Chandler v. Kendrick
| Decision Date | 24 February 1933 |
| Parties | CHANDLER et ux. v. KENDRICK. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Suit by H. L. Kendrick against H. L. Chandler and wife. From a decree for complainant, defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
BUFORD J., dissenting. Appeal from Circuit Court Okeechobee County; Elwyn Thomas, judge.
G. C Durrance, of Okeechobee, and Sumner & Sumner, of Fort Pierce for appellants.
J. C. Bills, Jr., and Paul W. Potter, both of West Palm Beach, for appellee.
In February, 1927, Kendrick, the appellee, and McDaniel loaned Chandler, the appellant, $7,250, and received a note for $7,500 secured by a mortgage. The difference of $250 between the note and amount actually loaned was never paid. The loan was for one year, and bore interest at 8 per cent., payable quarterly. In February, 1928, when the loan matured, Kendrick purchased the interest of McDaniel and extended the loan for one year. Chandler paid the interest and an additional consideration of $150. In 1929, when the loan matured, Kendrick granted a second extension for a year, and Chandler paid the interest and an additional consideration of $100. In 1930, when the loan matured, Kendrick granted a third extension of one year, and Chandler paid the interest and an additional consideration of $50. In November, 1930, Kendrick filed his bill to foreclose, claiming $7,500, with interest from the date of the last interest payment. Before any defense to the bill was interposed, Kentrick filed his amended bill alleging that the $250 difference between the face of the mortgage and the amount actually loaned was a voluntary offer on the part of Chandler, that it was never paid, nor did he, Kendrick, have any intention of charging it, and that it was his understanding that the cash payments of $150, $100, and $50, made at the time of the extension, were voluntary contributions on the part of Chandler to compensate him for his trouble and expense of traveling from his home and return to see Chandler in regard to the extensions; there being in all eight or ten of these trips of 300 miles each.
Chandler answered the bill as amended, admitting the execution of the note and mortgage, denied that he owed Kendrick $7,500, and tendered the defense of usury. On final hearing the chancellor entered a decree in favor of Kendrick in the sum of $7,250, with interest in the sum of $1,256.66, together with $132 for an insurance premium paid by Kendrick as per terms of the mortgage. This appeal is from that final decree.
It is admitted that the mortgage contract was technically usurious. The question we are called on to answer is whether or not under the facts as stated it was willfully so, and condemned by section 4852, Revised General Statutes of 1920, section 6939, Compiled General Laws of 1927.
The very purpose of statutes prohibiting usury is to bind the power of creditors over necessitous debtors and prevent them from extorting harsh and undue terms in the making of loans. Under the law and the decisions, usury is a matter largely of intent. It is not fully determined by the fact of whether the lender actually gets more than the law permits, but whether there was a purpose in his mind to get more than legal interest for the use of his money, and whether, by the terms of the transaction and the means employed to effect the loan, he may by its enforcement be enabled to get more than the legal rate. Benson v. First Trust & Savings Bank (Fla.) 142 So. 887; R. C. L. pp. 223, 224.
A thing is willfully done when it proceeds from a conscious motion of the will, intending the result which actually comes to pass. It must be designed or intentional, and may be malicious, though not necessarily so. 'Willful' is sometimes used in the sense of intentional, as distinguished from 'accidental,' and, when used in a statute affixing a punishment to acts done willfully, it may be restricted to such acts as are done with an unlawful intent. Clark v. Grey, 101 Fla. 1058, 132 So. 832; United States v. Boyd (C. C.) 45 F. 851, text 855; State v. Clark, 29 N. J. Law, 96.
To work a forfeiture under the statute, the principal must knowingly and willfully charge or accept more than the amount of interest prohibited by it. The evidence shows that Kendrick was an unsophisticated woodsman, and had no purpose...
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