Griffin v. Rustless Iron & Steel Co.

• Decision Date: 05 February 1947
• Docket Number: 49.
• Parties: GRIFFIN v. RUSTLESS IRON & STEEL CO.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

51 A.2d 280

187 Md. 524

GRIFFIN v. RUSTLESS IRON & STEEL CO.

No. 49.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

February 5, 1947

Appeal from Baltimore City Court; Herman M. Moser, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Daniel J. W Griffin, claimant, opposed by the Rustless Iron & Steel Company, employer and self-insurer, to recover compensation for injury to the eye. The State Industrial Accident Commission disallowed the claim, and the claimant appealed to the Baltimore City court. From a judgment of the Baltimore City Court denying compensation, the claimant appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

William Taft Feldman, of Baltimore (I. Duke Avnet, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Rignal W. Baldwin and David R. Owen, both of Baltimore (Semmes Bowen & Semmes, of Baltimore, on the brief) for appellee.

Before MARBURY, C.J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, HENDERSON, and MARKELL, JJ.

MARBURY, Chief Judge.

Daniel J. W. Griffin, appellant, was employed in the mill of Rustless Iron & Steel Company, appellee, in August, 1939, and was the victim of an explosion there, at that time, by which he was sprayed with a hot lead solution. Some of the lead went into his left eye. He received first aid treatment, including the bandaging of his eye, and then resumed work. He reported again for treatment three days later, and was then sent to the office of Dr. Buchness, the employer's doctor. The bandage was taken off his eye, the doctor looked at it, put some salve in it and told him to have it dressed again at the plant dispensary. He had burns on his body, face, neck and arms as well as his eye, and he received medical treatment once or twice a week for all of his injuries until they seemed to be cured. The appellant, however, started to get headaches and his eye commenced to pain. He went to the doctor and the doctor looked at it with a light and told him that if he had any trouble with it to let him know. That kept up for a year or eighteen months after the accident. Finally, he got tired and told Dr. Buchness that he had to get somebody to look after his eye. The doctor told him to go to a first-class hospital. He went to the Presbyterian Eye, Ear and Throat Hospital, but they did not treat him. Then the doctor sent him to a specialist, Dr. Anderson. The latter told him he had a film over his eye, that it was not ripe, to come back in nine or twelve months.

In twelve months' time the appellant went back to Dr. Anderson who again said it was not ripe and told him to come back in another nine or twelve months. The appellant tired of this, and at his request, Dr. Buchness sent him to another specialist, Dr. Tarun. He looked at the eye, put drops in, and on the following day made a thorough examination of both eyes. He also said there was a film over the eye. Dr. Tarun said (according to appellant) that after it got hard, he could get over to the corner of it and pick it off.

The appellant lost no time from work on account of his eye except for these visits to the doctor. He visited Dr. Anderson on July 30, 1941, and his visit to Dr. Tarum was in August, 1941. On cross-examination, the appellant was asked, with reference to this time in 1941, 'of course at that time you had no question in your mind that your eye had a defect, did you?' And he answered, 'No, sir.' He further said that at that time both doctors told him there was a film, although neither called it a cataract. Appellant worked regularly and continuously from 1939 until 1946, when he retired at the age of 65. When he was hurt, he was receiving 75¢ an hour and when he retired he was receiving $1.21 an hour. He was a foreman, and his pay was that regularly paid for his job.

