Chandler v. United States, CR No. 06-107-01-M
| Decision Date | 06 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | CR No. 06-107-01-M |
| Parties | ISAAC NATHANIEL CHANDLER, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
AMENDED DECISION AND ORDER
Before the Court are three motions filed by Isaac Nathaniel Chandler. They are: a motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 47), two motions to add supplemental claims (ECF Nos. 61, 68), and a motion for discovery (ECF No. 60). For the reasons that follow, these motions are denied.
On May 4, 2006, Providence police detectives executed a search warrant for Mr. Chandler and his two residences in Providence. On his person, the officers found $205 in cash, jewelry and 6.7 grams of crack cocaine. They found an additional 34.13 grams of crack cocaine, cutting and packaging materials, along with a loaded .45 caliber pistol, home theater equipment and a safe containing $2,500 in cash at his residences. Officers also seized a 1994 Lexus vehicle. After being advised of his rights, Mr. Chandler admitted that the crack cocaine and the firearm belonged to him and that he sold cocaine and kept the firearm for protection.
In October 2006, Mr. Chandler was charged in a three-count Federal indictment with: (1) possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a public school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B) and 860; (2) possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B); and (3) being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). During all pertinent proceedings pertaining to his plea and sentencing, Mr. Chandler was represented by court-appointed counsel.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Chandler pled guilty to all three counts.2 In that agreement Mr. Chandler agreed, inter alia, (1) that he possessed 40.91 grams of cocaine base in the form of crack cocaine, (2) that the items named in the indictment were subject to forfeiture "as proceeds of illegal conduct, property facilitating illegal conduct, property involved in illegal conduct... and substitute assets for property otherwise subject to forfeiture," and (3) that a two-level enhancement for possession of a firearm would apply to his sentence. Plea Agreement at ¶¶ 1, 4, Jan. 5, 2007. Mr. Chandler also agreed to waive his right to file a direct appeal if the sentence imposed was within "the guideline range determined by the Court or lower." Id. at ¶ 12.
The Government, for its part, agreed to recommend "a term of imprisonment at the lowest point of the guideline range for the offense level determined by the Court under the United States Sentencing Guidelines or 97 months imprisonment, whichever term was greater. Id. at ¶ 2.a. (emphasis added.) The Government also agreed (1) not to file an information under 21 U.S.C. § 851, (2) not to prosecute Mr. Chandler under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for possession of afirearm in furtherance of drug trafficking; and (3) to recommend a 2-3 level reduction in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility. Id. at ¶¶ 2.b; 2.C.; 2.e.; 2.f.
At his change of plea hearing, Mr. Chandler acknowledged that he understood the terms of the plea agreement, including the terms governing the Government's recommendation and the restrictions thereon. See Tr. of Change of Plea Hr'g 10, Jan. 5, 2007. The Court informed Mr. Chandler that it was not bound by the recommendations in the plea agreement, that it would determine the applicable sentencing guideline range, and Mr. Chandler indicated his understanding. Id. at 11-12.
The United States Probation Office prepared a Presentence Report (PSR), calculating a guideline range of 210 to 262 months based on a total offense level of 32 and a Criminal History Category VI. In accordance with the plea agreement, the Government did not file a sentencing enhancement information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, which would have increased the mandatory minimum for Mr. Chandler's drug offenses to ten years with a maximum of life, nor did the Government charge Mr. Chandler with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which would have added a mandatory five-year term of imprisonment consecutive to the sentence imposed.
At sentencing, the Government's attorney, in accordance with the plea agreement, recommended a prison sentence of 210 months, the low end of the guideline range calculated by the PSR. Tr. of Sentencing 28, Mar. 23, 2007. Defense counsel argued for both a downward departure and a variant sentence. Upon hearing argument, the Court granted a "horizontal" departure and lowered Mr. Chandler's Criminal History Category from VI to V, which yielded a guideline range of 188 - 235 months.3 After considering the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),the Court imposed concurrent sentences of 188 months imprisonment as to Counts I and II and 120 months imprisonment as to Count III. Id. at 40-41.
