Chancellor v. Banks

• Decision Date: 22 November 1909
• Citation: 123 S.W. 650,92 Ark. 497
• Parties: CHANCELLOR v. BANKS
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

123 S.W. 650

92 Ark. 497

CHANCELLOR v. BANKS

Supreme Court of Arkansas

November 22, 1909

Appeal from Prairie Chancery Court; John M. Elliott, Chancellor affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

Cypert & Cypert, for appellants.

Appellee is barred by his laches in neglecting, he and those under whom he claims, to assert their rights for more than forty years, and until the enhanced value of the lands made an assertion of title to appear advantageous. 96 U.S. 611; 155 U.S. 314; 43 F. 12; 78 Tex. 84; 81 Ark. 352; 10 Am. & Eng Dec. in Eq. 91; 1 Dillon (U.S.) 333; Fed. Cas. No. 9952; 5 F 305; 49 F. 512; 53 F. 415; 57 F. 959; 79 F. 143; 61 Ark. 575; Id. 527.

W. A Leach, for appellee; Trimble, Robinson & Trimble, of counsel.

Laches is not merely delay, but delay that works injury to another. 81 Ark. 432. It is based upon the assumption that the party to whom it is imputed has knowledge of his rights and the opportunity to assert them. 82 Ark. 368. In this case the void forfeiture stood for 35 years, during which time appellants asserted no claim to the land, which was wild and unoccupied. There was nothing to call into activity any assertion of rights during this time by appellee or his grantors. Until there is an interference with possession, there is no occasion for action. 70 Ark. 256; 75 Ark. 197. In the absence of some supervening equity calling for the application of the doctrine of laches, a court of equity will follow the law, and not divest the true owner of title by lapse of time shorter than the statutory period of limitation. 81 Ark. 296; 46 Ark. 25; 43 Ark. 469; 20 Ark. 339.

OPINION

BATTLE, J.

On the 12th day of August, 1907, W. R. Banks brought suit in the Prairie Chancery Court against John C. Chancellor and H. P Chancellor to quiet title to certain lands. He traces his title through mesne conveyances to the State of Arkansas. The defendants also trace their title in like manner to the same source, but they do so through a void tax sale. One half the land was sold in Prairie County, on the 26th day of July, 1869, at a sale for the taxes of 1868; and the other half was sold in White County, on the 22d day of August, 1869, at a sale for the taxes of the same year. The State was the purchaser at both sales, which were void. On the 23d day of May, 1903, the State of Arkansas conveyed to H. D. Williams all her "right, title, interest and claim" in and to the land, and on the 26th day of December, 1906, Williams conveyed to the defendants. The land has been at all times wild, unimproved and unoccupied. From the time of the sale or forfeiture to the State of Arkansas in the year 1869 until after the sale by the State to Williams no one has paid taxes on the land, and plaintiff has not from that time to the bringing of this suit paid any. Since the purchase of Williams from the State the land has greatly enhanced in value, on account of the building of a railroad within four miles thereof and the location of saw mills in its vicinity, but by no act of the defendants or their grantor. They pleaded laches in bar of plaintiff's right to relief. The court, finding, upon final hearing, that plaintiff was the owner in fee simple of the land and that the tax sales were void, set aside the conveyances under which the defendants claimed and quieted plaintiff's title to the land. Defendants appealed.

The land, being wild and unimproved, is in the constructive possession of the appellee, he having the legal title.

In Penrose v. Doherty, 70 Ark. 256, 261, 67 S.W. 398, the court said: "The land was wild and unoccupied, and remained so until a short time before the commencement of this action, when plaintiff, holding the Hutchinson title, promptly asserted his rights. Until there was an interference with the possession, there was no occasion for resorting to legal remedies."

In Jackson v. Boyd, 75 Ark. 194, 197, 87 S.W. 126, the court said: "In this case there is no evidence as to the increase in value, and there is no situation presented requiring action on part of the appellants. Until there is an interference with possession, there is no occasion for action, and payment of taxes by another is not sufficient of itself to call for action. Penrose v. Doherty, 70 Ark. 256, 67 S.W. 398. The bare lapse of time will not cure defects in an invalid tax title. Parr v. Matthews, 50 Ark. 390. Payment of taxes and color and claiming title are insufficient to start the statute of limitation. Calloway v. Cossart, 45 Ark. 81." This decision was afterwards approved in Williams v. Bennett, 75 Ark. 312, 317, 88 S.W. 600.

In Earle Improvement Company v. Chatfield, 81 Ark. 296, 301, 99 S.W. 84, it is said: "Appellants, deriving their title from the void tax sale, had notice of the defects therein. They cannot claim that they were injured or misled by any omission of appellee to bring suit or pay taxes. See Black v. Baskins, 75 Ark. 382. They had notice of his title and the defects of their own. * * *

"While it is true that the length of time during which a party may neglect to assert his rights and not be guilty of laches varies with the peculiar circumstances of each case, and is subject to no arbitrary rule, like the statute of limitations, * * * yet, in the absence of some supervening equity calling for the application of the doctrine of laches, a court of chancery should and will by analogy follow the law, and not divest the owner of title by lapse of time shorter than the statutory period of limitations. * * * The payment of taxes for only five years, even with a great increase in the value of the land, we do not think would justify a court of equity in depriving the true owner of the right to have his title quieted, because the payment of taxes gave appellants no right to or interest in the land."

In Osceola Land Co. v. Henderson, 81 Ark. 432 439, 100 S.W. 896, it is said: "It is true that mere delay does not, of itself, bar the plaintiff. 'Laches in legal significance is not mere delay, but delay that works a disadvantage to another. So long as parties are in the same condition, it matters little whether one presses a right promptly or slowly within the limits allowed by law; but...