In April 1945, the appellant reported for the last time to the company's dispensary and was examined there by Dr. Wampler. The latter turned on a flash light, looked into appellant's eye, and told him to come back in six months' time. The appellant told him he was getting tired of this 'come back business' and was going to take proceedings. He then went of his own accord to Dr. Hurwitz, an eye specialist, who examined him on May 7, 1945. Dr. Hurwitz found that in the left eye there was a dense mature cataract, and that appellant had no vision in that eye except that he could see light. The physician concluded from his examination that appellant had suffered from iritis, at some previous time, because of the atrophy of the tissue, and that his cataract was a secondary cataract. He said that there was a total loss of vision in the left eye, that a removal of the cataract might be attempted and the appellant might get a good result, but even in that event he would have to have a special heavy lens in order to see. The doctor said that it was possible there was causal connection between the accident of August, 1939, and the present condition. When atrophy of the iris exists, as was found in this case, the normal tissue is displaced by scar tissue. Senile cataracts are prevalent at appellant's age, but not secondary cataracts which he had. The appellant had testified that he never had any trouble with his eye until the accident. Both parties have treated the eye trouble as if it were traumatic, so we are not concerned, on this appeal, with any evidence questions in this respect. However, it has been held in compensation cases that lay testimony as to accidents and resulting effects is at times sufficient to submit a case to the jury. Neeld Construction Co. v. Mason, 157 Md. 571, 146 A. 748; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Ziegenfuss, Md., 49 A.2d 793, Cumberland & Allegany Gas Co. v. Caler, 157 Md. 596, 146 A. 750.

A claim was filed with the State Industrial Accident Commission on May 10, 1945, and at a bearing on September 27, 1945, the Commission disallowed appellant's claim on the ground that the condition complained of was not the result of, or caused by, the injury he had suffered in 1939. An appeal was then taken to the Baltimore City Court. There three issues were submitted to the jury. The first was whether the claimant's condition was caused by the injury. The second was whether the claimant filed his claim within one year after the beginning of his disability. The third was that if the claimant had not filed his claim within one year after the beginning of his disability, then was his failure induced by or occasioned by fraud or by facts and circumstances amounting to an estoppel.

After the testimony was completed, the court below directed the jury that they need not answer the first issue, that they should answer the second issue 'No' and that they should answer the third issue 'No.' As a result of this instructed verdict, the court affirmed the decision of the Commission and gave judgment in favor of the appellee for costs. From these actions the appeal comes here.

Two questions are presented for our consideration, based respectively on the second and third issues before the court. The first is whether appellant's claim is barred as provided by Code Article 101, section 38, as renumbered by Laws 1945, c. 528, § 2, because he did not file his claim within one year after the beginning of his disability. The second is based on the assumption that his claim was not so filed, and we are asked to determine whether the failure to file such a claim was induced by facts and circumstances amounting to an estoppel.

We have not in the statement of facts touched upon the testimony relied on for the establishment of the estoppel and it is therefore pertinent to mention this testimony at this time. The appellant said that after he went to Dr. Anderson the first time (which seems from his testimony to have been in 1940) he came back and told Mr. Grundman, the safety engineer of the plant. The appellant, however, places this conversation about 1941. He said Mr. Grundman said, 'All right, you just come up as the doctor tells you.' He told Mr. Grundman that Dr. Anderson had told him there was a film over his eye and to come back in nine or twelve months, and Mr. Grundman told him that was 'all right, just do that.' Again, in 1944, while appellant was talking to Dr. Wampler, Mr. Grundman came along and the doctor asked Mr. Grundman if the appellant could read. Mr. Grundman replied, 'Why certainly he can read. He can do more than I can do.' With that, appellant told him he was going to take proceedings. Grundman said, 'You cant't do that; we are going to look after you.'

The appellant testified that Mr. Grundman was the plant safety engineer. After accidents, he looked to see if there could be any remedies to prevent them and if he found any, he suggested them. It was not the practice of the appellant to speak with him about any accidents or injuries sustained in the plant, but he reported to Mr. Grundman in 1941, after his conversation with Dr. Anderson, because it was his order to report.

The company's physician, Dr. Buchness, continuously treated (or at least examined) appellant's eye until 1941 when he sent him to two specialists, but such treatment was purely medical and had nothing to do with the legal aspects of any claim against the company. Compare construction Longshoremen's Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq. Marshall v. Pletz, 317 U.S. 383, 63 S.Ct. 284, 87 L.Ed. 348. The mere fact that appellant was being treated by a physician paid by the appellee would not estop the latter from imposing the defense of limitations to a late claim. The sole basis for estoppel, therefore, are the two conversations appellant had with the plant engineer. These also both seem to relate only to the medical attention he was to get and not to any financial care. The appellant was working all the time, receiving the normal increases in pay. It is not suggested or intimated that this was in any way due to...