Chandler v. Martin

Decision Date14 May 2014
Docket NumberNo. CV–14–369.,CV–14–369.
Citation433 S.W.3d 884,2014 Ark. 219
CourtArkansas Supreme Court
PartiesDoralee CHANDLER, Candidate for Circuit Judge, District 20, Division 5, Appellant v. Mark MARTIN, in his Official Capacity as the Secretary of STATE for The State of Arkansas; James Bargar, Paul Foster, and Betty Pickett, in their Official Capacities as Commissioners of the Faulkner County Election Commission; L.C. Ratchford, Doyle Ragland, and G.C. Blair, in their Official Capacities as the Commissioners of the Searcy County Election Commission; Stephen James, Jim Kirkendoll, and Bob Patterson, in their Official Capacities as the Commissioners of the Van Buren County Election Commission; and Harry G. Foster II, Appellees Leslie Steen, in his Official Capacity as Clerk of the Supreme Court of Arkansas and Arkansas Court of Appeals, Third–Party Appellant v. Harry G. Foster II, Third–Party Appellee.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Dugger Law Firm, Little Rock, by: Terry Dugger, for appellant.

Martha Adcock, General Counsel, and L. Justin Tate, Associate General Counsel, for appellee Secretary of State Mark Martin.

David L. Hogue, for appellee Faulkner County Election Commission.

Jeff Rosenzweig, for appellee/third-party appellee Harry G. Foster, II.

Bristow & Richardson, PLLC, Jonesboro, by: Bill W. Bristow, for third-party appellant Leslie Steen.

CLIFF HOOFMAN, Justice.

Appellant Doralee Chandler and third-party appellant Leslie Steen, in his official capacity as Clerk of the Supreme Court of Arkansas and Arkansas Court of Appeals, (collectively appellants) appeal from a Pulaski County Circuit Court's order, denying Chandler's petition for writ of mandamus and declaratory judgment and granting the third-party complaint filed by appellee the Honorable Harrison (Harry) G. Foster II (Foster). This court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1–2(a)(4), as this appeal pertains to elections and election procedures. On appeal, Chandler contends that (1) the circuit court improperly determined that Foster was not “unlicensed” pursuant to Rule VII(C) of the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar (Rule VII(C) or “the Rule”), thereby improperly finding that he is qualified to seek the position of circuit judge despite his failure to timely pay his licensing fee four of the six consecutive years prior to the time for taking office, if elected; and (2) the circuit court improperly determined that Foster's suspension of his license to practice law due to his failure to timely renew his fee was a violation of his due-process rights. Steen also contends on appeal that the trial court erred in declaring Rule VII(C) unconstitutional and should be reversed. We affirm the circuit court.

This case arose after Doralee Chandler, a registered voter residing in Judicial District 20 and a candidate for Judicial District 20, Circuit Court Division 5, filed a petition for issuance of a writ of mandamus and for declaratory judgment against Mark Martin, in his official capacity as the Secretary of State for the State of Arkansas; James Bargar, Paul Foster, and Betty Pickett, in their official capacities as the Commissioners of the Faulkner County Election Commission; LC Ratchford, Doyle Ragland, G.C. Blair, in their official capacities as the Commissioners of the Searcy County Election Commission; Stephen James, Jim Kirkendoll, and Bob Patterson, in their official capacities as the Commissioners of the Van Buren County Election Commission; and Foster. Subsequently, Chandler filed an amended petition for issuance of a writ of mandamus and for declaratory judgment. In this petition, she alleged that Foster's license as an attorney in the State of Arkansas was suspended pursuant to Rule VII(C) for 77 days in 2013, from March 2 through May 17; for 64 days in 2012, from March 2 through May 4; for 64 days in 2011, from March 2 through May 4; and for 11 days in 2009, from March 2 through March 11. Therefore, she alleged that Foster was not a qualified or eligible candidate for the circuit judge position as he was not a “licensed attorney” for the constitutionally mandated six-year time period preceding the assumption of the office. As such, she prayed that the circuit court issue a declaratory judgment that Foster was unqualified and an ineligible candidate for the circuit judge position; that the circuit court issue a writ of mandamus to Martin to order him to strike and/or remove Foster from the list of ballot-eligible candidates; and that the circuit court issue a writ of mandamus to the Commissioners of the Faulkner, Searcy, and Van Buren County Boards of Election Commissioners to order them not to tabulate any votes for Foster.

Martin, Foster, and Faulkner County Election Commissioners James Bargar, Paul Foster, and Betty Pickett, in their official capacities, filed responses. Additionally, Foster filed a third-party complaint. In his complaint, he alleged that Rule VII(C) was unconstitutional under Article II of the Arkansas Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, because the Rule automatically suspended his license without procedural due process. Furthermore, he alleged that the letter sent by Steen prior to any suspension mentioned delinquent fees as the only consequence for failing to pay license fees by March 1. Thus, Foster prayed for the circuit court to deny Chandler's petition, grant his complaint, declare Rule VII(C) unconstitutional, enjoin Steen from enforcing the automatic suspension of delinquent lawyers from the practice of law, and award him attorney's fees and costs against Chandler only.

