Chandler v. State

• Decision Date: 23 August 2022
• Docket Number: 2020-CP-01060-COA
• Citation: 345 So.3d 632
• Parties: Louis Edward CHANDLER, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

345 So.3d 632

Louis Edward CHANDLER, Appellant

v.STATE of Mississippi, Appellee

NO. 2020-CP-01060-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

August 23, 2022

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: LOUIS EDWARD CHANDLER (PRO SE)

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LAUREN GABRIELLE CANTRELL

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD AND EMFINGER, JJ.

EMFINGER, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. On January 10, 2017, Louis Edward Chandler pled guilty in the Clay County Circuit Court to two counts of aggravated DUI. On January 17, 2017, he was sentenced to a term of seven years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), with five years suspended and two years to serve, for count one's conviction and fifteen years, with five years suspended and ten years to serve, for count two's conviction. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively. He was also ordered to serve a term of five years of post-release supervision for each conviction. He was ordered to pay court costs in both counts and, in count two, he was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $500 and restitution in the amount of $360,000. On January 21, 2020, Chandler filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief (PCR), which the circuit court dismissed without a hearing by an order entered on August 6, 2020.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. As a result of his guilty pleas, Chandler was convicted of two counts of aggravated DUI that arose from a head-on vehicle collision. The factual basis offered by the State during the plea proceedings showed that on the night of April 25, 2014, Chandler negligently drove his vehicle northbound in a southbound lane of travel. He collided with the vehicle driven by Joanna K. Hardwick.¹ Maurice Hall was a passenger in the Hardwick vehicle. Hardwick and Hall suffered "severe injuries to their legs and other organs" as a result of the accident. The State said its proof would show that Hardwick and Hall suffered injuries "that's necessary in the statute." Chandler was found to have been driving with a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.19%, which the State contends showed that he was "under the influence" at the time of the collision. The trial court asked Chandler, "Is that what happened, Mr. Chandler?" Chandler responded, "Those facts are true." As a result of his guilty pleas, Chandler was found guilty and sentenced as stated above.

¶3. In his PCR motion, Chandler sought to have all charges against him "dropped" and asked that he be released from incarceration immediately. In the alternative, Chandler asked for a new trial in a new venue or "review for a more appropriately judicial sentence" or that "the restitution judgment against him be vacated." The trial court found these claims were without merit and dismissed the motion without a hearing. Chandler appeals from this order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶4. In Davis v. State , 335 So. 3d 1108, 1110 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022), this Court stated:

When reviewing a circuit court's denial or dismissal of a PCR motion, we will reverse the judgment of the circuit court only if its factual findings are clearly erroneous; however, we review the circuit court's legal conclusions under a de novo standard of review.

(Quoting Hays v. State , 282 So. 3d 714, 716-17 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) ).

ANALYSIS

¶5. In his PCR motion, Chandler lists five grounds upon which he contends relief should be granted.² We will address these five grounds separately below. However, before setting out his grounds for relief, in the "Introduction" section of his PCR motion, Chandler seems to challenge the factual basis for his guilty pleas. In this section, he raises the following issues:

1. He did not think his operation of his vehicle was impaired by his consumption of alcohol.

2. He implies that the cause of the collision was a "poorly designed, poorly illuminated and dangerous" intersection of Highway 82 and Highway 45 Alt., which was under construction.

3. Both victims had illegal narcotics in their blood test reports.

4. The victims’ injuries did not qualify as "maiming" under the statute.

5. MHP officers gave false testimony.

¶6. During the guilty plea proceeding, the State made a proffer of what its evidence would show if this matter had proceeded to trial. As stated above, the State advised the court that its proof would show, that at the time of the collision, Chandler was operating his vehicle negligently by driving his vehicle northbound in a southbound lane of travel. Chandler's BAC was 0.19% at the time of the collision. The State would have shown at trial that Chandler's operation of his vehicle caused the head-on collision with the vehicle driven by Hardwick. The collision caused significant injuries to Hardwick and her passenger Hall. The State advised the court that its proof would show that the victims’ injuries were sufficient to meet the elements of the statute.

