Chance v. County of Marion.
| Decision Date | 30 June 1872 |
| Citation | 64 Ill. 66,1872 WL 8262 |
| Parties | JACOB O. CHANCEv.COUNTY OF MARION. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Marion county; the Hon. SILAS L. BRYAN, Judge, presiding.
Mr. T. E. MERRITT, and Mr. HENRY C. GOODNOW, for the appellant.
Mr. M. SCHAEFFER, Mr. TILMAN RASER, and Mr. D. C. JONES, for the appellee.
It appears, from the record in this case, that appellant was clerk of the county court of Marion county at the time the services were rendered; that the fees, for the recovery of which this suit was brought, were charged for services rendered as clerk after the adoption of the present constitution. The fees are charged and claimed under the act of February, 1865, (Sess. Laws, p. 65,) entitled “An act to fix the fees of certain officers in certain counties therein named,” which act was continued in force by the act of February 26, 1867. (Sess. Laws, p. 111.) The act is special in its scope, and does not, in its spirit, apply to all like officers of the State, but is, in terms, restricted to the counties therein named. See The People v. Miner, 47 Ill. 33.
It is contended that the 11th section of article 10 of the present constitution has abrogated this act, and that the fees charged under it are not warranted by any law. That section is this:
The first and second clauses of this section seem to apply to subsequent legislation in regard to fees, rendered necessary from the requirements of the constitution. They refer to classes of officers and counties which are required by that instrument; and it declares that the compensation therein provided for shall only apply to officers who should be subsequently elected. But the last clause manifestly refers to special laws then in force, giving fees to such officers, and it emphatically declares that such fees shall cease upon the adoption of the constitution. This language is clear and unambiguous. It neither requires nor admits of construction. No ingenuity can torture this language into any meaning, but the fees allowed by special laws then in force should cease when that instrument should be adopted by the people.
Such fees are expressly named, and hence none other can be embraced. To hold that, under this provision, special laws giving fees could be continued, would be to disregard the plainest expression that could be made by the use of language. It would violate, without the least pretense of an ambiguity or uncertainty of meaning, one of the plainest provisions of the fundamental law of the State. But it is urged that great inconvenience must result if this provision is enforced. If such were the case, it would afford no reason or the slightest pretense of an excuse for overriding the provisions of the constitution. Even if the officers were left without compensation until the legislature should provide by law for such fees, that would be a great hardship and manifestly unjust, but that would not abrogate the constitution. That instrument is designed, from the very nature of things, to be permanent and unyielding in its provisions. Mere necessity or inconvenience to a class of persons does not, nor can it change, its requirements. All departments of government, all officers and all classes of persons, as well as each individual must conform their acts to its provisions so long as they remain in force, and they can only be altered, changed or abrogated by the power that adopted them.
But the framers of that section have not imposed an unjust provision upon such officers, as they have, while repealing all special laws giving fees in terms, revived the general fee bill laws of the State. In this they made ample provision for compensation to such officers until the general assembly should revise these laws when they came to classify the counties. This section unmistakably declares that such officers shall receive fees under the general laws then in force. This is so clear and manifest that it requires no reasoning to make...
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...construction is consistent with section 8, and should be adopted, that both may stand; the provisions not being repugnant. Chance v. County of Marion, 64 Ill. 66. terms, the history, and the governmental application of our Constitution establish a system of circuit courts with one judge for......
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