Chandler v. Industrial Commission of Utah

• Decision Date: 20 June 1922
• Docket Number: 3795
• Citation: 60 Utah 387,208 P. 499
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: CHANDLER v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH et al

208 P. 499

60 Utah 387

CHANDLER v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH et al

No. 3795

Supreme Court of Utah

June 20, 1922

Rehearing denied July 11, 1922.

Appeal from District Court, Second District, Weber County; J. N Kimball, Judge.

Action by Emma Chandler against the Industrial Commission of Utah and others, after a refusal of the Industrial Commission to grant plaintiff an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act. From a verdict directed for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

AFFIRMED.

De Vine, Howell, Stine & Gwilliam, of Ogden, and E. L. Kearney of Salt Lake City, for appellants.

Chez & Douglas, of Ogden, for respondent.

WEBER, J. CORFMAN, C. J., and GIDEON, THURMAN, and FRICK, JJ., concur.

OPINION

WEBER, J.

On June 29, 1918, Mrs. Emma Chandler, the widow of George C. Chandler, deceased, filed with the Industrial Commission of Utah an application for compensation on account of the death of her husband, while an employe of A. M. Miller, one of the defendants. Compensation was denied by the Commission. Pursuant to the provisions of the Employers' Liability Act (Comp. Laws 1917, §§ 3061-3165), at that time in force, she commenced an action in the district court of Weber county. A demurrer to the complaint having been sustained, she appealed to this court, which reversed the judgment of the district court. Chandler v. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 213, 184 P. 1020, 8 A. L. R. 930. Thereafter the cause was tried in the district court before a jury, and, after all the evidence had been introduced and both sides had rested, the trial court peremptorily instructed the jury to return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against defendants for the amount of compensation allowed by law. From that judgment, defendants prosecute this appeal.

George Chandler, the deceased, was a deliveryman, employed by the defendant A. M. Miller. On January 2, 1918, he left his home to go to his employer's garage. On the way he was attacked by a dog, and his hand was bitten and lacerated. He regarded the injury of minor importance and returned to his work. In about two months he was taken violently ill, and died from hydrophobia as the result of the dog's bite.

It was claimed at the trial that he had brought home a package the evening before and that he intended to deliver the package to a customer on his way to the garage. The testimony adduced in support of this claim was meager and unsatisfactory, vague and uncertain, and we disregard it entirely.

It is, however, undisputed that the duties of deceased required him to make deliveries of meats and groceries daily; that his regular hours of employment were from 7 a. m. to 6 p. m.; that, at the time he was bitten by the dog, it was after 7 a. m., and that he was going by the most direct route to his employer's garage, where the delivery cars were kept. This garage was in the rear of his employer's residence, several blocks from the place of business of his employer. Chandler's purpose in going to the garage was to get the delivery car which he used, and to see to it that the other deliverymen had gas, oil, and water in their cars.

Two questions are raised by the exception taken by defendants to the court's instruction to the jury directing a verdict in favor of plaintiff, the first of which is whether the injuries resulting in the death of Chandler arose out of and in the course of his employment. If instead of going directly to the garage, Chandler had gone to his employer's place of business, and, upon his arrival there, had been ordered to go to the garage for the purpose of obtaining his delivery car and for the purpose of supervising the preparation of the other cars for their drivers, the case would clearly come within one of the well-recognized exceptions to the general rule that an employe injured while on his way to work and before he has reached his place of work does not come under the protection of the Compensation Act. He took the direct route to the garage during working hours, and, at the very time he was bitten by the dog, he was engaged in the furtherance of his employer's business and not on an errand of his own. He was obeying the order of his employer, the order to proceed...