the Glenn L. Martin Company plant at Middle River. In 1943 he was there engaged in shredding blue print paper. The dust incident to the operation irritated the claimant's respiratory system, and he visited his employer's dispensary for treatment of what he then thought was a cold. In February, 1944, he went to see a neighborhood physician, who referred him to a nose specialist. The latter told him his tissues were badly damaged. This information was conveyed by claimant to his foreman and to the hospital personnel at the plant hospital. The doctor at the hospital sent him to another nose specialist in Baltimore. He was treated by the latter until some time in the latter part of April when he was discharged and told to purchase a spray for the further treatment of his nose. These expenses were all paid for by the employer's insurer.
Claimant knew that claims were filed at the plant hospital, and shortly after his discharge by the specialist, he received a call to go to the hospital, and was there asked by one of the personnel, called by him a 'secretary' to sign a statement to the effect that he 'thought' his injury came from his work. He insisted that he 'knew' it came from his work, and would not sign the paper because of the wording used. In the latter part of May, or early June, 1944, he was again called to the hospital and interviewed by a claim adjuster for the insurer. It is what is claimed to have been told him by the adjuster that constitutes the basis of claimant's contention that he was prevented by facts amounting to an estoppel from filing his claim within the one year fixed by the statute. Claimant was advised by his own nose specialist that it was necessary for him to take continuous treatment to avoid ulceration, and, since June, 1944, he has been a regular patient for that purpose, visiting the physician on the average of every six or seven weeks. He lost no time from his work, but was placed on light duty. On May 7, 1947 he was discharged. He then visited the offices of the State Industrial Accident Commission, found he had no claim on file, and, on May 8, 1947 made out and signed the claim form which became the basis of this case.
The statute, Code Supp.1947, Article 101, Sec. 38 (formerly Code 1939, Art. 101, Sec. 51), provides that if a claim is not filed within one year after the beginning of disability, failure to do so 'shall constitute a complete bar' unless such failure was induced or occasioned by fraud or by 'facts and circumstances amounting to an estoppel.' In the latter case, the claim may be filed within one year from the time the facts and circumstances amounting to an estoppel cease to operate. No fraud is claimed here, the claimant knew he had the disability nearly three years before he filed his claim, and, therefore, the point before us is whether there is sufficient proof of facts and circumstances, amounting to an estoppel, to permit the issue to be submitted to the jury. This is largely a factual question, which must be considered with all favorable inferences in favor of the claimant.
We have passed upon the statute in several cases. In Parks and Hull Appliance Corporation v. Reimsnyder, 177 Md. 280, 9 A.2d 648, officials of the employer dissuaded the employee from filing a claim, stating they would do something for him, and misleading him about the necessity of filing with the Commission. We held this constituted an estoppel. In Harrison v. McCarty, 178 Md. 377, 13 A.2d 544 the employer, at the doctor's office, told the employee that 'everything was fixed up as far as his part was concerned' and instructed him to carry out the doctor's orders. The doctor told the employee he should wait for a year to determine the extent of his disability. He obeyed instructions, and we held the facts and circumstances there amounted to an estoppel, and that the employee could file his claim after the year had expired. In West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Morton, 185 Md. 623, 45 A.2d 725, we held that an assurance given employee by his superintendent that his claim would be taken care of did not amount to an estoppel, because the superintendent had no apparent or real authority to bind the employer, and the employee knew there was a man at the plant, representing the employer, whose duty it was to make out compensation claims. In Griffin v. Rustless Iron & Steel Co., 187 Md. 524, 51 A.2d 280, 282, we held that a plant safety engineer had no power to bind the employer, and the engineer's statement that 'we are going to look...
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