Chandler v. McEvoy
| Decision Date | 23 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2:20-CV-00026-WSH |
| Parties | CHAUNCEY D. CHANDLER, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER DANIEL MCEVOY, AND DISTRICT ATTORNEY KARA RICE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
This civil action was initiated pro se by Plaintiff Chauncey D Chandler against Daniel McEvoy, a law enforcement officer for the Sharon Police Department (“Officer McEvoy”), and Kara Rice, a district attorney for Mercer County, Pennsylvania (“Attorney Rice”) for alleged civil rights violations.
Before the Court for consideration are the following:
1. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or alternatively for a more definite statement by Defendant Daniel McEvoy (ECF No. 50); and
2. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim by Defendant Kara Rice (ECF No. 53).
While a briefing order was entered on June 8, 2021 (ECF No. 55) allowing Plaintiff until July 15, 2021 to respond, Plaintiff has not responded to either motion and therefore the motions will be decided without the benefit of his response. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Officer McEvoy's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 50) be granted and Plaintiff's claim of defamation be dismissed with prejudice, and his Fourth Amendment excessive force, false arrest and false imprisonment claims be dismissed without prejudice and Plaintiff be permitted to file an amended complaint to include facts supporting those claims[1]; and Attorney Rice's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 53) be granted and all claims against Attorney Rice be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff's claims have already been subjected to a primary round of motions to dismiss. While Plaintiff did not originally name Attorney Rice as a defendant in this matter, Mercer County argued in its motion to dismiss that to the extent that Plaintiff intended to name Attorney Rice as a defendant, she was entitled to prosecutorial immunity. The Court agreed and found that to the extent that Plaintiff intended to name Attorney Rice as a defendant, she was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for her role in prosecuting Plaintiff's bond revocation proceedings and any claims that Plaintiff attempted to assert against her were dismissed with prejudice. (ECF No. 41 at 3 n.1).
The court further allowed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint to “add the proper parties to this lawsuit or to add cognizable claims.” (ECF No. 41 at 4). Plaintiff thereafter filed an amended complaint naming Officer McEvoy and Attorney Rice as Defendants and alleging in toto as follows:
“Defamation of charchter(sic)” because I was in newspaper after I told “them” I didn't do it. 8th amendmen(sic) for the unsuall(sic) conduct officer use when I two hand bahind(sic) my back, that officer is Daniel McEvoy for Sharon Police, false because both x's I was free of all charges I was charge with both case no x-164843 11/18/2018 an(sic) 7/31/2019 Case no MJ35202 NT0000456 2019[.] This was a biais(sic) arrest because I won the first case McEvoy Daneil(sic) charge me with, an(sic) for D.A. Kara Rice who acted as D.A. n(sic) my case failed to give me Brady . . . [incomprehensible] . . . the 8th amendment cruel an[d] unusual [punishment] Officer perform police [brutality] on Plaintiff, false imprison[n]ment the Plaintiff spent like 22 months n(sic) jail an(sic) in either case there was no conviction on the charges filed against him in 7/31/2019 case no MJ35202MNT000046 or 11/18/2018 case no 164843. An(sic) the D.A. failed to give Brady mater[ia]l which violates due process.... [Officer McEvoy] showed police brut[ali]ty when I was handcuff[ed] in back seat snatch me out an[d] put his finger threw the cuff an[d] I'm face down on the road as he force down on my back jawbone trying to break it two officer was(sic) on the [scene] don't [remember] names.
The court will interpret Plaintiff's amended complaint as stating a due process violation against Attorney Rice for withholding “Brady” or exculpatory evidence during the pendency of her and/or Mercer County District Attorney's Office's criminal prosecution against Plaintiff for the possession of a firearm. The court will interpret Plaintiff's amended complaint as stating a defamation claim, a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a Fourth Amendment false arrest or false imprisonment claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer McEvoy.
A pro se pleading is held to a less stringent standard than more formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). As a result, a pro se complaint under § 1983 must be construed liberally, Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2002), so “as to do substantial justice.” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). While pro se litigants are afforded this leniency, they “do not have a right to general legal advice from judges, ” and “courts need not provide substantive legal advice to pro se litigants” because pro se litigants must be treated “the same as any other litigant.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245, 58 V.I. 691 (3d Cir. 2013). U.S. ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) ()).
The applicable inquiry under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is well settled. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A complaint that merely alleges entitlement to relief, without alleging facts that show entitlement, must be dismissed. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). This “‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary elements.” Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). Yet the court need not accept as true “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, ” Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2000), or the plaintiff's “bald assertions” or “legal conclusions.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
Although a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “sufficient to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. Facial plausibility exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556).
The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.... Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556) (internal citations omitted).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court's role is limited to determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of his claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. Id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim. Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).
As a general rule, if a court “consider[s] matters extraneous to the pleadings” on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the motion must be converted into one for summary judgment. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). However, a court may consider (1) exhibits attached to the complaint, (2) matters of public record, and (3) all documents integral to or explicitly relied on in the complaint, even if they are not attached thereto, without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Mele v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of New York, 359 F.3d 251, 256 (3d Cir. 2004) n. 5 (3d Cir. 2004); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
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