Mr. Chandler appealed, represented by new counsel. On July 18, 2008, the First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal, finding that Mr. Chandler's arguments were barred by the waiver-of-appeal provision in his plea agreement and that his ineffective assistance claims were premature. See United States v. Chandler, 534 F.3d 45, 49-51 (1st Cir. 2008).
Mr. Chandler then filed the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate. In his motion he claims: (1) that the Government breached its obligations in the plea agreement, (2) that he was ineffectively assisted by his counsel at sentencing, and (3) that he was ineffectively assisted by his counsel on appeal. Mr. Chandler subsequently filed two separate pleadings, seeking to supplemental his motion to vacate. The first was filed on July 2, 2010 and claims that two of the detectives who arrested him falsified information in order to obtain the warrants used to search his residences, and the second, filed on October 1, 2010, asserts that the fact that state court warrants were used as the basis of Mr. Chandler's federal prosecution violated federal procedure and his due process rights. Additionally, Mr. Chandler filed a motion for discovery in connection with his first supplemental pleading. These three motions before the Court are ready for decision.4
The grounds justifying relief under § 2255 are limited.5 A court may grant such relief only if it finds a lack of jurisdiction, constitutional error, or a fundamental error of law. See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184-185 (1979) () (internal quotations omitted).
Moreover, a motion under § 2255 is not a substitute for a direct appeal. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,165 (1982). A movant is procedurally precluded from obtaining § 2255 review of claims not raised on direct appeal absent a showing of both "cause" for the default and "actual prejudice" — or, alternatively, that he is "actually innocent" of the offense for which he was convicted. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998); see also Brache v. United States, 165 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 1999). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, are not subject to this procedural hurdle as the failure to bring those claims "on direct appeal is not subject to the cause and prejudice standard." Knight v. United States, 37 F.3d 769, 774 (1st Cir. 1994).
As a threshold matter, the Government argues that Mr. Chandler's original § 2255 motion was untimely because the motion was docketed after the filing deadline. See U.S. Br. 4-5, ECF No. 49. On October 13, 2009, just days before the expiration of the one-year limitations period, Mr. Chandler mailed his initial § 2255 motion to the "United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, 50 Kennedy Plaza, Providence, Rhode Island 02903," which is the street address of the United States Attorney's Office. The motion was received on October 19, 2009.On January 10, 2010, Mr. Chandler mailed a letter to the U.S. District Court stating that the motion was mailed to the incorrect address because he did not have access to an updated court address. The Court docketed Mr. Chandler's motion to vacate on January 27, 2010, over three months after the deadline.
The Government asserts that the motion should be considered as filed on January 27, 2010 and that Mr. Chandler should not receive the benefit of the so-called prisoner mailbox rule. Morales-Rivera v. United States, 184 F.3d 109,109 (1st Cir. 1999). Mr. Chandler counters that the prisoner mailbox rule should apply, excusing his mailing error, because he is a pro se litigant inexperienced in these formalities who was assisted in addressing the envelope by a law clerk at his prison facility. See Pet'r's Reply to Government's Resp. to Mot. to Vacate 3-7, ECF No. 51.6 He further contends that even if he was negligent in addressing the envelope, the prosecutor's office was equally negligent for receiving and signing for mail intended for this Court rather than promptly returning the mailing to Mr. Chandler, permitting him an opportunity to timely re-file. Id.
Generally, a number of courts considering whether pro se inmate papers mailed to an incorrect address may invoke the mailbox rule have given pro se prisoners the benefit of the doubt. See e.g. Mayne v. Hall, 122 F.Supp.2d 86 (D. Mass. 2000) (); Hollins v. United States, 2005 WL 1827914 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 2, 2005) (). However, courts have also noted that strict compliance and...
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