At the hearing, Steen testified that his duties included licensing all lawyers, keeping a list of all lawyers, and collecting license fees. He testified that license fees were due by March 1st of every year, unless that date fell on a weekend, and that delinquency therefore attached on the next day. A form letter is sent out to all licensed attorneys in December, informing lawyers of the due dates for fees. This letter in the past has not included any warning that an attorney's license is automatically suspended if fees are not paid on time. After an attorney's license has been automatically suspended for delinquent fees, Steen testified that his office sends a form letter informing a delinquent attorney that the Rule automatically suspended the lawyer from the practice of law and includes the following additional paragraph:

Our records show that you are delinquent in paying your annual license fee, however there is certainly the possibility this office made a mistake in posting or receipting your dues. If you think we are in error, please contact us. Otherwise, please remit a check in the amount of $300.00 to insure your good standing.

Furthermore, Steen testified,

[ROSENZWEIG:] Okay. And there is no provision for a hearing before this letter goes out?

[STEEN:] That's correct.

[ROSENZWEIG:] So, for instance, let's say that someone had—hypothetically speaking, someone had mailed a check in and it somehow didn't get there but there's evidence of mailing, for instance, or FedExing, whatever. That person would not necessarily have an opportunity to say, “Hey, I mailed it” or “you got it” before you—before the letter goes out?

[STEEN:] No. If there's evidence that somebody has mailed something timely—

[ROSENZWEIG:] Yes.

[STEEN:]—as long as the letter is postmarked by March the 1st—

[ROSENZWEIG:] Yes.

[STEEN:]—or over, I will waive the delinquent fee in that regard.

[ROSENZWEIG:] And I understand that. No. My question isn't whether they owe the delinquent fee or not. My question is let's say a person mails it on February 28th or 27th or FedExes it, but it never gets to you. I mean it just never gets to you and that person doesn't find out that it never got to you before you send the letter out. There's no—there's no provision for a hearing in front of a court?

[STEEN:] There is not, no.

A running list of suspended lawyers is kept on the computer, and Steen testified that approximately 700 to 900 attorneys fail to pay their fees on time each year, which is approximately 8 to 10 percent of all licensed attorneys. Subsequently, Steen testified that, in May of each year, a list of suspended lawyers at that time is sent to all the judges in the state.

Foster also testified at the hearing. He did not contest the dates alleged in which he failed to pay his license fees on time. After the circuit court heard all motions and oral arguments made by the parties, the circuit court announced its ruling, and a written order was filed on April 16, 2014. In a very detailed sixteen-page order, the circuit court found the following in relevant part:

8. Foster has been delinquent in paying the annual fee for his attorney's license, which is due no later than March 1 of each year. He paid the annual fee, plus a $100 late penalty, on the following occasions: March 7, 2007; March 6, 2008; March 12, 2009; May 4, 2011; May 4, 2012; and May 17, 2013.

9. Pursuant to Rule VII(C) of the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar, Foster's privilege to practice law pursuant to his law license was automatically suspended for non-payment of the annuallicense fee, without prior notice to him, for the following dates: between March 2 and March 7, 2007; March 2 and March 6, 2008; March 2 and March 12, 2009; March 2 and May 4, 2011; March 2 and May 4, 2012; and March 2 and May 17, 2013.

10. Foster's privilege to practice law pursuant to his law license was automatically reinstated after he paid his license fee and the required $100 late penalty in each instance previously mentioned.

11. Foster was not notified that his privilege to engage in the practice of law pursuant to his license was suspended in any instance before the automatic suspension mandated by Rule VII(C) went into effect.

Conclusions of Law

1. Amendment 80, Section 16(B) to the Constitution of Arkansas states the qualifications and term of office for...

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8 cases
  • Martin v. Kohls
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • October 15, 2014
    ...of the constitution de novo because it is for this court to determine what a constitutional provision means. Chandler v. Martin ex rel. State, 2014 Ark. 219, 433 S.W.3d 884. Although this court is not bound by the circuit court's decision, its interpretation will be accepted as correct on a......
  • Hartness v. Nuckles
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • December 3, 2015
    ...Transp. Dep't v. O.J.'s Serv. Two, Inc., 2015 Ark. 388, 473 S.W.3d 24 ; Arms v. State , 2015 Ark. 364, 471 S.W.3d 637 ; Chandler v. Martin, 2014 Ark. 219, 433 S.W.3d 884.Lastly, in my view, the majority also makes a mistake of fact when it purports to affirm the circuit court's finding that......
  • Bailey v. Martin
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • May 14, 2014
    ...section 16(b) is likely to recur, such issue is properly addressed in the companion cases decided this same day. See Chandler v. Martin, 2014 Ark. 219, 433 S.W.3d 884; Kelly v. Martin, 2014 Ark. 217, 433 S.W.3d 896; and Williams v. Martin, 2014 Ark. 210, 2014 WL 2695501. Appeal dismissed.Sp......
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    • June 26, 2014
    ...is not moot. Because the issue is not moot, it cannot be said that our opinion would be purely advisory. See Chandler v. Martin ex rel. State, 2014 Ark. 219, 433 S.W.3d 884 (recognizing that an advisory opinion is one that offers an opinion on a moot issue). Therefore, this court should add......
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