Chandler v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 01 January 1886
• Parties: CHANDLER and another v. THOMPSON and another.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

30 F. 38

CHANDLER and another v. THOMPSON and another.

United States Circuit Court, W.D. North Carolina.

November Term, 1886

Davidson & Martin and J. H. Merrimon, for defendants.

Shuford & Jones, for plaintiffs.

DICK J.

This case was tried before me at Asheville at the regular term of the court, in May, 1886, and judgment was rendered on a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. A motion was made for a new trial at said term, and was continued for argument and the preparation of briefs by counsel. Exceptions to the rulings of the court were taken by the counsel of the defendants during the trial, but were not formally reduced to writing, and presented in the court for signing. As the amount in controversy in this action is not sufficient to entitle the defendants to a writ of error to the supreme court, to review the actions and rulings of this court, a regular bill of exceptions was unnecessary and is not strictly essential, on a motion for a new trial as the recollections of the court may be aided by affidavits and the briefs of counsel. Written and signed exceptions would be of service on this motion, as the counsel of the parties do not, in some respects, concur in their recollections of the proceedings, and the court does not clearly and distinctly remember all the details of the trial. I have a strong impression as to the decided preponderance of the testimony in favor of the plaintiffs, and the justness of the verdict.

As the counsel of defendants, in their arguments and elaborate brief, have manifested such earnest confidence in the correctness of their legal propositions, I have considered their motion with some degree of care, upon their statement of exceptions taken on the trial. I have not deemed it necessary to refer to the statements of the recollection of the counsel of the plaintiffs, and decide questions of variance in the matters in dispute.

Before referring specially to the arguments and the authorities cited by the counsel of the parties, I will state some general principles of law involved in the controversy, as announced by text writers and sustained by decided cases. Where a witness is offered as an expert, for the purpose of giving information and opinions to the jury to aid them in their determination of questions of fact, the court, by means of a preliminary examination, must first determine, as a question of fact, the qualifications of the witness as an expert. The proper test for the admissibility of such testimony is whether the witness offered as an expert has any peculiar knowledge or experience, not common to mankind which renders his opinions founded on such knowledge or experience any aid to the court or jury in correctly determining the questions at issue. When such witness is adjudged to be an expert, he may be allowed to testify on questions of science or skill in any art or trade in which he is instructed by study or experience. Every business or employment requiring peculiar knowledge or experience, and which has a particular class of persons devoted to its pursuit, is an art or trade; and any person who, by study or experience, has acquired this peculiar knowledge and practical skill, may be allowed to give in evidence his opinions upon such matters of technical knowledge and skill, within the limits of his business, to enlighten the minds of a jury where they have to determine such matters in a pending trial. An expert cannot be properly allowed to express an opinion, on the whole evidence, as to the general merits of a case, or as to the amount of damages that ought to be assessed in a trial, as these are questions exclusively for a jury to determine.

When an expert may properly express an opinion, he does not decide the questions in issue; he only aids the jury in arriving at correct conclusions, and they must determine the questions of fact about which the opinion of the expert was given. The credibility of such testimony may be tested by the rules of evidence applicable to other witnesses, and its value greatly depends upon the knowledge, experience, opportunity, and capacity of the witness, and the soundness of the reasons upon which his opinions are founded. The only purpose and effect of such testimony is to enlighten the minds of a jury upon subjects upon which they have acquired no theoretical or practical knowledge. A witness who has acquired knowledge in a particular art by long experience, can generally give a more intelligent, intelligible, and satisfactory opinion about his vocation than can be given by scientific experts upon questions of science, upon which opinions are often formed by means of theories, conjectures, and abstract reasonings.

Upon subjects of general knowledge, and upon matters pertaining to the daily occurrences and the usual business avocations of ordinary life, a jury is presumed to be familiar, and to need no aid from the opinions of a witness in making necessary and natural inferences and deductions from facts ascertained by them from the evidence offered. When such subjects and matters are to be investigated upon a trial, the rules of evidence as to expert witnesses are not applicable. But in a case like the one now before us, where they are required to consider the construction, quality, capacity, and proper operation of complicated machinery, they must be informed in some way upon the subject, as but few jurors are qualified to form correct conclusions as to an art with which they are not familiar. The reasonable and legal way of obtaining such necessary information is the hearing of the opinions of witnesses who, by the usual methods of acquiring such knowledge and skill, have made themselves capable of forming and expressing intelligent and rational views upon such subjects.

In this case the jury on the trial might have been able to decide that the saw-mill would not exert the full capacity of its power, and do good work, from the facts stated by the witnesses that the saw was warped, and the frame of the machinery was out of plumb, and was operated by persons who had little knowledge and skill in such business; but they would not have been able to determine from such facts the questions arising out of the express warranty as to the exact horse-power of the engine furnished by the plaintiffs, in alleged compliance with the terms of their engagement, and the reasonable and proper management covenanted by the defendants; and these were some of the material questions in issue to be determined by the jury.

A steam saw-mill is certainly a kind of machinery that requires peculiar knowledge and skill in its erection and operation, in order to exert and exercise the full capacity of its power. I think that I acted right on the trial of this case in allowing an experienced machinist, who had acquired information by actual observation and careful examination, to give his opinion in evidence to enlighten the minds of the jury as to the horse-power of the engine, and whether the saw-mill machinery was in such working order as to exert the full force of its power; and also upon the question as to what would be the effects and consequences that would result from operating the machinery when not properly adjusted, and unskillfully managed.

I will now consider more particularly the exceptions of the defendant, as stated in the brief of their counsel. First exception: 'The controverted issue was whether the failure of the machinery to perform the work which it was expected by the defendants, and represented by the plaintiffs, to perform, was attributable to the fact that it was not of the requisite capacity, (a 13 horse-power engine,) or defective construction, as insisted by the defendants; or to want of skill and care in its management, as insisted by the plaintiffs. With a view to show that the failure of the machinery was due to the carelessness or want of skill on the part of the defendants, the plaintiffs introduced one Boyd, who had put down the mill as their agent, and afterwards had been employed by the defendants to examine and reset it; and were permitted, against defendants' objection, to put the question 'whether the defective work and condition of the mill was owing to defective construction, or want of skill or management on the part of defendants.' The witness answered 'that, in his opinion, it was owing to want of proper care and skill in the management.' The defendants excepted.'

The court, upon preliminary examination, had adjudged the witness Boyd to be an expert machinist. He had been employed in such art and trade, both by plaintiffs and defendants, and had acquired full knowledge as to the quality of the machinery, and its horse-power capacity. He had adjusted and arranged the mill, and it did good work. The mill was subsequently erected at another place, and was put out of proper order by the unskillful arrangement and management of incompetent machinists, sawyers, and workmen. He also further testified that, by actual measurement, he was satisfied that the engine was of 13 horse-power capacity. The plaintiffs had sold the engine as of 13 horse-power, and had, in a printed express warranty, stipulated 'that the machinery above described shall be well and properly manufactured, of good material, and that, with proper management, it will perform well;' and the defendants, under their hands and seals, had accepted this warranty as a part of the contract, and had also covenanted 'to use the said machinery with reasonable care.'

Thus it appears that proper management was an express stipulation in the mutual contracts of the parties, and was one of the issues to be decided by the jury, who were incapable of determining this question of mechanical skill, and were enlightened, properly, by the opinion of an intelligent...