Chandler v. Hudson's Ex'rs

• Decision Date: 01 January 1853
• Citation: 11 Tex. 32
• Parties: CHANDLER v. HUDSON'S EXECUTORS.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

11 Tex. 32

CHANDLER

v.HUDSON'S EXECUTORS.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1853.

Where A applied for letters of administration on the estate of B, C and D, who alleged that they were interested, as executors of E, in the estate of B, were allowed to oppose the grant of letters as prayed for. The interest of C and D did not appear.

It is true, that under this provision (Hart. Dig., Art. 1126), if there was no contest about the vacancy of the succession, there could be no opposition to the grant of the administration, without showing that some one else had superior claim to it; but we apprehend that it is different where the opposition is to any administration being granted at all. In such a case, it would seem that any person interested might be heard to make opposition.

Where, in an application for letters of administration de bonis non, by a creditor, filed June 15th, 1852. it appeared that the deceased had died in 1840; that administration on his estate was granted in April of that year; that the administration had been closed by the discharge of one administrator in 1849, and of the other in May, 1852; and it further appeared that the claim of the creditor was a judgment obtained against the deceased and another, in 1838, which was presented to one of the administrators and accepted by him in December, 1840, but was never presented to the Probate Judge to be ranked among the debts of the succession; Held, That there was no valid, subsisting claim, against the estate, disclosed by the facts, and that letters of administration de bonis non were rightly refused.

It seems that where one of two judgment debtors dies, execution may run against the survivor, without a discontinuance as to the deceased.

Stale demands cannot be made the grounds for re-opening a succession. Whenever a case is presented, showing a legal reason for the delay, we will know how to make the exception to the general rule based upon presumption.

Appeal from Fayette. The proceedings, in this case, were commenced by petition filed June 15th, 1852. The facts will be found in the opinion.

F. W. Chandler and J. B. McFarland, for appellant. I. The County Court, where this proceeding commenced, is a court of limited jurisdiction, and persons have no right to intervene, except in cases provided for by statute. The only opposition which the statute authorizes (Hart. Dig., Art. 1126), is where the intervenor claims the administration on his own behalf, or in behalf of another.

II. The oppositionists do not disclose their interest, if any. The pleadings of the County Court must be governed by the same rules as those of the District Courts, as to certainty at least. (Hart. Dig., Art. 671; Caldwell v. Haley, 3 Tex. R., 318; Wright v. Wright, Id., 180; Mims v. Mitchell, 1 Id., 446; 1 Chit. Pl., 224; Story, Eq. Pl., Sec. 23; Mitf. Pl., 37.) If they had any legal or equitable interest in the estate of Whitehurst, and they feared that their right would be impaired by the plaintiff's obtaining letters of administration, they were bound to clearly state the character of that interest, and how they would be injured. The District Court should therefore have sustained the plaintiff's demurrer. If it be admitted that they could be heard as amici curiæ in the County Court, without any disclosure of interest, yet it will not be contended that they had a right to appeal in that capacity.

J. A. & R. Green, for appellees. I. This case is now reduced to a question of costs, as the matters in litigation have been settled, with this exception. The appellant, in his petition for administration, showed no ground why letters of administration should be granted to him--on the contrary, he showed an estate administered in 1840. (Fisk v. Novel, 9 Tex. R., 13; Boyle v. Forbes, Id., 35.) He showed further that the estate had been settled in 1849, by the filing of the account, and the discharge of Brown, the only acting administrator. In order, therefore, to take advantage of this settlement, he must apply to the District Court to open the account, within two years. (Hart. Dig., Art. 1230, 807, 809.)

II. He alleges he represents a creditor; and his petition shows that the claim he represents is not a subsisting debt against the estate, for two reasons. (1.) It was never legally approved by the administrator, nor submitted to the judge to be ranked among the acknowledged debts of the succession. (2.) It is barred by the statute of limitations.

III. But, to avoid these objections, he says that the appellees had no right to file an opposition, because they did not allege their interest in the estate of Whitehurst, or apply for letters to themselves or some other person. (Hart. Dig., Art. 1126.) This was not necessary. The statute authorizes “any person, at any time before the application is granted,” to make the opposition. This is a substantive clause in the statute; it is based upon good policy, and intended to prevent indiscriminate applications for the administration of estates, which result in the waste and destruction of property belonging thereto.

The conclusion is sought to be drawn from the latter clause of the statute, that no opposition to a grant of letters can be made, unless there is an accompanying prayer for a grant to himself or some other person. This construction would prevent any opposition by any person, to a case where a grant of letters would not only be void, but be troublesome to parties entitled to the possession of the property. Such is not our construction of the law, either from its plain import, or from the reason thereof.

But even if the appellees had no right to object, the judgment of the District Court is still correct, that is in annulling the grant to Chandler. Chandler had no right to letters; and this Court will not reverse the judgment of the District Court, and thereby confirm the letters of administration to the appellant.

LIPSCOMB, J.

Proceedings, in this case, were commenced in the Probate Court by the appellant, on a petition to be appointed administrator de bonis non, on the estate of John H. Whitehurst. The petition sets out that in 1838 a judgment was obtained in the County Court of San Augustine County against the said Whitehurst and one Ford, in favor of Eubanks and White, assigned to Eubanks; that Whitehurst died in 1840; and that his widow and John Brown obtained letters of administration, in April of that year, on his estate; that the judgment was presented to and accepted by the said Brown in December of the same year, as a just claim against the estate; but it is not alleged that the claim was presented to the Probate Judge to be ranked among the acknowledged debts of the estate; that Brown, in 1849, filed his petition for final settlement, and alleged that the estate was insolvent; that Brown's account as administrator was approved, and he was discharged from the administration; that Mary Ann...