¶7. Had this matter gone to trial, a jury would have been called upon to determine whether the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of aggravated DUI.³ All the questions and issues raised by Chandler could have been presented to a jury for determination. However, Chandler chose to enter pleas of guilty. By admitting that the facts proffered by the State were true, Chandler waived his right to challenge the sufficiency of the State's proof or to have these issues decided by a jury. In Wright v. State , 271 So. 3d 560, 563 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018), this Court explained:

[T]his Court has held that "a valid guilty plea waives the right to challenge the sufficiency of the State's evidence." Grissom v. State , 66 So. 3d 1280, 1282 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).

After a review of the record, including the petition to enter a guilty plea and the transcript from the guilty-plea hearing, we find that Chandler's guilty pleas were freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made and entered and that each had a factual basis. Accordingly, Chandler's valid guilty pleas waived his right to challenge his convictions as to these unnumbered allegations or claims for relief. In any event, these claims are without merit.

¶8. We now move to the numbered grounds for relief Chandler presented to the circuit court in his PCR motion:

I. "Denial of due process in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution by improper commingling of criminal and civil proceedings."⁴

¶9. In his PCR motion, Chandler alleged that there was a "conspiracy" to falsely implicate "The Pony"⁵ in order to "maximize the potential financial awards resulting from this accident." As evidence of his theory, Chandler contends that two Mississippi Highway Patrol officers, who worked the scene of the accident, testified falsely during the hearing on his motion to suppress the BAC results. According to Chandler,⁶ the officers testified during that hearing that Chandler "confessed" to being at The Pony and that they remember Chandler wearing a "pink bracelet or wristband." Chandler also challenges the officers’ testimony that he was given three different field sobriety tests. While Chandler brought up this issue concerning the officers’ testimony on the morning of trial, there was no mention of The Pony during the guilty plea hearing that afternoon. The factual basis tendered by the State included proof that Chandler had a BAC of 0.19% at the time of the collision, but there was no mention of where he may have consumed the alcohol. There was also no mention of the pending civil lawsuit during Chandler's guilty plea hearing. While Chandler contends that the officers testified falsely, as noted above, that would have been for a jury's determination had this matter proceeded to trial.

¶10. Chandler then points to certain comments the circuit judge made during the criminal proceedings concerning the civil lawsuit and to the fact that the circuit judge signed the Final Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice.⁷ Those comments were made by the circuit judge during the sentencing hearing as he considered restitution and how restitution was to be paid in light of the amount of damages and the pending civil lawsuit. The judge's comments at that time show that he was aware of the civil lawsuit, because he noted that one of the civil lawsuit attorneys was present at sentencing. There is no evidence that any contested issue in the civil lawsuit had been brought before the circuit judge for his decision, prior to Chandler's guilty pleas and sentencing. Chandler failed to show that the pending civil lawsuit was "improperly commingled" with his criminal case or that it had any impact upon the voluntariness of his guilty pleas to the charges in the underlying criminal case.

¶11. Chandler further alleges that his attorney in the civil lawsuit advised him, prior to his guilty pleas, that the plaintiffs would dismiss him from the lawsuit if Chandler would admit that he had been at The Pony. Chandler refused, but he states that he was later advised, after his incarceration, that The Pony had settled the case for $300,000. He maintains that The Pony had "no liability in regards to my accident." Chandler attached to his PCR motion a copy of an "Absolute Release With Covenants,"⁸ which shows that his insurance company settled the civil lawsuit against him for a payment of $100,000. In his PCR motion, Chandler fails to show how settlement negotiations by his attorney for the civil lawsuit had any impact upon the voluntariness of his guilty pleas.

¶12. Many of Chandler's arguments are without support in the appellate record. He draws inferences from facts that are not supported by the record. He speculates as to the cause and effect of statements that were made at different points in the proceedings. Much of his argument is admittedly based upon his own "opinion" concerning these matters. In Home Solutions of Mississippi LLC v. Ridge , 301 So. 3d 670, 676 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020), we held:

In the absence of meaningful argument or citation

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