Chandler v. Volunteers of Am., Se., Inc.

Decision Date27 August 2015
Docket NumberCivil Action Number 3:12–cv–3701–AKK
Parties April D. Chandler, Plaintiff, v. Volunteers of America, Southeast, Inc., et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

Michael Levoy Weathers, Michael L. Weathers, Attorney at Law, Florence, AL, for Plaintiff.

Kimberly K. Rucker, Richard R. Raleigh, Jr., Wilmer & Lee PA, Huntsville, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ABDUL K. KALLON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff April D. Chandler, an African–American, claims that her former employers, Volunteers of America, North Alabama, Inc. ("VOANA") and Volunteers of America, Southeast, Inc. ("VOASE") (collectively "Defendants") subjected her to a racially hostile work environment and race discrimination, and retaliated against her based on her complaints of discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). Doc. 28. Defendants now move for summary judgment. Doc. 121. For the reasons below, the court will grant summary judgment as to all claims against VOANA, and as to the hostile work environment and race discrimination claims against VOASE (Counts I, II, III, IV and V). The court will deny summary judgment as to the Section 1981 and Title VII retaliation claims against VOASE (Count VI).1

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." To support a summary judgment motion, the parties must cite to "particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Moreover, " Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id . at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who is required to "go beyond the pleadings" to establish that there is a "genuine issue for trial." Id . at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The court must construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) ; see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor). However, "mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion." Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (citing Bald Mountain Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 863 F.2d 1560, 1563 (11th Cir.1989) ). Furthermore, "[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ).

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2005, Chandler began working as a House Manager with VOANA, a Christian human-services organization that provided home care for developmentally challenged individuals around Florence, Alabama until it ceased operating on December 31, 2010. Docs. 123–5 at 2; 123–4 at 2. As VOANA ceased its operations, it gave its employees the option of accepting employment with VOASE, which provides the same services as VOANA, and which was scheduled to take over VOANA's operations in Florence. Doc. 123–4 at 3. Chandler accepted employment with VOASE and began working there as a House Manager on January 1, 2011. Id . at 4. A few months later, on May 4, 2011, VOASE discharged Chandler for insubordination, intimidating other employees, and "misrepresenting material facts to employees." Id . at 32.

A. Allegations while Chandler worked at VOANA

This action is Chandler's second lawsuit for alleged unlawful employment practices she experienced at VOANA. On November 2, 2010, Chandler initiated Chandler v. Volunteers of Am., N. Alabama, Inc., 598 Fed.Appx. 655, 664 (11th Cir.2015) (hereinafter Chandler I ) and brought claims of race discrimination, harassment, and retaliation based on the actions of Chandler's direct supervisors (Teresa Stephenson and Nicole Jones). In the present action, Chandler again brings claims against VOANA based upon the actions of Stephenson and Jones. Doc. 28. The court ruled on Defendants' motion to dismiss in this case on May 19, 2014. Doc. 53. Based on res judicata principles and the applicable time limitations for challenging allegedly unlawful employment actions, the court limited Chandler's hostile work environment claims (under both Section 1981 and Title VII) and her Section 1981 discrimination and retaliation claims to allegedly unlawful actions occurring after November 2, 2010 (i.e., after Chandler initiated the Chandler I litigation), and her Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims to actions occurring after January 1, 2011 (i.e., after Chandler joined VOASE).2 Doc. 53 at 2.

Relevant to the Section 1981 discrimination and retaliation claims for employment actions at VOANA from November 2, 2010 until December 31, 2010, counsel for Defendants asked Chandler at her deposition whether there is "any type of discipline or adverse employment action that [she] contends Ms. Jones or [VOANA] imposed on [her] that [she] didn't raise in [Chandler I ]," and Chandler responded, "No." Doc. 123–1 at 14. Along the same lines, while Chandler's current Section 1981 and Title VII hostile work environment claims for employment actions at VOANA are based in part on the allegation that "the racially hostile work environment ... continued on from November 2, 2010 through December 31, 2010" at VOANA, see doc. 140–9 at 28, Chandler explained during her deposition that the person who created a hostile work environment for her "from the time period of August [3], 2005 up until January 1, 2011, [was] ... Teresa Stephenson," doc. 123–1 at 45. Significantly, it is undisputed that Teresa Stephenson resigned from VOANA in March 2010 and was not present to create any hostile work environment for Chandler during the relevant time period (i.e., after November 2, 2010). Doc. 140–1 at 1.

Apparently, however, Jones allegedly continued to create a hostile work environment for Chandler after Stephenson resigned, and Jones's behavior "trickled on beyond [Chandler's] first case," (i.e, Chandler I ). Doc. 123–1 at 6; see doc. 140–9 at 2–3. Specifically, Chandler added in her post-deposition declaration—which she submitted in opposing the motion for summary judgment—that Jones "would unload verbal and visual racial abuse against [Chandler] constantly and on almost a daily, if not daily, basis" while Chandler worked at VOANA and after Stephenson resigned. Doc. 140–9 at 3. In particular, Chandler explains that although Jones never used any racial slurs, doc. 123–1 at 8, Jones purportedly talked down to Chandler and used "code words like ‘back-talking,’ ‘boss,’ and ‘attitude’ to refer to black employees," doc. 140–9 at 2. Chandler adds that she "knew that [Jones] meant ‘nigger’ when she used those words," and "Jones's tone of voice and the facial expressions she made when talking to black employees was a tone of and were expressions of disgust." Id . at 3. Jones also allegedly "kept hand sanitizer on hand ... so [that] if she came in contact with any of the [African–American] clients or employees, she used her hand sanitizer." Doc. 123–1 at 8. Chandler explains that Jones's alleged harassment was many times "so bad [that Chandler] would just go somewhere and cry." Doc. 140–9 at 3. Chandler claims that she complained about these incidences to the Human Resources department (including Kimberly O'Neal) "on numerous occasions from the time [Chandler] was employed [at VOANA] up until [Chandler] left [VOASE] ... in 2011." Doc. 123–1 at 4–5. While O'Neal denies receiving any complaints from Chandler from November 2, 2010 until January 1, 2011, doc. 123–5 at 2, Chandler asserts that she indeed complained to O'Neal during this time period, doc. 140–9 at 9.

B. Allegations while Chandler worked at VOASE

Chandler believes that Jones and Susan Manno (Chandler's supervisors at VOASE), Brenda Calvert (Regional Services Director for VOASE's Florence office), and Deanna Ferguson (VOASE's Vice President of Services for Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi) discriminated, harassed, and retaliated against her. Doc. 140–9 at 21. Allegedly, Jones, Manno, and Ferguson discharged Chandler in retaliation for her complaints of unlawful employment practices. See id . at 25–26. As grounds for Chandler's termination, Manno and Ferguson cited to incidences of insubordination, intimidation of coworkers, and misrepresentation of material facts. Doc. 123–4 at 32. The court will begin by recounting Chandler and Jones's interactions at VOASE since one of their verbal altercations—at the April 15, 2011 "CORE" team meeting—was seemingly the starting point for the events that led to Chandler's discharge.

1. Jones's alleged harassment and the April 15, 2011 CORE team meeting

Once Chandler joined VOASE...

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