Chandler v. Superintendent of Upstate Corr. Facility
| Decision Date | 01 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | 10 Civ. 2347 (BMC) |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER CHANDLER, Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDENT OF UPSTATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
This matter is before me on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A jury convicted petitioner of robbery in the third degree in connection with the robbery of a cell phone and $250 from a livery cab driver. He was sentenced to three to six years' imprisonment. The jury acquitted him of the more serious charge of robbery in the first degree, rejecting the prosecution's contention that he used a gun during the robbery.
Familiarity with the facts of the case is assumed as supplemented by references below to the background relating to each of petitioner's three points of error. The three points are: (1) the trial court erred in admitting testimony by a detective that inferentially disclosed the contents of a conversation between the detective and a non-testifying witness; (2) the prosecution failed to turn over a statement of that non-testifying witness; and (3) trial counsel was ineffective. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied and the case is dismissed.
Just before opening statements, the prosecutor alerted the trial judge that she intended to elicit certain testimony from the lead detective on the case. She proffered that the detective was going to testify that he obtained petitioner's name and considered him a suspect after speaking to a woman named Laura Morgan and her daughter Dominique Morgan. The detective had identified Dominique as a passenger in the cab at the time of the robbery. The prosecutor's proffer indicated that the detective would not be asked and would not disclose what Dominique said to him, but only that after speaking to Dominique, he believed petitioner was a suspect.
Petitioner's trial counsel objected that the testimony would be hearsay because the jury would necessarily conclude that Dominique identified petitioner as a passenger with her in the cab. The prosecutor responded that the detective's testimony was not being offered for the truth of whatever Dominique had said to him, but only as background to explain why the detective turned the investigation towards petitioner. The trial court overruled the objection on that basis and the testimony came in at trial in the following form:
On direct appeal, petitioner challenged this ruling on both Confrontation Clause and hearsay grounds. The Appellate Division found the Confrontation Clause objection "unpreserved for appellate review" because it had not been raised at trial, and, alternatively,because it was "without merit." People v. Chandler, 59 A.D.3d 562, 872 N.Y.S.2d 283 (2d Dept.), leave to app. den., 884 N.Y.S.2d 705 (2009). It also found the hearsay objection without merit since the testimony was offered "not... for its truth, but rather to explain police actions and the sequence of events leading to [petitioner's] arrest." Id. In addition, the Appellate Division found that "the challenged testimony did not implicate [petitioner] as the perpetrator of the crime." Id.
When a "state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred." Dunham v. Travis, 313 F.3d 724, 729 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991)). A federal court will only review procedurally barred claims if a petitioner "can show 'cause' for the default and 'prejudice attributable thereto,' or demonstrate that failure to consider the federal claim will result in a 'fundamental miscarriage of justice.'" Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262, 109 S. Ct. 1038 (1989) (citations omitted).
The Appellate Division's invocation of a procedural bar as to petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim was proper. Both federal and state courts have held that a hearsay objection is insufficient to preserve a Confrontation Clause claim. See United States v. Hardwick, 523 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir 2008); United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 60 (2d Cir. 2002); People v. Kello, 96 N.Y.2d 740, 743-44, 723 N.Y.S.2d 111 (2001); People v. Lopez, 25 A.D.3d 385, 386, 808 N.Y.S.2d 648 (1st Dept. 2006). Petitioner has not demonstrated cause, and it is clear that petitioner suffered no prejudice. The testimony only showed that the detective had conducted an investigation (including a conversation with Dominique) that led him to petitioner. And, asdiscussed below, petitioner gave a statement at the time of his arrest admitting that he was in the cab with Dominique. This statement was admitted into evidence. Petitioner therefore suffered no prejudice when the detective disclosed that his conversation with Dominique was part of what led him to petitioner.
It is well settled that "[e]rroneous evidentiary rulings do not automatically rise to the level of constitutional error sufficient to warrant issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Taylor v. Curry, 708 F.2d 886, 891 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991). Rather, I must make a two-part inquiry: "(1) whether the trial court's evidentiary ruling was erroneous under New York State law, and (2) whether the error amounted to the denial of the constitutional right to a fundamentally fair trial."1 Kotler v. Woods, 620 F. Supp. 2d 366, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Wade v. Mantello, 333 F.3d 51, 59 n.7 (2d Cir. 2003); Davis v. Strack, 270 F.3d 111, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2001)). An evidentiary error does not amount to the denial of a fundamentally fair trial unless the erroneously admitted evidence was '"sufficiently material to provide the basis for conviction or to remove a reasonable doubt that would have existed on the record without it.'" Dunnigan v. Keane, 137 F.3d 117, 125 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Johnson v. Ross, 955 F.2d 178, 181 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Under New York law, it is within the trial court's discretion to admit evidence of an out-of-court statement "not for its truth, but to provide background information as to how and whythe police pursued and confronted [a] defendant." People v. Tosca, 98 N.Y.2d 660, 661, 746 N.Y.S.2d 276 (2002); see also People v. Gregory, 78 A.D.3d 1246, 1246-47, 910 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2010). Here, the trial judge admitted the detective's testimony over petitioner's hearsay objection in order to explain how the detective came to identify petitioner as a suspect. I see nothing erroneous about this ruling under New York law.2
Even if I were to conclude that the trial judge erroneously admitted the hearsay evidence, petitioner still would not be entitled to habeas relief because it is clear that admission of the challenged testimony did not deprive him of a fundamentally fair trial. First, there was no dispute that petitioner was in the livery cab with Dominique on the date in question. Counsel admitted petitioner's presence during his opening statement.3 And petitioner gave a statement to the detective in which he admitted being in the cab with Dominique, getting into an argument with her, and stealing the driver's cell phone. This statement was admitted into evidence.
Second, there was strong evidence, apart from the challenged hearsay, showing that petitioner committed the robbery. In addition to the petitioner's own statement, the prosecution offered the testimony of the cab driver, who described how he came to be robbed. Although he could not identify petitioner as the perpetrator at trial, he did identify petitioner as the man who robbed him at a line-up conducted a little over two months after the incident.4 Specifically, the driver testified that he viewed a line-up and identified "number one" as the man who robbed him. Thereafter, the detective testified that the driver viewed a line-up and "instantaneously" pickednumber one as the man who robbed him. The detective also testified that petitioner was number one.
In addition, an employee from Sprint/Nextel testified about phone calls that were made from the driver's phone immediately after petitioner stole it. Through this witness, the prosecution introduced the driver's cell phone records for April 2006. The driver picked up petitioner and Dominique a little after 1:00 a.m. on April 8, 2006. The Sprint/Nextel witness testified about a series of outgoing phone calls that were made from the driver's phone on April 8, starting at 12:59 a.m. and ending at 5:26 p.m. (when the driver had his cell phone cut off). With the exception of two calls made to the driver's voicemail number, the driver did not call any of the outgoing numbers during April 2006 except for during that period on April 8. Moreover, 11 of those calls were made to Dominique's cell phone. And a computer analyst for the Department of Corrections testified about phone calls petitioner made from his personal identification number while he was housed at Rikers Island (from June to August 2006). According to the analyst, while at Rikers Island, petitioner's personal identification number was used to make phone calls to four of the numbers that were called on April 8.5
In other words, there was strong evidence showing that (1) petitioner stole the driver's cell phone on the morning of April 8; (2) numerous phone calls were made on that cell phone from the time when petitioner stole it until the time that the driver had the phone cut off; (3) the driver did not call any of those numbers (except for the two calls to the voicemail) at any other time during the month of April 2006; (4)...
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